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Preface
In the wake of the covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing global recession, the role of the state
in the economy and its instruments for reform have recently received increased attention.
The various fiscal and industrial measures governments around the globe are implementing
to tackle the recession have triggered a debate about their appropriateness. For instance,
a popular intervention have been reductions to the value-added tax in order to revive
consumption. However, it is uncertain how much of the decrease will actually be passed
on to consumers and whether the foregone tax revenue could have not been spent more
efficiently and effectively (Fuest; 2020). Moreover, there is a controversy about the state
taking a stake in companies, such as in the airline or the pharmaceutical industry. Should
this, in turn, entail that the government takes an active role in management decisions, and
what is the impact on competition?
Despite these current debates and controversies, the role of the state and the influence
of its policies have long been an issue in the economic literature. Going back to the Great
Depression, John Maynard Keynes’ ideas about state intervention became the dominating
paradigm at the time (Keynes; 1936). Despite subsequent criticism and refinements, his
theory still constitutes some of the principles of modern fiscal and industrial policy and
established the notion that the state does matter to the economy. Building on this, the
economic literature has found ways to critically evaluate the performance of state inter-
ventions. For instance, by estimating who actually carries the economic burden of taxes
(Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch; 2018; Fuest, Dolls, Krolage and Neumeier; 2019; Löffler and
Siegloch; 2018; Carbonnier; 2007) or the effect of other measures, such as rent controls
(Diamond et al.; 2019), it is possible to assess whether policies fulfill their intended goals.
Equally important, a strand of literature has focused on the determinants of fiscal and
industrial policies, such as political and institutional arrangements (Alesina and Tabellini;
1990; Persson and Svensson; 1989; Roubini and Sachs; 1989).
This dissertation contributes to that research in different dimensions. In Chapters 1 and
2 the institutional setting in Germany is exploited to analyze both the determinants and
the effects of fiscal policies. In Chapter 3 the effects of a fiscal policy shift on the European
Union are evaluated in a theoretical model. Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on industrial policy
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and whether the Chinese government influences the cross-border mergers and acquisition
strategies of Chinese companies. This thesis therefore aims for a better understanding
of the determinants and effects of fiscal and industrial policies in a number of different
contexts. To achieve this goal, I apply a variety of econometric techniques, including an
event study design, a differences-in-differences estimation, and an instrumental variables
approach. Moreover, I complement the empirical models with a theoretical one in Chapter
3. In the following, the four chapters are summarized.
In Chapter 1 I evaluate the incidence of the value-added tax. The value-added tax
(VAT) is one of the most important tax revenue sources in many countries. However, it
is sometimes considered unfair as it ultimately hits consumption, and poorer households
spend a greater share of their income on consumption. But this depends on whether, and
to what degree, the value-added tax is actually passed on to consumers. Exploiting an
exogenous value-added tax reform in Germany, I use an event study and a differences-
in-differences approach to investigate the pass-through to consumers for a wide range of
commodities. On average, I find a modestly positive but statistically insignificant effect
on prices. However, there are differences in tax incidence between commodity groups,
ranging from negative price effects to an over-shifting of the tax burden. Simply relying
on the average incidence would therefore be misleading. Policy makers should consider
this when reforming the VAT rate. Particularly as I show that the consumption of certain
commodities seems to differ between income groups in the population, VAT reforms could
have unintended distributional effects. Moreover, I observe anticipatory price effects well in
advance of the actual implementation of the value-added tax reform. A possible explanation
for the low average effect in 2007 could be a simultaneous reduction in social security
contributions in Germany. I explore this possibility by comparing the price effects in
2007 with those of a VAT reform in 1998 in Germany, which was not accompanied by a
reduction in social security contributions. I indeed find that the magnitude of price effects
is noticeably higher in 1998, suggesting that the reduction in social security contributions
in 2007 absorbed some effect of the VAT increase. However, for both VAT reforms the
price increase is on average statistically insignificant and, therefore, I cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no price effect. While one needs to be careful not to interpret this
as proof for no price effect, this result at least provides no clear evidence that modest
VAT increases are necessarily passed through to consumers and thereby casts doubt on
the hypothesis that the VAT is incontrovertibly a regressive tax on consumption. In turn,
if the VAT should indeed not be shifted to consumers, it would be carried by producers,
ultimately hitting either wages or profits. If the former applies, the VAT would after all
cause distortions on the labor-market, which would have important policy implications.
Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Lea Immel and Florian Neumeier. We turn to
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the factors that determine fiscal policy. Economic theory predicts that income inequality
is such a factor impacting the provision of public services and redistributive policies. But
the nature of the relationship between fiscal policy and income inequality is controversial,
as there are both hypotheses of a positive and a negative relationship. We therefore exploit
the specific institutional setting in Germany, which grants local authorities a high degree
of fiscal autonomy, to identify the causal effect of income inequality on local fiscal policy
in German city districts. We concentrate on inequality driven by the lower bound of the
income distribution, that is, economic deprivation, as this scenario aggravates the impor-
tance of redistributive policies. Specifically, we study the effect of three different measures
of economic deprivation on fiscal policy, namely the poverty gap, the poverty rate, and the
median gap. Fiscal variables include local tax rates as well as spending on local public
services. Using a Bartik-style instrumental variables approach, which predicts changes in
regional economic deprivation through national income trends, allows us to overcome con-
founding effects like mobility and spatial segregation. Our results are ambiguous regarding
the distributional consequences of economic deprivation. We find that increasing economic
deprivation causes local policy makers to increase the local business tax rate, while we do
not find significant effects on the local property tax. Given that the local business tax is
likely to be perceived as a progressive tax, whereas the perception of the property tax is
more ambivalent, this seems like an attempt to make the tax system more redistributive
as economic deprivation increases. However, aggregate spending on local public services is
negatively affected by economic deprivation. In particular, this effect is driven by a spend-
ing cut on welfare, schooling, and sport facilities. As these public services are likely to be
of most benefit to lower income groups, our results suggest a negative relationship between
economic deprivation and redistributive fiscal policies on the expenditure side. We discuss
possible explanations for this ambivalence as well as potential transmission channels.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on fiscal policy in Germany, whether at the national or at the
local level. Chapter 3, which is joint work with Clemens Fuest, extends the analytical
framework to the European Union. It is motivated by the fact that once the United
Kingdom (UK) leaves the European Union (EU) entirely, it is theoretically no longer
subject to EU state aid regulations, which prohibit member states from offering preferential
tax treatment to certain companies or sectors. Thus, the UK could target its corporate
tax policy to specific firms or sectors more aggressively. This may have consequences
for corporate tax competition throughout Europe. To investigate the implications of a
policy shift towards tax discrimination, we develop a model of tax competition with three
countries that initially form a union where countries refrain from using different tax rates
in different sectors of the economy. Our analysis of the impact of one country leaving the
union leads to three key results. First, we show that the introduction of discriminatory
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taxation in one country increases tax policy heterogeneity within the remaining union,
regarding tax rates as well as revenue. Second, if the two countries remaining in the union
harmonize their tax rates, the introduction of tax discrimination in the third country
redistributes tax revenue between the countries remaining in the union. The country with
lower taxes before harmonization loses while the high tax country benefits. Third and most
importantly, the incentives for tax harmonization among the countries remaining in the
union decline as the third country introduces discriminatory taxation. We discuss these
results in the context of the debate on the tax policy implications of Brexit. This paper is
published in the National Tax Journal (Fuest and Sultan; 2019).
In Chapter 4 the focus shifts from fiscal to industrial policy. It is joint work with
Clemens Fuest, Felix Hugger, and Jing Xing. We analyze whether the cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions strategies of Chinese companies differ from those of other international
investors. The underlying motivation is the growing unease of Chinese investment, partic-
ularly in Europe and the US, which roots in the suspicion that the Chinese government
takes an active role in shaping these strategies. Critics argue that Chinese investors outbid
competitors with help from their government, that the acquisitions lead to undesirable
technology transfer, or that they may have negative consequences for the employees of the
target firm. This debate, however, is mostly based on speculations and anecdotes. We
therefore use a large deal-level dataset on cross-border acquisitions to investigate whether
Chinese foreign acquisitions differ from cross-border investment coming from other coun-
tries. We find that relative to non-Chinese investors, Chinese acquirers indeed appear to be
different in some dimensions. They focus on targets with lower profitability, more assets,
higher levels of debt, and more patents. In contrast, we do not find that target countries’
institutional qualities, such as political stability and the rule of law, play a different role
in determining Chinese cross-border acquisitions than they do for non-Chinese investors.
Moreover, Chinese companies do not seem to pay more for targets with given character-
istics, questioning the view that they are subsidized to outbid other investors. Policy
initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025 influence state-owned
but not private Chinese investors, suggesting that geopolitical or technology interests play
a role. Finally, a key question is whether Chinese acquisitions have a different impact on
the development of target firms, including their employees. In the years after the takeover,
target companies acquired by Chinese investors exhibit lower growth in capital produc-
tivity but a higher growth of employee compensation. This paper is available as EconPol
Working Paper (Fuest, Hugger, Sultan and Xing; 2019).
The four chapters in this thesis are self contained, and each is followed by appendices
with additional material. A consolidated bibliography is presented at the end of the thesis.
Chapter 1




The value-added tax is one of the most important tax revenue sources in many countries.
For instance, it accounts for roughly 30% of overall tax revenue in Germany. As indirect
tax it has the advantage of being hard to avoid, which makes it an efficient tax instrument
in terms of revenue collection (Keen and Lockwood; 2010). Another advantage is that, in
contrast to the income tax, it supposedly does not distort labor-market decisions. Yet, the
value-added tax (VAT) is sometimes considered unfair, as it ultimately hits consumption,
and less wealthy households spend a greater share of their income on consumption.1 Also
in that vein, a number of countries have recently announced or implemented cuts to the
VAT rate in order to stimulate consumption during the covid-19 pandemic.2 But all
of this hinges on the assumption that the VAT is fully passed through to the consumer.
However, this assumption is hardly so straightforward. Depending on, for instance, demand
elasticities and industry competition, theory predicts that the burden of the VAT might be
shared with the producer (Stern; 1987; Besley; 1989; Weyl and Fabinger; 2013). How the
1Keen (2007) provides as overview of recent criticism and threats to the VAT.
2For instance, the German government has implemented a temporary decrease to the standard VAT
rate by 3 percentage points and by 2 percentage points to the reduced VAT rate. Moreover, restaurants
are temporarily subject to the reduced rate instead of the standard rate. Similarly, the UK has announced
a VAT decrease for hospitality, hotel accommodation, and admissions to certain attractions.
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tax burden is actually distributed has important policy implications as the progressivity
of the tax system is, in part, determined by this question3 and also its actual impact on
the labor-market. This is where this paper aims to make a contribution by exploiting a
VAT reform in Germany in 2007. Using detailed price data, I employ an event study and
differences-in-differences (DiD) approach to investigate the incidence of the VAT for a wide
range of commodity groups. French prices for the same product groups serve as control
group. Thereby, I avoid potential general equilibrium effects that could arise with using
goods in the same country, not affected by the reform, as control group instead (Benedek
et al.; 2019).4
I find that on average the 2007 VAT reform in Germany had a modestly positive but
statistically insignificant effect on prices. Therefore, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the
increase in the VAT has not been passed on to consumers. However, there are differences
between individual commodity groups, ranging from negative price effects to an over-
shifting of the tax burden. Moreover, I observe anticipatory price effects well in advance of
the actual implementation of the reform. Possible explanations for the rather low average
effects are discussed. In particular, I focus on a simultaneous reduction in social security
contributions in Germany. Employers could have used this reduction in non-wage labor
costs to lower prices, particularly in labor-intensive sectors. I explore this possibility by
comparing the price effects in 2007 to a VAT reform in 1998, which was not accompanied by
a reduction in social security contributions. I indeed find that the magnitude of price effects
is noticeably higher in 1998, suggesting that the reduction in social security contributions
absorbed some effect of the VAT increase in 2007. However, even in 1998, the price increase
is on average statistically insignificant. While this should not be interpreted as proof for
no price effect, these results at least provide no clear evidence that modest increase in the
VAT are necessarily passed on to consumers. Therefore they question the hypothesis that
the VAT is incontrovertibly a regressive tax on consumption. This means that the VAT
could also be carried by producers, ultimately hitting either wages or profits. If the former
applies, the VAT would after all cause distortions on the labor-market, which would have
important policy implications.
I contribute to the literature in several ways. So far a sizeable fraction of the literature
on the VAT incidence has concentrated on relatively large reforms that only applied to
very particular sectors. For instance, Kosonen (2015) and Benzarti et al. (2020) both
study a VAT reform to the Finnish hairdressing sector, where the VAT was decreased from
22% to 8% in 2007 and subsequently increased to its former level again in 2012. Kosonen
(2015) studies only the VAT reduction and shows that hairdressers adjusted prices by half
3Saez and Zucman (2019) find that the consumption taxes make the US tax system overall regressive.
4Note that there was no change to the VAT rates in France during the considered period.
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of what full pass-through would imply. Consequently, hairdressers were able to increase
their profits significantly. Benzarti et al. (2020) focus on the asymmetric price reaction
to the decrease compared to the increase in the VAT rate. In particular, they find that
prices react twice as much to the increase than to the decrease. Similarly, Benzarti and
Carloni (2019) exploit a decrease in the VAT on French sit-down restaurants from 19.6%
to 5.5% in 2009 to study the impact on workers, firm owners, consumers, and suppliers.
They find that firm owners profited the most from the tax cut as there is a large increase in
their profits, while consumers benefited least as prices only decreased slightly.5 Carbonnier
(2007) studies two large VAT reforms in France that took place in 1987 for car sales and in
1999 for housing repair services. While taxes are under-shifted on prices in both markets,
the degree of under-shifting is significantly lower in the housing repair service market
compared to the car market. Carbonnier (2007) argues that this might reflect that market
competition is higher in the housing repair service market. Gaarder (2018) exploits a
significant drop in the VAT on food in Norway from 24% to 12% to study both incidence
and distributional effects of the reform. Using a regression discontinuity model, Gaarder
(2018) finds that food prices fully adjust to the 12% decrease in the VAT. Moreover the
reform lowers inequality in consumer welfare, partly because the income share that poor
households spend on food items is higher and partly due to shifting expenditure patterns
after the price changes.6 However, as these studies focus on comparatively large VAT
rate reforms in very particular sectors, their external validity is limited. In contrast, the
German reform I study was modest and applied to a wide range of commodities.
Other studies such as Benedek et al. (2019) or the second part of Benzarti et al. (2020)
focus on a cross-country comparison by pooling all VAT reforms in the European Union over
approximately 20 years. Among other things, Benedek et al. (2019) study the difference in
the pass-through depending on whether the VAT reform concerned the standard rate or the
reduced rate. They find that prices are only fully adjusted to changes in the standard VAT
rate. Benzarti et al. (2020) confirm their previous finding of asymmetric price reactions to
VAT decreases compared to increases also for the pooled European dataset, while Benedek
et al. (2019) cannot confirm that. Buettner and Madzharova (2017) also conduct a cross-
country comparison of 22 European countries but focus on the pre-announcement effect of
VAT tax reforms on sales and prices of durable goods. Their results support the assumption
that the incidence of the VAT is fully borne by the consumer but also that most of the
5Falkenhall et al. (2018) also exploit a significant drop in the VAT on restaurants and catering services
from 25% to 12% in Sweden. Using a synthetic control approach, they show that the restaurant industry
performed better after the reform on a number of indicators, such as higher profit margins and employment,
but they do not study price effects.
6Mariscal and Werner (2018) also look at incidence and welfare effects of the VAT by exploiting two
reforms in Mexico, which only applied to certain cities.
8 Who Carries the Burden of the Value-Added Tax? Evidence from Germany
price adjustments already take place before the implementation on the reform. Moreover,
they find intertemporal shifts in consumption and purchases due to the tax reforms.
This paper also contributes to the literature studying the consequences of the 2007
VAT reform in Germany. Most related, Danninger and Carare (2008) study its effect on
core inflation in Germany by comparing VAT and reduced-VAT items. They find that core
inflation did not rise much after the implementation of the reform, as there had already
been anticipatory effects during 2006. However, the suitability of their comparison group
is highly questionable, as the group of reduced-VAT items mostly consists of food. Due
to the World food crisis of 2006 to 2008, food prices rose dramatically during that time
period. Also, Danninger and Carare (2008) do not provide any evidence that the common
trends assumption of their differences-in-differences approach is fulfilled.7 Buchheim and
Link (2017) use the VAT reform to study the effect of new information on expectations.
They compare German durable and non-durable goods retailers, arguing that the former
had more reliable information about future demand due to the reform. Buchheim and
Link (2017) find that durable goods retailers indeed become more forward-looking. Com-
paring German households during the VAT reform to those in other European countries,
D’Acunto et al. (2016) observe an increase in German households’ inflation expectations
and willingness to buy durable goods. I extend this literature by studying the incidence of
the 2007 VAT reform.
More generally this paper is related to the growing literature on tax incidence, such
as of the corporate tax (Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch; 2018), the real estate transfer tax
(Fuest, Dolls, Krolage and Neumeier; 2019), the property tax (Löffler and Siegloch; 2018),
or energy taxes (Stolper; 2017; Fuest, Schober and Woll; 2018). These studies reveal
that tax incidence does not follow straightforward assumptions and needs to be validated
empirically.
Finally, by also discussing the implications of a simultaneous decrease in non-wage labor
costs on commodity prices, this paper contributes to the literature on fiscal devaluations.
Fiscal devaluations describe tax reforms that intend to shift the burden of taxation from
income to consumption, with the aim of increasing competitiveness. Such reforms were
for instance frequently proposed during the Euro crisis to make the Southern European
countries more competitive.8 The literature studying fiscal devaluations has so far mostly
concentrated on the effects on trade (see, for instance, Holzner et al. (2018) or Ivens (2018)),
while I consider the possible effects on prices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the insti-
7See Section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of reduced-VAT items as suitable control group for the
2007 VAT reform in Germany.
8Fiscal devaluations were for instance implemented by Spain in 2010 and France in 2014.
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tutional setting of the VAT system in Germany and the 2007 reform. In Section 1.3, I
introduce and describe the datasets. The empirical model is presented in Section 1.4. The
main results on tax incidence are presented and discussed in Section 1.5. A number of
robustness tests are conducted in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 The 2007 VAT Reform in Germany
The current value-added tax system in Germany was introduced in 1968.9 It broadly
consists of a standard and a reduced rate.10 The reduced rate applies to basic needs of
everyday life such as most food products, cultural and educational goods and services, and
a range of medical products. The standard rate applies to most other commodities. Figure
1.1 shows the development of both rates from 1968 to 2019. The standard VAT rate was
set to 10% in January 1968. Over the course of the years, it increased successively by
1 percentage point in July 1968, January 1978, July 1979, July 1983, January 1993, and
April 1998 to reach 16%. But the biggest increase took place in January 2007, when it
increased by 3 percentage points from 16% to 19%. The reduced VAT rate was initially
set to equal half of the standard rate. Thus, in January 1968 it amounted to 5%. Until
1983, it increased together with the standard rate to reach 7%. However, it has not been
altered since then.
The 2007 VAT reform was already part of the coalition agreement between the Social
Democrats and the Conservatives, which was passed in mid-November 2005.11 The aim
was to raise tax revenue in order to consolidate the budget. Germany needed to cut its
debt, as it had violated the 3% deficit-to-GDP rule, part the EU Maastricht Treaty, since
2001. The EU Commission had already opened a deficit procedure. Germany therefore
needed to announce credible plans to cut its deficit in order to avoid potential fines. This
implies that the 2007 VAT reform in Germany can be considered as independent of future
economic conditions and as an exogenous policy shock. In May 2006, the German Federal
Parliament (Bundestag) agreed on the supplemental budget law, which included the VAT
reform. Another important part of the supplemental budget law was a decrease in the
unemployment insurance contributions by 2.3 percentage points to 4.2%. While the effect
of this on households’ disposable income is modest12 and any effect on prices through the
9The previous system did not include an input tax deduction.
10There are certain goods and services that are entirely exempt from the VAT, for example most medical
treatments. Moreover, for agricultural businesses there is a special VAT regime with rates of 10.7% and
5.5%.
11The coalition agreement also already included the exact increase in the VAT rate by 3 percentage
points.
12Considering that contributions to the pension and health insurance increased at the same time and also
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demand side should therefore be limited, there might be an effect on prices through the
supply side, as employers might use this reduction in non-wage labor costs in Germany to
lower prices. This might particularly be the case in labor-intensive sectors. I will discuss
this in more detail in Section 1.5.3. The VAT reform took its final legislative hurdle
when the German Federal Council (Bundesrat) approved the respective law in mid-June
2006. There had been some controversy on whether the Federal Council would approve the
law. Only a compromise regarding the federal contributions to public transport ensured
its timely implementation.13 Now it was legally certain that the standard VAT rate in
Germany would be raised from 16% to 19% on January 1st, 2007. This is why June 2006
is chosen as reference period relative to which price changes are measured in the empirical
strategy as will be explained in Section 1.4. The reform was then implemented with the
change of the year. It seems to have reached its goal: revenue from the VAT jumped from
e111 billion in 2006 to e128 billion in 2007 and has since then steadily increased to e175
that lower contribution payments increase the income tax base, the decrease in unemployment insurance
contributions does not amount to a significant increase in disposable income. Taking the mean income in
West Germany and assuming a single household, a back-of-the-envelope calculation results in an increase
in the disposable income by e16.1 per month.
13See, for instance, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (2006) for media coverage on the decision by the Federal
Council in June 2006.
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billion in 2018 (Statista; 2019). Moreover, in 2007, Germany was able to comply with the
3% deficit-to-GDP rule, again.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Price Data
Part A: German Price Index Part B: French Price Index
Commodity group Mean Standard dev N Mean Standard dev N
Alcoholic beverages 102.80 2.74 160 101.93 2.30 48
Audiovisual equipment 91.67 12.07 400 88.26 14.26 144
Clothing 100.71 2.39 640 100.70 1.14 80
Footwear 101.10 2.49 112 100.82 1.10 48
Furniture, carpets, home-textiles 100.74 2.97 432 101.02 2.03 128
Glass- & tableware, household utensils 101.56 2.44 176 102.22 2.32 48
Household appliances 99.54 3.26 272 96.73 3.40 144
Household maintenance 101.83 2.86 224 102.05 2.05 32
Non-alcoholic beverages 106.14 8.94 128 103.31 3.29 48
Personal care 101.41 3.07 448 100.94 2.39 64
Personal items 101.58 2.07 224 101.60 1.88 64
Recreational items 99.27 4.62 368 99.64 4.20 80
Recreational activities 102.95 5.70 80 103.72 2.83 16
Restaurants & hotels 102.88 2.60 320 104.69 4.12 64
Service & repair 103.16 3.56 256 104.89 4.07 144
Stationary 102.10 2.93 144 102.92 2.53 32
Tobacco 106.63 5.17 48 103.35 4.41 48
Tools & equipment 102.19 3.63 240 102.20 3.03 48
Vehicles purchase 103.53 3.66 208 102.45 5.02 112
Total 100.80 5.72 4880 100.23 7.20 1392
Notes: The table shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the number of observations (N) for both the German and the French seasonally
adjusted price index by commodity groups.
In order to measure the incidence of the VAT, detailed price data is needed. For
Germany, this data is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The data is
recorded on the most disaggregated 10-digit level based on the Classification of Individual
Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). The data is available on a monthly basis
from 1991 to 2015. For the given analysis, I restrict the sample to two years before and
after the VAT reform, thus, to the years 2005 to 2009.14 Moreover, I only consider those
goods that are subject to the standard VAT rate in the sample period according to the
German VAT tax law (Umsatzsteuergesetz).15
14Benedek et al. (2019) show that noticeable price effects due to a VAT reform take place within a one-
year frame before and after the respective reform. Thus, considering a two-year window is a conservative
approach. Moreover, considering a longer time window would increase the risk that other events, which
also affect prices, take place.
15§12 of the German VAT tax law regulates which commodities are subject to what VAT rate. More-
over, the European Commission publishes an annual report on the VAT rate applied to commodities in
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This leads to a balanced panel of 305 different commodities, which I categorize into
19 commodity groups. These roughly correspond to the 3-digit level according to the
COICOP classification.16 Note that I deviate from the COICOP classification by grouping
all service and repair commodities into a separate category. I also remove fuel and energy
commodities, as their prices are not entirely market-driven and even partly state-regulated
in Germany.17
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Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for commodities subject to the standard VAT rate developed in
Germany and France from 2005 to 2009 on average. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in
November 2005. The solid red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The
dashed green vertical line marks the implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.
its member states. See https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp for the
public documents repository on the VAT rates applied in the EU member states.
16Table 1.A1 in the Appendix shows how individual commodities are mapped in the commodity groups
according to the COICOP classification. Note that jewelery is removed from the category of personal items,
as prices for jewelery increase abnormally in France.
17To be precise, for example the electricity price is made up of three components: procurement, sales,
margin (22%), network usage fees (24%), duties and taxes (54%). Since 2007 the network usage fees are
state-regulated in Germany. The regulation initially led to a decrease of the network usage fees. On the
total sum of the first two components and all other duties and taxes, the value added tax is levied. That
means it is not simply levied on the wholesale price. Moreover, one should note that the given data contains
consumer prices. Hence, it also includes the basic charge for electricity and potential bonuses. Thus, the
given data is only to a limited degree suitable to study the VAT pass-through in the electricity sector, as
there might be simultaneous developments for example to the network usage fees or the basic charge that
also affect the electricity price. Previous studies such as Benedek et al. (2019) have similarly dropped the
sector due to the fact that the price is not market-driven. Nevertheless, in unreported regressions, I also
look at the VAT incidence for fuel and energy commodities. I find that the point estimates for the price
effect are close to zero for both groups and statistically insignificant at the 10%-level. However, given the
previous explanation, these results should be interpreted with caution.
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I complement the German price data with French data for the same time period.18 It
is retrieved from Eurostat’s Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is also
available on a monthly basis. However, it is on a 5-digit level according to the COICOP
classification. Thus, it is less disaggregated than the German data so that I am left with a
balanced panel of 87 commodities, which are then also categorized into the 19 commodity
groups.19 To illustrate what the different aggregation levels imply, I will detail it for the
clothes sector: the German data contains prices for different kinds of women’s clothes,
such as dresses or shirts. The French data, meanwhile, only has prices for women’s clothes
on average, without any further differentiation. The same is true for men’s and children’s
clothing. For both French and German data, all types of clothes are then categorized into
the commodity group Clothing.






















2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
Date
Notes: This figure shows the relative development of the French and the German seasonally adjusted price index for commodities
subject to the standard VAT rate from 2005 to 2009 (German price index divided by French price index). The dotted blue vertical
line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in November 2005. The solid red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the
reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The dashed green vertical line marks the implementation of the respective VAT
reform in January 2007.
As the base year for the German price index is 2010 while it is 2005 for the French price
data, I furthermore recalculate the base year of the German data to match the French base
year.20 Finally, to remove some of the volatility and seasonality in the data, the price index
is first averaged on a quarterly basis for each commodity and, secondly, annually repeating
patterns are accounted for. Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics by commodity group
and the overall price index for both Germany and France.
18A detailed discussion of why French prices are chosen as control group follows in Section 1.4.
19Note that I code the commodity groups as country specific to account for the fact that the same
commodity group in the two countries might be subject to different trends.
20Note that the German Federal Statistical Office is currently revising the consumer price index data.
The new base year will be 2015 and the data with base year 2010 is no longer available. However, the data
I use remains valid, as the current revision does not affect data before 2015.
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Figure 1.2 shows how the price index for the selected sample of commodities developed
in Germany and France from 2005 to 2009. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing
of the coalition agreement in November 2005, the solid red vertical line marks the final legal
decision on the VAT reform in June 2006, and the dashed green vertical line highlights its
implementation in January 2007. Prices in both countries first contract and then stagnate.
This development is very similar in both countries until the decision on the VAT reform in
Germany, which provides first graphical evidence that the French price index is a suitable
control group for the German price index, as they follow parallel trends throughout the
year and a half before the decision on the reform. Then the trends for the two indices start
to differ. While both increase, the increase is steeper for German prices until January 2007,
the implementation of the VAT reform. Afterwards, German and French prices follow a
similar increasing trend. Figure 1.2 therefore seems to suggest that the effect on prices due
to the increase in the VAT took place before the actual implementation of the reform, at
the time of its final legal decision. Moreover, the effect seems rather modest. These findings
are corroborated by Figure 1.3, which shows the relative development of the German to
the French price index. It oscillates around the value 1 until mid-2006 and then jumps to
1.01.
While Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the average trend for all commodities, the question is
whether the development for the individual commodity groups differs. Figure 1.4 therefore
shows the development of the German and French price index for selected commodity
groups.
Figure 1.4a compares the development of the price indices for the commodity group
of alcoholic beverages only. Again, before the decision on the VAT reform in Germany,
the two indices follow parallel trends. Then there is a marked and steady increase in both
indices but the increase is steeper for German prices. This seems to suggest that prices for
alcoholic beverages in Germany did react to the VAT reform, albeit to a modest degree, and
that this reaction again took place before the actual implementation of the reform. Figure
1.4b shows that prices for household appliances developed similarly negative in France and
Germany until the beginning of 2006. In France, the negative trend continues, while prices
stabilize in Germany at around the time of the VAT reform and even increase slightly in
2007. Thus, for the interpretation of the following regression results it is important to note
that prices for household appliances in Germany and France do not follow parallel trends
from around 2006 onwards and that French prices decrease sharply.21 In Germany, prices
for personal care items, such as hygiene products, increase noticeably around the time the
21Note that the development for French prices is not driven by a one specific commodity within that
group. Instead, prices for all commodities in that commodity group decrease sharply.
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Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for selected commodity groups developed in Germany and France
from 2005 to 2009. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in November 2005. The solid red
vertical line marks the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The dashed green vertical line
marks the implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.
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VAT reform was decided on as Figure 1.4d shows. The same is true for tobacco products.22
Thus, also for these commodity groups the VAT increase seems to affect prices before
the actual implementation of the reform. However, there are also commodity groups for
which this is not true. For instance, Figure 1.4c shows that prices for household mainte-
nance commodities develop very similarly in Germany and France throughout the sample
period. The same is true for the commodity groups Glass-& tableware and household
utensils or Personal items.23
Finally, Figure 1.4f shows the price development for service and repair commodities.
This, for example, includes prices for domestic services by paid staff, repair of household
appliances, or hairdressing. In both countries prices increase stepwise with the turn of
the year. This suggests that prices for these commodities are sticky, as there might be
costs to changing them, for example, printing new signboards in a hair salon. However,
the increases are less strong in Germany. This price pattern also holds for the commodity
group Restaurants & hotels. It is interesting to note that both of these commodity groups
are particularly labor-intensive. Thus, the less pronounced price increase in Germany
could reflect the decreasing non-wage labor costs due to the decrease in social security
contributions, which was another part of the supplemental budget law (see Section 1.2).
This will be discussed in more detail in Section 1.5.3. It is important to note, though, that
for these two commodity groups, the parallel trends assumption seems to hold less well,
as prices in Germany and France already follow different trends before the decision on the
VAT reform.
In summary, the average price development in Figure 1.2 only partly provides an ac-
curate depiction of the development for the individual commodity groups.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
I use two different methods to estimate the price effects of the 2007 VAT reform in Germany.
First, I implement an event study design to assess the dynamic impact of the VAT reform
on the consumer price index. As it provides quarterly estimates of the price effect, the event
study design, in contrast to a DiD approach, enables to more precisely locate the timing of
any effect. Moreover, the event study design provides an illustration of common pre-trends
in commodity prices in Germany and France, which is the key identifying assumption.
Second, I estimate the average treatment effect of the VAT reform with a generalized DiD
model.
22See Figure 1.4e.
23The development for the remaining commodity groups is depicted in Figures 1.B6 and 1.B7 in the
Appendix.
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1.4.1 Event Study
The following baseline event study model is used to estimate the average quarterly VAT




βj(Dtreat ∗ It+j) + αic + γt + εitc. (1.1)
The dependent variable is the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and
country c. Dtreat is a treatment dummy indicating whether the commodity was affected
by the VAT reform or not. It+j is an indicator for the event window which runs from 5
quarters prior to the decision on the VAT reform to 11 quarters after the decision on the
reform.24 βj is therefore the coefficient of interest, as it measures the treatment effect,
which is the price change for commodities that were exposed to the VAT reform which
exceeds the change in the control group in a given quarter.
As reference period relative to which the change in prices is measured, I choose the
final legal decision on the VAT reform in June 2006, that is, the second quarter 2006.
As explained in Section 1.2, from this point in time there was legal certainty that the
reform was going to be implemented in January 2007. Thus, anticipatory price effects
seem likely. These would be missed if the reference period is set to the implementation date
instead. Figures 1.2 or 1.4a, for example, show that prices did, indeed, already react in June
2006. Moreover, Benedek et al. (2019) find that for increases in the standard VAT rate,
anticipation effects are likely. As a robustness test, I alternatively choose November 2005,
the date when the coalition agreement was passed, and January 2007, the implementation
date of the reform, as base periods. The results can be found in Section 1.6.3.
I include country-specific commodity fixed effects, αi,c, to account for time-invariant
characteristics by country and commodity that affect the development of the price index.
γt controls for time fixed effects to capture general quartely price level trends.
1.4.2 Differences-in-Differences
Besides the quarterly event study estimates of the price increase, I estimate the average
treatment effect of the VAT reform using the following generalized DiD model:
ln(p)itc = β0 + β1Dtreat + β2Post+ β3(Dtreat ∗ Post) + αic + γt + εitc, (1.2)
where the dependent variable is again the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter
t and country c. Dtreat is a treatment dummy indicating whether the commodity was
affected by the VAT reform or not. Post is a binary indicator for the treatment period,
24The event window runs until quarter 10, as the reference month is coded as 0.
18 Who Carries the Burden of the Value-Added Tax? Evidence from Germany
which takes on the value 1 for observations after the decision on the VAT reform in June
2006, that is, after the second quarter 2006. β3 is therefore the coefficient of interest, as
it measures the treatment effect. Country-specific commodity fixed effects, αic, and time
fixed effects, γt, are again controlled for in all specifications.
1.4.3 Statistical Inference
An important issue in the design of the empirical strategy are assumptions regarding the
structure of the error term. The first important assumption regards homoskedasticity.
Figure 1.B5 in the Appendix shows that the variance is greater for more extreme values
of the dependent variable. Accordingly, using a Breusch-Pagan test, the assumption of
homoskedasticity is rejected. I correct for this by using heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.
The second assumption concerns the correlation of errors within clusters. As shocks
might be correlated within a commodity across time, standard ordinary least squares (OLS)
would underestimate standard errors (Donald and Lang; 2007; Moulton; 1986). This is
corroborated by a test for cross-sectional dependence described in Pesaran (2004) and
Pesaran (2015). Thus, clustering standard errors at least at the level of the identifying
variation, commodity i, is necessary. To be even more prudent, I follow Angrist and Pischke
(2008) in clustering standard errors at a higher level in the baseline specification, namely,
the commodity group level. However, this reduces the number of clusters to 38. As few
clusters might lead to an underestimation of the correlation, I follow Cameron et al. (2008)
and Cameron and Miller (2015) and use the wild cluster bootstrap method to correct for
this in my baseline specification.
As robustness tests, I also report the main specification with heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors, clustered standard errors, pairs cluster bootstrapped standard errors,
and wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors at the commodity level, instead of the
commodity group level (see Table 1.4 in Section 1.6.1). Only when not accounting for
intraclass correlation, the null hypothesis of no price effect can be rejected at the 1%-level.
Equations 1.1 and 1.2 are the baseline models to estimate the price effect across all
commodities. I also estimate the price effect for specific commodity groups in a slightly
adjusted version. Specifically, errors are now wild cluster bootstrapped at the individual
commodity level i, rather than at the level of the commodity group.
Finally, Abadie et al. (2017) have recently questioned the common practice to report
clustered standard errors. In case of fixed effects regressions they argue that clustering is
only necessary when there is heterogeneity in the treatment effect. As this is true here
and, moreover, there is also clustering in the assignment because only German commodity
prices are treated, clustering standard errors seems necessary even from this perspective.
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1.4.4 Identification
The parallel-trends assumption is the necessary condition for causal interpretation in the
given setting. It requires that the price indices in Germany and France follow similar
trends before and after the VAT reform, if the reform would not have happened. Figures
1.2 and 1.4 provide first graphical evidence that prior to the reform the development in
the price indices is very similar, both for all commodities on average and most of the
different commodity groups.25 It therefore seems valid to assume that prices would have
behaved similarly in Germany and France absent the policy shock, which makes French
prices a suitable control group. Nevertheless, the decision to choose France as control
group requires some explanation.
The most obvious control group seem to be commodities subject to the reduced VAT
rate in Germany, because that rate did not change in 2007 (see Section 1.2). This group
mostly consists of food items, though. That means that their prices were affected by the
World food crisis 2006 to 2008.26 Thus, exactly at the time of the reform to the standard
VAT, the commodities subject to the reduced rate were also exposed to a price shock,
albeit unrelated to their taxation. Figure 1.B1 in the Appendix shows the development
of prices for commodities subject to the reduced VAT rate in Germany. The price shock
due to the food crisis is clearly visible. Thus, these items cannot serve as control group to
estimate the price effect of the VAT reform. Moreover, Benedek et al. (2019) criticize the
use of goods in the same country, not affected by a VAT reform, as control group due to
potential general equilibrium effects.
With the disqualification of the reduced VAT items as suitable control group, an al-
ternative are prices in other Euro countries for the same commodities as in Germany but
that did not experience a VAT reform during the period 2005 to 2009.27 A further restric-
tion is the availability of price data at a sufficiently disaggregated level. Although Eurostat
makes price indices available for all European countries, the level of detail of the data varies.
Thus, the two criteria mean that four countries are left as possible control group: Belgium,
France, Lithuania, and Slovenia. Due to the great difference in economic development
compared to Germany, the latter two countries do not seem like natural control groups,
whereas Belgium and France seem like viable options. As outlined above, French prices
do indeed seem to fulfill the parallel-trends assumption. Belgian prices, however, seem to
25The statistical evidence will be provided in Section 1.5.1.
26For a number of reasons, global food prices rose substantially during the period 2006 to 2008. For a
more complete discussion see, for instance, Headey and Fan (2010).
27To avoid complications due to the exchange rate, only countries which use the Euro as currency are
considered in the search for potential control groups. This condition precludes, for instance, the United
Kingdom.
20 Who Carries the Burden of the Value-Added Tax? Evidence from Germany
be more cyclical than German ones, as Figure 1.B2 in the Appendix shows. The price
development before the VAT reform is less similar comparing Germany and Belgium than
it is comparing Germany and France. Furthermore, the risk of potential price spill-overs is
higher for Belgium than for France due to their relative size compared to Germany. Hence,
France fulfills the condition for causal interpretation best, which motivates its choice as
control group.28 D’Acunto et al. (2016) likewise conclude that the similarity of pre-shock
trends is most pronounced when they only use France as control group. Moreover, Mon-
tag et al. (2020) use France as a control group in a differences-in-differences approach to
measure the impact of the temporary VAT reduction in Germany in 2020 on fuel prices,
arguing that the two countries are very similar in various of dimensions.
Moreover, Figure 1.B3 in the Appendix shows that for a number of macroeconomic
indicators, such as inflation, unemployment, or GDP growth, Germany and France show
relatively similar trends compared to the other potential control countries. As mentioned
above, there was no reform to the VAT rates during the time frame 2005 to 2009 in France.
The most recent amendments to the standard VAT rate are a reduction from 20.6% to
19.6% in 2000 and an increase to 20% in 2014. One of the few tax reforms that took place
during the sample years in France concerned the taxation of donations and gifts. This
was part of a bigger fiscal package by the Fillon administration in 2007, which aimed to
liberalize the labor-market, ease the fiscal burden on businesses, and stimulate investment,
for instance, by exempting overtime hours from the income and payroll taxes. Another tax
reform was a modification to the wealth tax for non-resident French citizens in the summer
of 2008. It is unlikely that either of these reforms had a significant impact on commodity
prices in France. Besides fiscal reforms, the French administration tried to implement new
youth employment laws in 2006 but this legislation had to be scrapped due to ongoing
protests. Furthermore, plans to reform the pension benefits system triggered widespread
protests in late 2007. Thus, no significant reform was successfully implemented during the
sample years in France.
Finally, the German data follows the national definitions of the consumer price index
(CPI), whereas the French data follows the definition of the harmonized index of consumer
prices (HICP). One might argue that this difference in definition distorts the results. How-
ever, as Figure 1.B4 in the Appendix shows, the development of the German price index
is very similar whether following the national or the harmonized definition. Thus, any
conclusions based on the CPI data should also hold for the HICP data.29
28Note that as a robustness test I furthermore control for potential pre-treatment trends in prices. The
results remain very similar even with these "detrended" prices. Thus, diverging pre-treatment trends in
German and French prices do not seem to drive the results (see Column (1) in Table 1.5 in Section 1.6.2).
29I prefer the CPI over the HICP data, as the level of disaggregation is greater for the CPI data.
Who Carries the Burden of the Value-Added Tax? Evidence from Germany 21
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Event Study
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This figure plots quarterly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for the baseline event study specification
Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and country c. Commodity and time
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the commodity group level. The red vertical line marks the final legal
decision on the VAT reform in June 2006. The number of observations can be found in Table 1.2.
In this section, I will first report the results from Equation 1.1. Thus, Figure 1.5 displays
quarterly event study estimates of the price increase across all commodities. It corroborates
the descriptive findings from Figure 1.2. First, I observe flat pre-trend in prices, which
provides statistical evidence that French prices are a suitable control group. Second, the
point estimates become modestly positive around three quarter after the decision on the
VAT reform. These anticipatory price effects would have been missed if the reference period
would have been set back to the implementation of the reform. Therefore, the decision
date seems like a suitable choice as reference period.30 Given that the VAT increases by 3
percentage points from 16% to 19%, the reform would imply an increase in prices by 2.58%
if the VAT burden is fully shifted to the consumer.31 The values of the point estimates in
30The annual pattern in point estimates and confidence intervals is due to sticky prices for commodities
in some industries and an increasing variance for observations further away from the reference period. Sticky
prices mean that prices for these commodities do not adjust immediately but only at fixed points in time,
for example, because it is costly to change prices. For a given time period, the individual prices remain
stable but within a commodity group there is still fluctuation. Together with the growing variance for
observations further away from the reference period, this leads to the step-like pattern for point estimates
and confidence intervals observed in Figure 1.5. Furthermore, it is reinforced by the method used to control
for quarterly seasonality.
31For the calculation: (119/116 * 100 -100) = 2.58.
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Figure 1.5 display a price increase by around 1.5%. This would imply a pass-through of
around 60%, which is below the average pass-through of 79% that Benedek et al. (2019)
estimate for reforms to the standard VAT in the EU. The lower pass-through could be due
to the fact that the VAT reform in Germany affected more than 50% of the consumption
basket. This is important because Benedek et al. (2019) also show that for VAT reforms
with a broad scope the pass-through to consumers is lower.
However, the effects are not statistically significant at the 5%-level. The relatively
broad confidence intervals include under- to over-shifting. Thus, it is difficult to draw any
precise conclusions with regards to the incidence. But at least it is valid to conclude that
Figure 1.5 lends no straightforward evidence that VAT increases are on average necessarily
(fully) passed on to the consumer. In so far, I cannot lend support to the notion that the
VAT is incontrovertibly a regressive tax on consumption. The question is now whether
this also holds for the individual commodity groups.
Figure 1.6 shows quarterly event study estimates of the price increase for a number
of different commodity groups. Figure 1.6a shows that prices for alcoholic beverages in
Germany did initially increase statistically significant by around 1.5% after the decision
on the VAT reform relative to French prices. The immediate reaction in alcohol prices
already before the implementation of the VAT reform is in-line with results by Young and
Kwapisz (2001), who find that there is no lag in the response of prices to the excise tax on
alcohol in the US.
German prices for household appliances also increase statistically significant by around
2% three quarters after the decision on the VAT reform and continue to increase by as
much as 4% in comparison to the base period and relative to French prices as Figure 1.6b
shows. This would even imply an over-shifting of the VAT increase to consumers by around
50%. This corroborates results by Buettner and Madzharova (2017), who use a dataset of
major domestic appliances. They that the period after the 2007 VAT reform in Germany
is characterized by substantially higher prices for these goods. Similarly, D’Acunto et al.
(2016) find that the 2007 VAT reform led to an increase in households’ willingness to buy
durable goods. This could have induced producers to increase prices. Moreover, a further
explanation for the price increase might be the fact that most household appliances in
Germany are imported and, therefore, could not profit from the lower labor costs due to
the decrease in social security contributions, while fully bearing the increased VAT rate.
However, it also needs to be stressed that the change is measured relative to prices for
household appliances in France, where prices decrease sharply. The large positive point
estimates for the price effect for this commodity group therefore are also a reflection of
this relatively positive development.
A similarly large price increase can be observed for tobacco products for three quarters
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Notes: This figure plots quarterly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent variable is the log
of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and country c. Commodity and time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered at the commodity level. The red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in June 2006. The number
of observations can be found in Table 1.2.
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following the decision on the VAT reform (see Figure 1.6e). As the tobacco industry
can be described as monopolistic, the observed over-shifting is possible from a theoretical
viewpoint due to imperfect competition (Stern; 1987; Weyl and Fabinger; 2013). However,
the effect fades out over time. Meanwhile, the price effect for personal care items remains
relatively consistent at around 2% as depicted in Figure 1.6d but it becomes statistically
insignificant seven quarters after the reference period. The statistically significant positive
price effects for alcohol, personal care items, and tobacco might well be explained by low
demand elasticities for these commodity groups. Thus, producers know that they can shift
at least part of the tax burden to the consumer, without hurting demand too much.
At the same time, for the commodity group Household maintenance no statistically
significant price effects can be observed (see Figure 1.6c). This commodity group includes
items such as detergents or cleaning agents. As competition might be tight in this sector
and costumer loyalty low, producers might be reluctant to pass through any VAT increases
in order not to hurt demand.
Finally, Figure 1.6f shows the price effects for service and repair commodities. Following
the decision on the VAT reform, the point estimates hover around zero and seven quarters
after the reference period even turn negative. An explanation for this unexpected pattern
might be the decrease in the social security contributions, which lowers labor costs in
Germany. Thus, in the medium-run an indirect effect on commodity prices, especially in
labor-intensive sectors, cannot be ruled out. I will discuss this in more detail in Section
1.5.3. However, it also needs to be noted that Figure 1.6f reveals significant pre-trends for
this commodity group, suggesting that service and repair prices in Germany and France
did not follow parallel trends prior to the VAT reform.32 Thus, any conclusions based
on such a comparison need to be regarded with caution. This similarly applies to the
labor-intensive commodity group Restaurants & hotels.
Figures 1.B8 and 1.B8 in the Appendix show the event study estimates for the remaining
commodity groups. Similar to the average price effect in Figure 1.5, the confidence intervals
for many of the individual commodity groups tend to be quite large.
1.5.2 Differences-in-Differences
While the event study estimates enable the detection of any dynamic effects and a visu-
alization of the parallel trends assumption, I estimate the magnitude of the average price
effect of the VAT reform using a generalized DiD model. The main regression results from
Equation 1.2 are shown in Table 1.2. Column (1) shows the average treatment effect for
all commodities and Columns (2) to (7) focus on individual commodity groups.33 In-line
32This was already visible in Figure 1.4f.
33Results for the remaining 13 commodity groups can be found in Tables 1.A2 and 1.A3 in the Appendix.
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Table 1.2: DiD Estimates: Main Specification














Treatment 0.0116 0.0123 0.0368** -0.000583 0.0111 0.0392* -0.0163
(0.0248) (0.0083) (0.0129) (0.0078) (0.0128) (0.0152) (0.0083)
95% CI [-0.0350, 0.0644] [-0.0056, 0.0313] [0.0102, 0.0632] [-0.0614, 0.0605] [-0.0183, 0.0481] [0.0007, 0.0707] [-0.0331, 0.0006]
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6272 208 416 256 512 96 400
Within R2 0.0301 0.892 0.271 0.569 0.320 0.834 0.828
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in parentheses.
with the event study estimates, the average treatment effect for all commodities is positive
but statistically insignificant. This holds also for the individual commodity groups, except
for household appliances (see Column (3)) and tobacco (see Column (6)), for which the
positive effects are statistically significant at the 5-% level and 10-% level, respectively.
The coefficient implies an average price increase of household appliances by 3.7%, which
translates into an average over-shifting of the tax burden by 40% for this commodity
group. While the positive sign of the point estimates seems reasonable, the magnitude
of the implied effect should be considered with caution due to the fact that the parallel
trends assumption for this commodity group does not hold well and that the prices in the
control decrease sharply. The effect for tobacco is of similar magnitude and implies an
over-shifting by 50%. This is most likely due to the low demand elasticity, which enables
producers to shift the tax burden to consumers. A noticeable deviation from the average
effect can also be observed for the commodity group Service & repair in Column (7). The
coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant at the 10%- level. This corroborates
the findings in Figure 1.6f.
In summary, whether using an event study or a DiD approach, there is a lack of statis-
tically significant evidence that the burden of the VAT is on average shifted to consumers.
It is important, though, to stress that this should not be interpreted as evidence for no
price effect. All this means is that the with the given data and approach, I cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no price effect. This at least challenges the assumption that the
VAT is necessarily carried by consumers. If it is instead carried by firms, it could either hit
wages or profits.34 The former would cast doubt on the hypothesis that the value-added
tax causes no distortions on the labor-market and is therefore advantageous in comparison
to other taxes, such as the income tax.
34To be more precise, it would affect pure profits, that is, profits beyond those provided by the normal
return to capital. It would be similar to a cash-flow tax. As investments are fully deductible, they would
not be distorted.
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Previous literature for VAT decreases has found that prices do not fully adjust and that
firm owners are able to increase their profits (Kosonen; 2015; Benzarti and Carloni; 2019).
For VAT increases, this, in turn, would imply that consumers do not necessarily need to
carry the entire VAT burden as it is shared with producers, which would be in-line with
my results for the 2007 VAT reform in Germany. But this would assume that there is a
symmetric reaction to VAT decreases and increases. However, Benzarti et al. (2020) find
that this is not the case, as prices seem to react more to increases than to decreases in the
VAT rate. It is therefore problematic to base predictions on the effect for producers on
the previous literature for VAT decreases. Instead, it would be necessary to extend that
research also to VAT increases in order to allow for more precise statements regarding the
actual effects on wages and profits and, hence, potentially the labor-market.
Moreover, both the event study and the DiD estimates reveal that the price effect varies
between commodity groups. Carbonnier (2007) similarly finds that the consumer share of
the VAT burden differs between sectors in France. Simply relying on the average incidence
would therefore be misleading and could mask potential distributional consequences. Using
representative household data on spending in Germany from the income and consumption
survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe EVS) for the year 2003, Figures 1.B10,
1.B11, 1.B12, and 1.B13 in the Appendix show that spending on the 19 previously defined
commodity groups does differ between net household income quartiles.35 For instance, one
can observe that the share of spending on tobacco products is almost 5% for the lowest
net household income quartile, while it is only 1.3% for the highest income quartile.36 As
I show that there is an over-shifting of the tax burden for tobacco (see Column (6) in
Table 1.2), this implies that lower income groups are relatively more affected by this price
increase.37 This demonstrates how differences in tax incidence and consumption patterns
can entail distributional consequences to VAT reforms. Policy makers should consider this
when reforming the VAT rate.
Beyond that, the event study estimates show that prices already start to react at the
35The EVS is provided by the Statistical Offices of the German States. It is conducted every five years.
The year of interest for the analysis is 2003, that is, the closest year available before the VAT reform.
The EVS contains detailed information on income, wealth, debt, and consumption expenditures of private
households in Germany. It is send out to 60,000 households from all social backgrounds, so that the survey
provides a representative sample. However, the participation in the survey is not mandatory.
36Spending on the 19 previously defined commodity groups equals 34% of average net household income
for the lowest income quartile and 28% for the highest income quartile. For the lowest quartile, quarterly
average net household income is e4045.98 and for the highest quartile quarterly average, quarterly average
net household income is e18,880.3. In absolute numbers this means that the lowest and the highest net
household income quartile spend around e69 on tobacco products in a given quarter.
37Note that there is a related literature looking at the regressivity of so-called sin taxes on commodities
such as alcohol, tobacco, or sugar (Dubois et al.; 2020; Griffith et al.; 2017).
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time of the final legal decision on the reform, six months prior to its actual implementation.
This corroborates previous research on anticipatory price effects of VAT reforms.
1.5.3 Comparison to the 1998 Value-Added Tax Reform
Both the event study and the DiD estimates presented above revealed only a modest and
statistically insignificant average price effect for the 2007 VAT reform. As explained in
Section 1.2, the increase in the VAT from 16% to 19% in 2007 was accompanied by a
decrease in the unemployment insurance contributions by 2.3 percentage points. These are
part of non-wage labor costs and the reduction therefore could in the medium-run have
translated into lower prices, especially in labor-intensive sectors. Thus, the modest price
reaction in 2007 might in part be explained by the joint implementation of a VAT increase
and a decrease in social security contributions, a so-called fiscal devaluation.
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Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for commodities subject to the standard VAT rate developed in
Germany and France from 1996 to 2000 on average. The solid red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in
December 1997. The dashed green vertical line marks the implementation of the VAT reform in April 1998.
While it can be argued that particularly any anticipatory price effects are probably
due to the VAT reform, because the effect on prices through the labor-market are more
likely to show in the medium-run, it is difficult to precisely disentangle the effect of the
two reforms. Therefore, I compare the effects of the 2007 VAT reform to those of a VAT
reform in Germany which took place in 1998. During that reform the standard VAT rate
was increased by 1 percentage point from 15% to 16%, which is a third of the increase
in 2007. Importantly, in contrast to the 2007 VAT reform, the 1998 VAT reform was
not accompanied by a change in social security contributions and may therefore provide a
benchmark of the "pure" VAT price effect. The 1998 VAT reform was decided on by the
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German Federal Council in December 1997 and implemented in April 1998. Analogously
to the approach described in Section 1.4, I therefore choose December 1997, that is, the
last quarter of that year, as reference period relative to which price changes are measured.
I construct a sample from 1996 to 2000 again comparing German and French prices.38
Figure 1.7 compares the development of German and French prices for the period 1996
to 2000 across all commodities. While the two indices follow very similar trends from 1996
to the end of 1997, verifying that French prices represent a suitable control group also
during this time frame, there is a noticeable jump in German prices right at the time the
VAT reform was decided on and a further increase after its implementation in April 1998.
In comparison to the development from 2005 to 2009 shown in Figure 1.2, the price effect
does seem more pronounced in 1998, although the increase in the VAT rate in 1998 is only
a third of the increase in 2007. This provides first graphical evidence that the price effects
in 2007 might indeed be partly absorbed by the simultaneous reduction in social security
contributions.
Figure 1.8: Development of the Price Index for Selected Commodity Groups - 1998
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Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for commodities subject to the standard VAT rate developed in
Germany and France from 1996 to 2000 on average. The solid red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in
December 1997. The dashed green vertical line marks the implementation of the VAT reform in April 1998.
As the reduction in social security contributions is most likely to translate into price ef-
fects in labor-intensive sectors, Figure 1.8 shows the development of the price index for the
two commodity groups Service & repair and Restaurants & hotels, which are particularly
labor-intensive and which had peculiar point estimates for the 2007 VAT reform. In com-
parison to Figures 1.4f and 1.B7d, it first of all needs to be noted that the assumption of
flat pre-trends seems to be fulfilled much better for the 1998 VAT reform for both of these
38Note that there was no VAT reform in France during that time period.
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commodity groups. Moreover, for service and repair commodities the reform in 1998 seems
to have no price effect, as the development continues to be very similar to that of French
prices even after the VAT reform was decided on. Both follow a similarly large stepwise
increase over the sample period. In contrast, from 2005 to 2009, French and German prices
in that sector seem to follow different trends. Given that this is a labor-intensive sector,
this development might have been an implication of a number of reforms which sought to
make the German labor-market more competitive, most notably the 2004 Hartz reforms.
The reduction in unemployment insurance contributions can also be counted towards these
measures.
However, contrary to expectation, the increase in prices for restaurants and hotels in
1998 is less pronounced for German than for French prices. This is likely due to the 1998
World Cup, which took place in France and is found to impact prices for tourist hotels and
restaurants in that year (Dauncey and Hare; 2014).
Analogously to the estimation strategies explained in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2, I will
now present event study and DiD estimates for the 1998 VAT reform for all commodities
and the two commodity groups Service & repair and Restaurants & hotels.

















-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 
Point estimate 95% conf. int.
Notes: This figure plots quarterly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for the baseline event study
specification Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and country c.
Commodity and time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the commodity group level. The red vertical line
marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in December 1997. The number of observations can be found in Table 1.3.
Figure 1.9 again serves to illustrate the parallel trends assumption and to show the
dynamic impact of the 1998 VAT reform on prices for all commodities. There is an increase
of around 1% to 2% following the decision on the reform. This is surprisingly large given
that the VAT rate only increased by 1 percentage point from 15% to 16%, which would
imply a price increase by 0.87% if the VAT increase is fully shifted to the consumer. These
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findings are corroborated when estimating the average treatment effect. In Column (1) of
Table 1.3 DiD estimates for all commodities are presented. The coefficient is positive and
would imply an average price increase by 1.28%. Thus, the magnitude of the price effect for
the 1998 VAT reform is substantially higher than for the 2007 VAT reform if one considers
that the VAT increase in 1998 was only a third of the increase in 2007. This could be an
implication of the simultaneous decrease in social security contributions in 2007. However,
even in 1998 the price effect remains statistically insignificant in the preferred specification.








Treatment 0.0128 0.00485 -0.0105
(0.0147) (0.0071) (0.0060)
95% CI [-0.0147, 0.0438] [-0.0095, 0.0190] [-0.0247, 0.0055]
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 5456 336 368
Within R2 0.0343 0.758 0.730
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster bootstrapped
standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in parentheses.
Figures 1.10a and 1.10b show quarterly event study estimates for the two labor-intensive
commodity groups Service & repair and Restaurants & hotels. First, it can indeed be
confirmed that the parallel trends assumption holds for both groups this time. Moreover,
for service and repair commodities the quarterly price effects are positive in 1998. This is
also true for the average treatment effect for this commodity group shown in Column (2)
of Table 1.3. This is in contrast to the negative effects found in 2007 for this commodity
group (see Figure 1.4f). The difference in effects could be an impact of the reduction in
social security contributions in 2007, which made labor in Germany cheaper right at the
time when the VAT was increased. However, the effect is also statistically insignificant in
1998.
As expected, the price effects for restaurants and hotels are negative, which is likely to
be due the 1998 World Cup in France. But they are also statistically insignificant both for
the dynamic effects (see Figure 1.10b) and the average treatment effect (see Column (3) of
Table 1.3), while they are statistically significant and negative for the 2007 VAT reform.
In conclusion, a comparison between the 2007 and the 1998 VAT reform in Germany
does indicate that the effects in 2007 were muted in magnitude by the simultaneous re-
duction in social security contributions. This would imply that beyond affecting trade,
fiscal devaluations also feedback on prices. However, for both reforms the price effects
are statistically insignificant. For neither reform there is therefore statistically significant
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Figure 1.10: Event Study Estimates for Selected Commodity Groups - 1998
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Notes: This figure plots quarterly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for the baseline event study
specification Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and country c.
Commodity and time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the commodity level. The red vertical line marks
the final legal decision on the VAT reform in December 1997. The number of observations can be found in Table 1.3.
evidence that the burden of the VAT increase is shifted to consumers.
1.6 Robustness Tests
I carry out a number of tests in order to verify the robustness of my results. In Section
1.6.1, I change the assumptions regarding the error structure, I control for pre-trends and
winsorize the data in Section 1.6.2, and in Section 1.6.3, I change the reference period
relative to which price changes are measured in the event study approach.
Table 1.4: DiD Estimates: Robustness - Statistical Inference











Treatment 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0116 0.0116 0.0116
(0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0102)
95% CI [0.0061, 0.0170] [0.0051, 0.0180] [-0.0369, 0.0600] [-0.0318, 0.0607] [-0.0078, 0.0311]








robust & wild cluster
bootstrap at
commodity level
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6272 6272 6272 6272 6272
Within R2 0.0301 0.6130 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in
parentheses in Columns (5) and (6). Within R2 is reported for Columns (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6). Normal R2 is reported for Column (2).
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1.6.1 Statistical Inference
In Table 1.4, I rerun the baseline DiD equation (see Equation 1.2) with a number of different
assumptions regarding the error structure. I continue to control for commodity and time
fixed effects in all specifications. In Column (1), I neither control for heteroskedasticity
nor correlation of the error terms, while I do control for the former in Column (2). Only
for these two specifications the treatment effect is highly statistically significant. This
suggests that neglecting the presence of correlation within a commodity group leads to an
underestimation of the probability to reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. In
the remaining specifications intraclass correlation is controlled for but the methods differ.
Precisely, in Column (3) errors are clustered at the commodity group level but I do not
bootstrap. In Column (4), pairs cluster bootstrapped standard errors at the commodity
group are reported. The results are very similar to the main specification in Column (1)
of Table 1.2 with wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors, which according to Cameron
et al. (2008) and Cameron and Miller (2015) is the preferred method with few clusters.
Finally, Column (5) reports wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors at the individual
commodity level. This leads to a smaller standard error and narrows the confidence interval
in comparison to the main specification. This is likely due to the fact that the number
of clusters is now higher. However, it is also the less cautious approach as Angrist and
Pischke (2008) recommend to cluster at a higher level, when in doubt.












Treatment 0.0119 0.0116 0.00515
(0.0255) (0.0248) (0.0145)
95% CI [-0.0362, 0.0666] [-0.0351, 0.0642] [-0.0253, 0.0360]
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 6272 6272 6272
Within R2 0.0239 0.0301 0.148
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster boot-
strapped standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in parentheses.
1.6.2 Detrending and Winsorizing Data
The price data is cleaned of a linear pre-treatment trend in Column (1) of Table 1.5. This
is done to ensure that results are not biased by different trends in the pre-treatment period
for German and French prices. The results remain very similar to the main specification,
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suggesting that different pre-treatment trends between German and French prices are not
a major issue on average.39
Moreover, to verify that the results are not driven by outliers in the data, I report
winsorized results at the 1%- and 2%-level in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1.5, respectively.
Again, the results are very robust, especially when winsorizing at the 1%-level.
Figure 1.11: Event Study Estimates for All Commodities - Robustness
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Point estimate 95% conf. int.
Notes: This figure plots quarterly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands for the baseline event study
specification Equation 1.1. The dependent variable is the log of the price index for commodity i in quarter t and country c.
Commodity and time fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the commodity group level. In the left panel the red
vertical line marks the implementation of the VAT reform in January 2007. In the right panel the red vertical line marks the
implementation of the VAT reform in January 2007.
1.6.3 Event Study: Reference Period
As robustness test to the event study approach, I choose two alternative base periods
relative to which the price changes are measured. On the one hand, one could argue
that there might already be anticipatory price effects when the coalition agreement, which
contained the decision on the VAT reform, was passed in November 2005. Figure 1.11a
therefore plots the quarterly event study estimates for this case. The point estimates remain
close to zero for three quarters following the reference period now. This suggests that
there were no anticipatory price effects immediately following the passing of the coalition
agreement but that price reactions only set in after another few quarters. Thus, one would
miss no relevant anticipatory price effects by setting the reference period back two quarters,
which is exactly the time of the final legal decision on the reform. This is the approach
39Note that I specifically control for the linear pre-treatment trend only and not the linear trend in the
entire sample period, as that would potentially absorb part of the treatment effect. This is particularly
problematic in case of dynamic treatment effects (Wolfers; 2006).
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followed in the baseline specification (see Figure 1.5).
On the other hand, if one presumes that there are no anticipatory price effects, the
reference period should be set to the implementation date of the VAT reform. Therefore,
Figure 1.11b alternatively plots the event study estimates for the situation where January
2007, the implementation date, is chosen as reference period. As expected, the treatment
effects are now smaller, as one ignores the anticipatory price effects. This suggests that
June 2006 is the preferable reference period relative to which price effects are measured.
Thus, the baseline specification seems to follow the most appropriate approach.
1.7 Conclusion
The value-added tax is one of the most important tax revenue sources in many countries.
It is efficient in terms of revenue collection and is assumed to cause only relatively low
distortions on the labor-market. However, it is also often referred to as regressive tax, as
it supposedly ultimately hits consumption, and lower income groups spend a greater share
of their income on consumption. It is also for this reason that a number of governments
have recently implemented VAT cuts in order to revive consumption during the covid-19
pandemic. These attributions and measures all contain inexplicit assumptions about the
tax incidence of the VAT, namely that it is necessarily passed on to consumers. However,
previous literature has shown that tax incidence often does not follow straightforward
assumptions. It is therefore essential to provide empirical evidence of who actually carries
the burden of the VAT, also for modest and broad reforms, which have so far received little
attention in the literature.
This is where this paper aims to make a contribution by exploiting an exogenous VAT
reform in Germany in 2007. Using detailed price data, I implement an event study and DiD
approach to investigate the incidence of the VAT for a wide range of commodity groups.
I find that on average the 2007 VAT reform in Germany had a modestly positive but
statistically insignificant effect on prices. I can therefore not reject the hypothesis that on
average the VAT increase has not been passed through to consumers. However, there are
differences between individual commodity groups, ranging from negative price effects to an
over-shifting of the tax burden. Simply relying on the average incidence would therefore be
misleading. Policy makers should consider this when reforming the VAT rate. Particularly
as the consumption of certain commodities seems to differ between income groups in the
population, VAT reforms could have unintended distributional effects. Moreover, I observe
anticipatory price effects well in advance of the actual implementation of the reform.
A possible explanation for the low average effect in 2007 could be a simultaneous reduc-
tion in social security contributions in Germany. Employers could have used this reduction
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in non-wage labor costs to lower prices, particularly in labor-intensive sectors. I explore
this possibility by comparing the price effects in 2007 with those a VAT reform in 1998
in Germany, which was not accompanied by a reduction in social security contributions.
I indeed find that the magnitude of price effects is noticeably higher in 1998, suggesting
that the reduction in social security contributions in 2007 absorbed some effect of the VAT
increase. This would imply that fiscal devaluations also feedback on prices.
However, for both VAT reforms the price increase is on average statistically insignif-
icant. Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no price effect. While one needs
to be careful not to interpret this as proof for no price effect, this result at least provides
no clear evidence that modest increases are necessarily passed through to consumers and
thereby casts doubt on the hypothesis that the VAT is incontrovertibly a regressive tax
on consumption. In turn, if the VAT should indeed not be shifted to consumers, it would
be carried by producers, ultimately hitting either wages or profits. If the former applies,
the VAT would after all cause distortions on the labor-market. This would have important
policy implications.
Particularly as the given setting and empirical approach do not allow to draw more
precise conclusions on the incidence of the value-added tax for broad and modest reforms,
there is scope for future research.
Finally, it is difficult to directly compare the 2007 VAT reform and its effects to the
recently implemented VAT reforms in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic for a number
of reasons. First, the 2007 VAT reform implied an increase to the standard VAT rate,
while the recent reforms are VAT reductions. This is an important difference as Benzarti
et al. (2020) show that the price reaction to increases and decreases in the VAT is not
symmetric. Second, some of the recent VAT reforms target very particular sectors, for
example hospitality and hotel accommodation in the UK, while the 2007 reform in Germany
had a broad scope. Benedek et al. (2019) find that the price effects are smaller for broader
reforms. Third, the 2007 VAT reform was announced as permanent increase, while most of
the recent VAT reforms are announced as temporary. One could argue that sticky prices
and menu costs will mean that prices are less likely to adjust to temporary modifications.
Moreover, firms face additional bureaucratic costs when the VAT is reformed and the
scope to decrease prices in the short-run might therefore be limited.40 A final important
40At the same time, one could argue that the primary policy aim of temporary consumer tax reductions is
an increase in consumer spending, irrespective of the actual price effects. For instance, the UK government
introduced a temporary VAT reduction in 2008 as fiscal stimulus during the recession following the financial
crisis. Crossley et al. (2014) show that the volume of retail sales did indeed increase as consumers brought
forward their purchases. However, firms only initially passed-through the reduction in the VAT by lowering
prices. After a few months the price cuts were partly reversed. Thus, the increase in sales was due to
intertemporal substitution rather than an income effect. Similarly, Agarwal et al. (2017) show that for
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difference between the current situation and the one in 2007 is that we are facing an
unprecedented recession in many countries. This means that firms compete more fiercely
in many markets, that consumers are likely to be more price sensitive, and that the level
of uncertainty is higher.41 Altogether this implies that making predictions for the price
reactions in 2020 based on those for the 2007 VAT reform in Germany is problematic.
temporary sales tax holidays in the US, spending on the covered goods increases substantially. For the
very short-run, Montag et al. (2020) show that the pass-through due to the temporary VAT reduction
in Germany in 2020 on retail fuel prices was fast, substantial, but incomplete, with pass-through rates
depending on the competitiveness of the relevant market.
41Balleer et al. (2020), for instance, look at how supply and demand forces affect planned price adjust-
ments in the early stage of the covid-19 pandemic in Germany (at the time the temporary VAT reductions
were not yet in place). They find that demand deficiencies dominate, which could be due to an expected
income risk and higher economic uncertainty. This shows that under the current circumstances there are
many factors at play that affect prices.
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1.A Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 1.A1: Definition of Commodity Groups
Commodity group Commodities
Alcoholic beverages Brandy, cognac or similar, grain or double grain, liqueur, whiskey, rum, vodka or
similar, white wine, red wine or rose wine, sparkling wine, prosecco, champagne,
beer, non-alcoholic beer, mixed beer drink, wine spritzer or similar
Audiovisual equipment MP3 players or the like, loudspeakers or headphones, TV, DVD recorder, DVD
player or Blu-ray player, home cinema system, satellite system, digital camera,
digital camcorder, zoom lens, binoculars, desktop PC, portable computer, monitor,
printer, scanner, joystick, gamepad or similar for PC, organizer or mobile
navigation device, calculator or desktop calculator, operating system or other PC
application software, unrecorded data carriers, pre-recorded data carriers or music
downloads, photo album
Clothing Fabrics for outerwear, men’s suit, men’s leather jacket, blazer or jacket for men,
men’s pants, men’s coat, pullover or cardigan for men, sports or work clothing for
men, men’s shirt, men’s T-shirt, men’s pajamas, men’s underwear, stockings or
socks for men, costume, dress or pants suit for women, women’s skirt, women’s
trousers, women’s blouse, women’s jacket, women’s coat, sweater, cardigan or twin
set for women, sports and workwear for women, bra, women’s shirt, nightgown or
pajamas for women, women’s underwear, women’s tights, children’s jacket,
children’s pants, costume, dress, skirt or pants suit for girls, sportswear for
children, shirt or blouse for children, children’s shirt, pajamas or nightgown for
children, children’s underwear, stockings, socks or tights for children, romper suit
or two-piece suit for infants, cap or hat, cycling helmet, gloves, tie, scarf or other
clothing accessories, knitting wool or other ere haberdashery
Footwear Classic shoes or casual shoes for men, men’s slippers, men’s sports shoes, pumps or
casual shoes for women, women’s slippers, women’s sports shoes, children’s shoes,
toddler shoes, children’s slippers, shoelaces or insoles
Furniture, carpets, and
home-textiles
Chair or corner bench, cupboard element for fitted kitchen, kitchenette or fitted
kitchen, wardrobe, bed, slatted frame or spring frame, mattress, sofa bed,
upholstered furniture, living room table or dining table, living room cabinet, desk,
computer table or desk chair, bathroom furniture, wardrobe furniture, garden
furniture or camping furniture, shelf, wall lamp or ceiling lamp, table lamp or floor
lamp, Berber carpet, oriental carpet or the like, carpeting, carpet tile or the like,
laminate, finished parquet, linoleum or the like, woolen blanket, duvet, bedspread
or the like, duvet cover set or bed sheet, curtain, interior blind or similar, bathroom
carpet or bathroom furniture, towel, tablecloth, table runner or similar, garden
umbrella
Glass- & tableware and
household utensils
Drinking glasses, tableware made of porcelain, baking dish, cutlery, kitchen knife or
the like, kitchen scales, mixing spoons, pounders or the like, frying pan, casserole or
saucepan, tableware made of metal, plastic or wood, laundry basket or folding box
made of plastic, storage container made of plastic, ironing board, baby bottle or the
like
Household appliances Refrigerator, fridge-freezer combination, freezer or freezer, washing machine, dryer,
dishwasher, stove, oven or microwave, fireplace, extractor hood, fan or similar,
vacuum cleaner, sewing machine, toaster, waffle iron or similar, coffee machine or
tea maker, kettle, egg cooker or the like, fully automatic coffee machine, pod
machine or the like, electric mixer or blender, iron
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A1: Definition of Commodity Groups
Commodity group Commodities
Household maintenance Heavy duty detergent, mild detergent or special detergent, fabric softener, starch or
similar, dishwashing detergent, sanitary cleaner, shoe polish or other shoe care
product, metal care product or other care product, all-purpose cleaner or other
cleaning agent, aluminum foil, transparent film or the like, filter paper, paper cups
or the like, nails, screws or the like, brushes, brooms or other cleaning articles,
candles, glue, matches or the like
Non-alcoholic beverages Cola drink, caffeine-free lemonade, apple juice or similar fruit juice, orange juice or
similar fruit juice, multivitamin juice, diet fruit juice, vegetable juice
Personal care Hair dryer or other hair care device, electric, razor, electric toothbrush, hairbrush,
comb or hair clip, bathroom scales, toothbrush, non-electric, wet razor, razor blades
or the like, Eau de toilette or perfume, hair shampoo, Hairspray, hair gel or the
like, hair color or tint, hand cream, day cream or night cream, children’s cream,
toothpaste, mouthwash, dental floss or the like, aftershave, shaving cream or the
like, lipstick or lip balm, nail polish, make-up, kohl pencil or mascara, fine soap,
shower gel, shower bath or bath additive, deodorant spray or deodorant roller,
toilet paper, tissue, diapers for babies or toddlers, tampons, facial tissues or other
hygiene products
Personal items Wristwatch or pocket watch, wall clock, alarm clock, stopwatch or the like, battery
change for a wristwatch, women’s handbag, briefcase, satchel or backpack, suitcase,
travel bag or the like, purse, ID bag or the like, disposable lighter, stroller, child car
seat, umbrella, sunglasses, weather station
Recreational items Motorhome, caravan, musical instruments, including accessories, board game, game
console, game for game console, electric model train or accessories, construction kit,
experiment kit or model kit, tricycle, scooter or other children’s sports vehicle, doll,
teddy bear or other soft toy, toy car, toy shop or other toy, decorative items for
parties, soccer or other sports balls, skis, snowboards or other winter sports items,
tennis rackets, table tennis rackets or the like, fitness equipment, inline skates, ice
skates or roller skates, football shoes or other special sports shoes, paddling pool,
diving goggles or the like, sleeping bag, tent or other camping items, flower pot or
planter, flower fertilizer, potting soil, bark mulch, peat or the like
Recreational activities Visit to an amusement park, services from photo laboratories or similar, ride with
cable car or ski lift, fishing permit or similar, fee for gym
Restaurants & hotels Consumption of meat dishes, consumption of fish dishes, consumption of pasta,
pizza, omelets or similar, consumption of soups or stews, consumption of ice cream
or other dessert, consumption of other dishes, food for consumption on public
transport, consumption of coffee, tea or the like, consumption of fruit juice or
vegetable juice, consumption of mineral water, consumption of lemonade or the
like, consumption of spirits, consumption of beer, consumption of wine or sparkling
wine, drink for consumption on public transport, consumption of food in canteen or
cafeteria, overnight stay, overnight stay in youth hostels, rent for holiday apartment
or holiday home, campsite fee
Service & repair Repair of consumer electronics, laying and fixing floor coverings, sanding and
sealing parquet flooring, repair on large household appliances, domestic help
services, cosmetic repairs and other repairs, hairdresser for men, hairdresser for
children, hairdresser for women, fee for tanning salon, cosmetic treatment or the
like, painting of a fender, car inspection, car repair, car wash, bicycle repair
Stationary Calendar, postcard or greeting card, pen, fountain pen or similar, file folder, stamp
or other office supplies, envelopes, letter pad or stationery, exercise book, drawing
pad, printer paper, pencil, colored pencil, ink box or similar, printer cartridge
Tobacco Cigarettes, cigars and cigarillos, tobacco
Continued on next page
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Table 1.A1: Definition of Commodity Groups
Commodity group Commodities
Tools & equipment Motor lawn mower, hammer drill, cordless screwdriver or drill, garden tools,
hammer, screwdriver or similar, paintbrush or paint roller, locks, keys or fittings,
halogen lamp, energy-saving lamp or similar, socket, plug, cable or similar, alarm
detector or motion detector, batteries, wallpaper, paints or varnishes, wallpaper
paste, thinner or the like, building materials, doors, windows and the like
Vehicles purchase New cars, vans, used cars, motorcycles, bicycles, car tires, car battery or spark
plugs, accessories or spare parts for motor vehicles, car trailers, car wax, paint care
products or the like, tires or inner tubes for bicycles, accessories or spare parts for
bicycles
Table 1.A2: DiD Estimates for Selected Commodity Groups: Main Specification I










Treatment 0.0581 0.00151 0.00256 -0.00149 -0.00701 0.0322
(0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.007) (0.0246) (0.0064)
95% CI [-0.0772, 0.1938] [-0.0197, 0.0127] [-0.0203, 0.0227] [-0.0196, 0.0169] [-0.0291, 0.0134] [-0.0479, 0.0996]
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 544 720 160 560 224 176
Within R2 0.459 0.274 0.543 0.256 0.647 0.636
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in parentheses.
Table 1.A3: DiD Estimates for Selected Commodity Groups: Main Specification II














Treatment 0.0008 -0.000270 -0.00193 -0.0198* -0.00527 0.00457 0.0137
(0.0614) (0.0237) (0.0282) (0.0089) (0.0078) (0.0162) (0.0186)
95% CI [-0.0191, 0.0135] [-0.0512, 0.0703] [-0.3679, 0.4023] [-0.0383, 0.0015] [-0.0562, 0.0460] [-0.0351, 0.0470] [-0.0319, 0.0537]
Commodity FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 288 448 96 384 176 288 320
Within R2 0.722 0.0401 0.436 0.891 0.735 0.589 0.624
Notes: Commodity and quarter fixed effects in all estimations. Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are reported (10,000 repetitions) in parentheses.
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1.B Appendix: Additional Figures
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Date
Notes: This figure shows the development of the price index for commodities subject to the reduced VAT in Germany from 2005 to
2009. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in November 2005. The solid red vertical line marks
the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The dashed green vertical line marks the
implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.





























2005m1 2006m1 2007m1 2008m1 2009m1
Date
Germany Belgium
Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for commodities subject to the standard VAT rate developed in
Germany and Belgium from 2005 to 2009 on average. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in
November 2005. The solid red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The
dashed green vertical line marks the implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.
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Notes: This figure shows macroeconomic trends for a selection of European countries for 2000 to 2010. Source: OECD.
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Figure 1.B4: Development of the German Price Index Following the National (CPI)
and the Harmonized (HICP) Definition
Notes: This figure shows how the price index in Germany develops following the national definition of the consumer price index
(CPI) or the harmonized definition (HICP). Source: UK Office for National Statistics (2016).
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Fitted values
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of residuals with the log of prices as dependent variable.
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Germany France
Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for selected commodity groups developed in Germany and France
from 2005 to 2009. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in November 2005. The solid red
vertical line marks the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The dashed green vertical line
marks the implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.
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Germany France
Notes: This figure shows how the seasonally adjusted price index for selected commodity groups developed in Germany and France
from 2005 to 2009. The dotted blue vertical line marks the passing of the coalition agreement in November 2005. The solid red
vertical line marks the final legal decision on the reform to the standard VAT rate in June 2006. The dashed green vertical line
marks the implementation of the respective VAT reform in January 2007.
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Notes: This figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent variable is the log
of the price index for commodity i in month t and country. Commodity, time and country fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are clustered at the commodity group level. The red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in June 2006. The
number of observations can be found in Table 1.A2.
Who Carries the Burden of the Value-Added Tax? Evidence from Germany 47




















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 














-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 
Point estimate 95% conf. int.



















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 


















-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 
Point estimate 95% conf. int.



















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 




















-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Quarters relative to decision on VAT reform 
Point estimate 95% conf. int.
Notes: This figure plots monthly event study estimates and corresponding 95% confidence bands. The dependent variable is the log
of the price index for commodity i in month t and country. Commodity, time and country fixed effects are included. Standard errors
are clustered at the commodity group level. The red vertical line marks the final legal decision on the VAT reform in June 2006. The
number of observations can be found in Table 1.A3.
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Alcoholic beverages Audiovisual equipment Clothing
Footwear Furniture etc. Glass- & tableware etc.
Household appliances Household maintenance Non-alco. beverages
Personal care Personal items Recreational items
Recreational activities Restaurants & hotels Stationary
Tobacco Tools & equipment Vehicles purchase
Service & repair
This figure shows consumption shares for 19 previously defined commodity groups for the first net household income quartile in %.
This figure is based on data from the income and consumption survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the year
2003.
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Tobacco Tools & equipment Vehicles purchase
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This figure shows consumption shares for the 19 previously defined commodity groups for the second net household income quartile
in %. This figure is based on data from the income and consumption survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the
year 2003.
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Personal care Personal items Recreational items
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This figure shows consumption shares for the 19 previously defined commodity groups for the third net household income quartile in
%. This figure is based on data from the income and consumption survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the year
2003.
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This figure shows consumption shares for the 19 previously defined commodity groups for the fourth net household income quartile
in %. This figure is based on data from the income and consumption survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe, EVS) for the
year 2003.
Chapter 2
How Does Economic Deprivation Affect Lo-
cal Fiscal Policy in Germany?
2.1 Introduction
How governments set their tax rates and the quality of the public services they provide is
an important determinant of many outcomes. In terms of economic outcomes, for instance,
fiscal policy impacts the level of public debt, investment, and even growth (Aghion et al.;
2014; Kneller et al.; 1999). But fiscal policy also influences social outcomes, such as social
cohesion or mobility (Schneider; 2010). Moreover, it can also spark political protests, such
as the yellow jackets in France who initially protested against an increase in fuel taxes.
Thus, it can affect political outcomes as well.
This raises the question of what, in turn, determines fiscal policy. One hypothesis
is that as societies become more heterogeneous in terms of income, it also becomes more
difficult to agree on the provision of public services and redistributive policies. At the same
time, there are also hypotheses indicating a positive association between income dispersion
and government size, due a higher demand for redistribution. This is where this paper aims
to make a contribution. Our goal is to identify the causal influence of economic inequality
on fiscal policy outcomes. While existing contributions concentrate on general measures of
income inequality, like the Gini coefficient, we focus on the effect of economic deprivation
on fiscal policy. The Gini coefficient is often criticized for being an imperfect measure of
income inequality, as very different income distributions can lead to the same realization of
the Gini coefficient. For instance, both an increase in income for the rich and a decrease in
This chapter is based on joint work with Lea Immel and Florian Neumeier
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income for the poor can lead to a high Gini coefficient. However, it is especially the latter
scenario which is of interest here, as increasing economic deprivation, i.e. an increase in
inequality driven by the lower bound of the income distribution, aggravates the importance
of redistributive fiscal policies. Specifically, we study the effect of three different measures
of economic deprivation on fiscal policy, namely the poverty gap, the poverty rate, and the
median gap.
We exploit the specific institutional setting in Germany, which grants municipalities
and districts a high degree of fiscal autonomy: they can set the rates of a number of
different taxes and they can decide on spending for several public services. We use this
high level of local variation to identify the effect of economic deprivation on fiscal policy.
For our analysis, we construct a panel data set combining administrative fiscal data
for the universe of German city districts with measures for economic deprivation from the
German Microcensus. Our sample period covers the years from 1993 to 2016. We use
instrumental variables (IV) estimation to draw conclusions about the causal influence of
economic deprivation on local fiscal policy in Germany. Following Boustan et al. (2013),
we construct instruments for region-specific measures of economic deprivation that are
exogenous to asymmetric economic developments, to endogenous political reactions to
growing support for radical parties, and to endogenous sorting of individuals into regions.
Our results are ambiguous regarding the distributional consequences of economic depri-
vation. We find that increasing economic deprivation causes local policy makers to increase
the local business tax rate, while we do not find significant effects on the local property
tax. Given that the local business tax is likely to be perceived as a progressive tax, whereas
the perception of the property tax is more ambivalent, this seems like an attempt to make
the tax system more redistributive as economic deprivation increases. However, aggregate
spending on local public services is negatively affected by economic deprivation. In partic-
ular, this effect is driven by a spending cut on welfare, schooling, and sport facilities. As
these public services are likely to mainly benefit lower income groups, our results suggest
a negative relationship between economic deprivation and redistributive fiscal policies on
the expenditure side. We discuss possible explanations for these ambiguous results as well
as potential transmission channels.
The present paper is related to the literature examining the relationship between in-
come dispersion and the size of the state.1 This relationship has been addressed both
theoretically and empirically. The seminal paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981) builds on
the median voter theorem. Assuming majority rule, a decrease in the median income rela-
tive to the mean income translates into a stronger vote for redistribution. It can therefore
1There are also papers studying other factors that affect local fiscal policy, such as the partisanship of
local councils (Wittrock et al.; 2016).
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be assumed that increasing economic deprivation makes redistributive fiscal policies more
likely.
Epple and Romano (1996) construct a model in which both the public and the private
sector provide goods and services. In contrast to the standard assumptions of the median
voter theorem, this results in non-single peaked preferences, as the decision of whether
to choose a public service or its private alternative depends on the level of the quality of
services provided. In this setting, the median voter theorem does not generally characterize
the voting equilibrium and the level of public provision is below that preferred by the
median income voter as a coalition of poor and rich households favor private over public
provision. Thus, an increase in the number of poor and rich leads to a decrease in the
public provision of goods and lower taxation.
Economic theory can thus motivate both a positive and a negative relationship between
economic deprivation on the one hand and the provision of public services and redistribu-
tive policies on the other hand. However, most theoretical models are based on majority
rule. Hence, their findings only have limited application in a setting with proportional
representation, such as Germany.
The empirical literature on income dispersion and fiscal policy can be broadly divided
into two branches: the first group uses cross-country data, the second group focuses on
sub-national jurisdictions in countries with a federal system. The first group has the
advantage that national governments are typically equipped with more far-reaching fiscal
competencies than sub-national governments. The advantage of the latter group is that
sub-national jurisdictions are typically more comparable with regard to their institutional
and political framework, which mitigates concerns about endogeneity biased estimates.
However, to the best of our knowledge, studies focusing on the sub-national level only exist
for the US. Moreover, both literature branches typically only rely on the Gini coeffcient as
a measure of income inequality.
Milanovic (2000) uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to investigate
the relationship between income inequality and redistribution for 24 countries with a fixed
effects model. He finds a significant positive relation but no evidence that the median voter
theorem can explain the redistribution as the income gain of the middle class proves to be
independent from its initial income.2
Karabarbounis (2011) uses three different indices of income inequality for 14 OECD
countries in the same empirical framework. He argues that not just the median voter, but
2Attempting to test the relationship between redistribution and components of the Mirrless model,
Hannu et al. (2018) also employ LIS data for a sample of 14 countries. Using the optimal tax formula to
construct redistributive preferences, they find a positive correlation between factor-income inequality and
the extent of redistribution, which in turn has a positive effect on governments’ propensity for redistribution.
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the demands of various income groups of voters determine redistribution. Establishing a
positive relationship between the income of the poor and redistribution as well as a negative
relationship between income of the middle and upper class and redistribution, he coins the
term one dollar, one vote politico-economic equilibrium:, an increase in the income of a
group of citizens relative to the average income results in redistribution tilting towards the
bliss point of that group.
Focusing on the sub-national level, our paper is most closely related to Boustan et al.
(2013). Using an IV approach they show that a broadening of the income distribution is
associated with an increase in tax collection and expenditures in US municipalities and
school districts. They also analyze the impact of a rise in inequality on the composition
of local expenditures and find that particularly police, fire protection, and infrastructure
receive additional funding. Similarly Corcoran and Evans (2010) find a positive relation
between income inequality and educational spending on school district level in the US.
Using different inequality measure, Schwabish (2008) shows that both an increase in the
upper- as well as the lower-end of the income distribution leads to an increase in social
spending on non-health and non-educational goods and services. He uses US state-level
data for the time period 1977-2005.
While the above papers focus on the relationship between income inequality and the
size of the public sector, other works concentrate on how income inequality affects tax
progressivity and tax structure. For the 434 local governments in Norway, Borge and
Rattsø (2004) find that a more unequal income distribution causes the tax burden to shift
from the poll to the property tax. This points to an increase in redistribution as the
property tax in Norway is proportional to income. Looking at various determinants of
sub-national tax progressivity in the US, Chernick (2005) finds that greater inequality in
pre-tax income distributions is compensated by more progressive tax systems but the effect
is relatively small.3
As the overview above shows, most existing empirical literature on the sub-national
level focuses on the US. Due to the differences in the political system, the possibilities for
comparing those results with the German setting are limited. Most importantly, the US
uses majority rule, whereas Germany follows the principle of proportional voting, also on
the local level. This difference is likely to impact results. Freier and Odendahl (2012), for
example, show that majority governments spend more on public services and set higher
tax rates, which is in-line with the results for the US presented above. We therefore test
whether fiscal policy differs between divided or unified governments in our data.
More generally, our paper is also related to the literature on the effect of diversity
3As measure for the degree of tax progressivity, Chernick (2005) uses the income tax share compared
to the sales and excise tax shares in state and local tax systems.
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and heterogeneity in society on the size of the welfare state and the willingness to redis-
tribute. Alesina et al. (1999) find that ethnic fragmentation on the local level in the US
is associated with a decrease in the share of spending on public goods, such as education
or infrastructure. An et al. (2018) connect ethnic fragmentation to income inequality by
studying whether the racial structure of inequality, i.e. the between-race component of
income inequality, affects local provision of public goods in the US. While they do not find
consistent evidence that the overall level of income inequality affects local investment in
public goods, they find a significant negative relationship between the between-race com-
ponent of inequality and public goods spending.4 Chevalier et al. (2018) study the effect
of mass migration into West Germany after World War II on local governments’ public
policy. They document a shift in the tax burden towards farm and business owners and
an increase in welfare spending.
The remainder of the paper is structured up as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
institutional background of the local government administration in Germany. Section 2.3
presents our data as well as the measures of economic deprivation that we construct. We
provide descriptive statistics of our data in Section 2.4. The empirical strategy is explained
in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 we present our results on the relationship between economic
deprivation and local fiscal policy. We discuss these results in Section 2.7. Robustness
tests are presented in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background of the Local Government Ad-
ministration in Germany
Due to the federal structure of Germany, power is divided both horizontally as well as
vertically between the 16 federal states (Bundesländer) and the local authorities, that is,
municipalities, districts, and city districts. City districts are large municipalities that con-
stitute their own district, such as Munich or Frankfurt. For reasons of data availability, we
restrict our analysis to city districts (see Section 2.3 for details). Municipalities, districts,
and city districts constitute the lowest level of the state and administrative structure in
Germany. Nevertheless, the German constitution grants them local autonomy within the
limits of the law (German Constitution Art. 28). This right of self-governance includes
financial and tax sovereignty. Financial sovereignty entitles local authorities to manage
their income and expenditure. Tax sovereignty grants them the right to raise taxes as long
as this does not violate higher law. The main tax rates that are determined at the local
level are two types of property tax rates as well as the local business tax (LBT) rate. To
4Similarly, Lind (2007) and Hero and Levy (2018) find evidence for an inverse relationship of between
race inequality and welfare redistribution for the US.
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be precise, the local authorities can decide on the local scaling factor of the property tax
rates and the LBT rate. Particularly the LBT is an important income source for local
authorities. In 2016, for example, the LTB contributed 43% to the overall tax revenue of
the German local authorities. The two property taxes jointly accounted for 14% of the
overall tax revenue (Statistisches Bundesamt; 2017).5
The LBT rate is determined by multiplying the respective local scaling factor with the
basic rate (Gewerbesteuermesszahl). The basic rate is defined at the federal level and from
1993-2007 was set at 5.0% with a decrease to 3.5% in 2008. In contrast, the local scaling
factor for a given year is voted on by the municipal council one year in advance. Thus,
changes in the LBT rate are primarily driven by changes in the local scaling factor, which
is determined by the local authorities.6
There are two types of property tax rates in Germany: property tax rate A, which
applies to agricultural areas, and property tax rate B, which applies to residential property.
The property tax rates are again determined by multiplying their respective local scaling
factor with their respective basic rate (Grundsteuermesszahl), which is determined by
federal law (Property tax law §14 and §15) and depend both on the value and the type of
property. In our main analysis we focus on the property tax B as, together with the LBT,
it constitutes the most important local tax instrument in terms of revenue collection.
In contrast to countries like Norway where the property tax is proportional to income
and thereby constitutes a progressive tax, the incidence of the residential property tax in
Germany is not straightforward. It is proportional to the value of the property. However,
it is, strictly speaking, not a tax on the ownership of property, which would make it more
plausible to classify it as progressive tax as higher income groups in Germany are more
likely to own property (Dustmann et al.; 2018). Instead, it is a tax on the "right to reside"
as it is part of the apportionable service charges. Thus, landlords can pass it on to their
tenants. Indeed, Löffler and Siegloch (2018) show that in the long run both the statutory
and the economic incidence of the property tax are borne by the tenant. Hence, it seems
more likely that the property tax B is a regressive tax.
On the expenditure side, local self-governance includes only those tasks that fall within
the local authorities’ own sphere of influence, whereas it does not apply to tasks that the
federal government or the respective federal state has transferred to the local authority
by law. As we are interested in how local authorities react to changes in local inequality,
only tasks that fall under their own sphere of influence are of interest here. In contrast,
local authorities have no discretion in spending on tasks that do not belong to their area
5The remaining sources of tax revenue are the local authorities’ share of the income tax (37%) and the
sales tax (5%) as well as other taxes (2%).
6Note that the tax base and liability criteria of the LBT are determined at the federal level.
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of influence. Instead, they have to spend a specific earmarked amount on these tasks, for
which they typically receive grants from the respective federal state. Therefore, we restrict
our analysis to those tasks that fall the local authorities’ sphere of influence. These tasks
differ in their degree of local autonomy. In the case of voluntary self-government tasks
(freiwillige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben) the local authority is free to choose whether and
how to carry out the activity. In contrast, local authorities are obliged to fulfill mandatory
self-government tasks (pflichtige Selbstverwaltungsaufgaben), but are free to choose the
manner of provision.
As the definition of the different spheres of influence as well as the different types of
self-government tasks is not precisely and consistently specified across the different consti-
tutions and municipal codes of the federal states, we follow the categorization in Postlep
(1987). We also cross-check this definition with the constitutions and municipal codes
of the federal states where possible and find a great overlap. Accordingly, examples for
voluntary self-government tasks are cultural activities such as operating theaters or the
construction of sports facilities. Mandatory self-government tasks include school mainte-
nance and waste removal. For the purpose of our analysis, both voluntary and mandatory
self-government tasks are of interest as local authorities have at least some degree of au-
tonomy in their provision.7 To account for the varying definitions of tasks across local
authorities, we include regional fixed effects in our regressions (see Section 2.5).
2.3 Data
To analyze the relationship between economic deprivation and local fiscal policies, we
construct a unique panel dataset combining local poverty measures with data on local
government expenditure and taxation. Our panel covers the years 1991 to 2016 for West
Germany and 1998 to 2016 for East Germany. Most importantly, to be able to combine
the spending and taxation data on the municipality-level with the poverty measures on
the district-level, we restrict our sample to city districts. These are large municipalities
that form their own district. Our final sample includes roughly 104 city districts per year8,
of which more than 80% are in West Germany. Our sample of city districts accounts for
roughly 30% of the overall German population.
To create our dataset, we mainly rely on three sources. Regional inequality and poverty
measures are constructed based on microdata from the German Microcensus (Mikrozen-
sus). Data on local taxation is taken from the real property and business tax statistic
(Realsteuervergleich). Finally, local government expenditure is calculated based on the an-
7See Section 2.3.4 for more details.
8The exact number varies 87 in 1993 (West Germany only) and 110 in 2005.
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nual account data of municipalities (Jahresrechnungsstatistik der Gemeinden und Gemein-
deverbände).
2.3.1 The German Microcensus
The Microcensus is a household survey that is carried out annually since 1957 by the
statistical offices of the German states (Statistische Landesämter) and is administered
by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). It comprises a representative
1%-sample of the German population, resulting in a sample size of more than 800,000
persons from almost 400,000 households per year. The Microcensus contains information
about various demographic characteristics, including the county of residence, employment
status, household size, the age of all household members, education levels, and household
income, among others. For our analysis, we use the waves from 1991 to 2016. As the
Microcensus is not available for the years 1995 and 1996, there is a gap in our sample for
these two years. Besides the numerous variables, one major advantage of the Microcensus
is its large sample size, which allows us to construct economic indicators at the regional
level. Moreover, the Microcensus is administered by a federal agency and there is a legal
obligation to answer the questions. Therefore, item-non-response is not an issue. Also,
answers must be truthful and complete.
We use information on monthly net household income to construct our measures of
economic deprivation. To account for differences in household size, we compute equivalized
household incomes using the OECD equivalence scale. In addition, we adjust the income
figures for changes in prices using the consumer price index for Germany. Note that the
income variable in the Microcensus dataset is interval-censored, i.e., respondents are asked
to indicate in which income class they belong to. However, the width of the income classes
is rather narrow and the number of income classes is large, varying between 18 and 24,
depending on the survey year. In order to obtain continuous household income figures, we
apply an imputation approach. That is, we estimate a continuous income figure for each
household based on information on a household’s income class as well as various socio-
demographic characteristics using interval regressions. This imputation technique ensures
that the empirical distribution of the continuous income variable matches the shape of the
distribution of the income classes. As a result, we obtain a single income figure for each
household that is consistent with the observed income limits (see for example Royston
(2008)), which we then use to calculate a number of inequality and poverty measures at
the district-level.
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2.3.2 Indicators of Economic Deprivation
We employ three different indicators of economic deprivation that account for the relative
economic well-being of citizens living in a given district compared to the national average.
Our first indicator measures the poverty rate within a district; that is the share of house-
holds within a district living below the national poverty line znatpov,t in year t. We set the
poverty line at 60 percent of the national median income znat50,t, so that znatpov,t = 0.6× znat50,t.
Our second indicator of economic deprivation is constructed in a similar fashion, but
it measures the average shortfall from the national poverty line instead of the share of
households living below the poverty line. This indicator is widely known as the poverty
gap and is defined by the following formula:








where nit is the number of households from city district i at year t that are included
in the Microcensus data, and yijt is the income of household j.
Our final measure of relative economic deprivation is the average shortfall in the incomes
of a city district’s residents from the national median income. We refer to this measure as
the median gap. It is constructed as follows:








2.3.3 The Property and Trade Tax Statistic
The property and trade tax statistic collects all information regarding local tax revenues.
It is published on a yearly basis by the Federal Statistical Office. Besides recording the
local scaling factors of the property taxes and the LBT, it also includes the respective
tax revenues as well as information on the municipality’s share of the income and sales
tax revenue. As the city states, Bremen, Berlin and Hamburg, have a greater degree of
autonomy over their budget, we exclude them from our sample for consistency.
2.3.4 Annual Account Data of Municipalities
The municipalities’ annual account data for the years 1992-2006 is taken from the statistical
offices of the German states. The data is available for all federal states except for the city
states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. Moreover, for the years 1992-1997 only data for
West Germany is available. The data contains information on income and expenditure of
German municipalities and specifies to which task the cost or income can be assigned. As
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specified in Section 2.2, we focus on voluntary and mandatory self-government tasks for
our analysis, as municipalities have at least some degree of autonomy in their provision.
We therefore select those expenditure items in the municipalities’ account data that fit
this definition and create sensible clusters to obtain our final list of expenditure variables.9
Following this procedure, our final list of expenditure variables includes schooling, welfare,
health, sport, culture, public education, waste disposal, fire protection, local police, and
roads. These variables only cover costs that fall under the definition of voluntary and
mandatory self-government tasks of the municipalities. For schooling expenditure, for
instance, this means that the variable includes costs for school maintenance and wages for
non-teaching staff but it does not cover wages for teaching staff as these costs incur at the
level of the federal states. Moreover, we create an aggregate over all spending on voluntary
and mandatory self-government tasks for a given year and municipality, which we label
aggregate spending in the following.
While the annual account data offers a good approximation of municipalities’ income
and expenditure, it also needs to be noted that this data does not cover all forms of
financing. For instance, so-called Public private partnerships (PPP) are not included in
the data. Thus, if a school or local road is renovated with the funds of a PPP, this is not
included in the annual account data of the municipality. We can therefore only study the
effect of economic deprivation on the officially recorded spending on public services.
2.3.5 Control Variables
In our empirical analysis, we include several control variables depicting the demographic,
economic, and political situation in a city district. We control for its dependency ratio,
population density, the share of foreigners, and mean income. Furthermore, we control
for political polarization, which we define as the aggregate vote share for extreme right
and extreme left parties at national elections.10 To account for the fact that city districts
also have other income sources besides the revenue generated by local businesses and the
property tax, we control for the log of per capita income tax revenue, which the city districts
receive from the federal states.11 Population densities are provided by the Federal Institute
for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Developments (Bundesinstitut für Bau-
9Table 2.B2 in the Appendix shows our selection of expenditure items and how we combined them to
create our final expenditure variables.
10The definition for extreme right and extreme left parties in Germany follows Dorn et al. (2018). Note
that political polarization might be an insufficient control variable as a rise in economic deprivation could
result in political polarization. We therefore rerun our main specification without that control variable.
The results do not change.
11Note that the share of the income tax revenue that city districts receive is fixed, and city districts
cannot manipulate it.
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, Stadt-, und Raumforschung, BBSR). The share of foreigners is taken from the German
Regional Database (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland) as well as the Statistical Offices of
the German states. Federal election outcomes are provided by the federal returning officer
(Bundeswahlleiter). The remaining control variables are calculated based on individual
responses from the German Microcensus.
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
In the following three subsections we provide graphical descriptions of regional economic
deprivation, local taxation and spending on public services. Table 2.B1 in the Appendix
provides summary statistics for all our dependent and control variables.
Figure 2.1: Measures of Economic Deprivation
(a) Poverty Rate (%) (b) Poverty Gap (%)
(c) Median Gap (%)
Notes: This figure shows the development of the average poverty rate, the poverty gap, and the median gap of city districts over the
sample period from 1993 to 2016. Additionally, the standard deviation and the range (P10/P90) for each measure are displayed.
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2.4.1 Regional Economic Deprivation
The average development of the three measures of economic deprivation between 1993
and 2016 for the city districts in Germany is shown in Figure 2.1. All three indicators, the
poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap, evolve rather similary. There is a steady
increase since 1993 with a peak in 2004/2005. The peak could be due to the Hartz reforms,
which were implemented at that time and changed the unemployment and social benefits
system in Germany. The largest drop can be observed in the poverty gap, while the median
gap displays the smallest decline. From 2006 economic deprivation increases again. For
the poverty rate and the poverty gap the increase continues at approximately the same
slope as before the peak, while the slope is slightly reduced for the median gap. During
the sample period, economic deprivation has therefore become a more urgent problem in
German city districts.
2.4.2 Local Taxation
Figure 2.2 illustrates the development of the average local scaling factor of the locally
determined tax rates for the city districts from 1993 to 2016. The local scaling factor of
the LBT rate starts at a level of just over 400% in 1993 and increases slowly until 1997,
when there is a slight decline. Afterwards the local scaling factor of the LBT remains rather
stable until 2009. It then increases to reach approximately 430% in 2016 (see Figure 2.2a).
At around 360% the local scaling factor of the property tax B rate in 1993 is lower than
that of the LBT rate (see Figure 2.2b). However, the local scaling factor of the property
tax B rate increases continuously throughout the sample period, with an increase in the
slope in 2009. By 2016 the level of the local scaling factor of the property tax B rate is
just under 500%. Finally, the local scaling factor of the property tax A rate increases from
just over 250% in 1993 to just over 300% in 2016 (see Figure 2.2c).
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Figure 2.2: Local Tax Rates (Local Scaling Factor)
(a) Business Tax Rate (%) (b) Property Tax B Rate (%)
(c) Property Tax A Rate (%)
Notes: This figure shows the development of the average local scaling factor for the business rate rate, the property tax B rate, and
the property tax A rate of city districts over the sample period 1993 to 2016 in %. Additionally, the standard deviation and the
range (P10/P90) for each measure are displayed.
2.4.3 Local Government Spending
We use the city districts’ annual account data to depict how average per capita spending
for voluntary and mandatory self-government tasks in German city districts has evolved
over the sample period 1993 to 2006. We show the aggregate trend but also break it down
into the individual spending categories. The aggregate average per capita spending is fairly
stable over time at around e1000 as Figure 2.3 shows.
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Figure 2.3: Aggregate Per Capita Spending on Public Services (e)
Notes: This figure shows the development of average aggregate per capita spending on public services in the German city districts
from 1993 to 2006 in e. Public services include only those defined as voluntary and mandatory self-government tasks. Additionally,
the standard deviation and the range (P10/P90) are displayed.
To see whether the composition of spending has changed over time, Figures 2.4a and
2.4b divide aggregate spending for the years 1993 and 2006 into the different categories.
The biggest changes can be observed in the categories waste disposal, welfare and schooling.
While spending on waste disposal accounts for 27% of aggregate spending in 1993, it drops
to 12% in 2006. On the other hand, from 1993 to 2006 the share of spending on schooling
and welfare increases by 5% and 10%, respectively. The share of the remaining categories
remains fairly stable over the sample period.
Figure 2.4: Composition of Spending on Public Services
(a) 1993 (b) 2006
Notes: This figure shows the average share of per capita spending on the different categories of public services in % for the years
1993 and 2006 in the city districts.
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2.5 Empirical Approach
To evaluate the influence of economic deprivation on local taxation and public spending
we estimate the following empirical panel data model first by ordinary least squares (OLS)
and then by an instrumental variables approach:
τit = αi + βDeprivationit + γ′Xit + δt + εit (2.3)
where the dependent variable τit is either the local scaling factor of the property or
business tax in city district i and year t or the city district’s expenditures on its mandatory
and voluntary self-government tasks.12 αi is a city district fixed effect that is included to
account for time-invariant regional-specific factors that are related to economic conditions
and might affect fiscal policy and δt is a year dummy to capture the effect of nation-wide
events. We also include several demographic, economic, and political control variables Xit.
Finally, Deprivationit is a measure of regional economic deprivation. In our empirical
analysis, we employ three different measures of economic deprivation: the poverty rate,
the poverty gap, and the median gap. Moreover, we consider not only the effect of economic
deprivation on the LBT and property tax rates but also the respective revenues per capita.
To account for the skewed distribution of tax revenue, we take logged values.
2.5.1 Endogeneity Concerns and Instrumental Variable Approach
Identifying the causal effect of regional economic deprivation on fiscal policy is challenging
since there are several confounding factors that are correlated with both fiscal policy and
regional economic conditions, such as preferences of local voters or compensatory transfers
from the state or federal government (Boustan et al.; 2013). We try to control for the
first by including the vote share of extreme right and left wing parties at the latest federal
election in our estimation, and for the latter by including the district’s revenue share of
the (national) income tax. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that there
are other relevant variables which we cannot observe and that might distort the results.
Besides omitted variable bias (OVB), biased estimates as a result of household sorting, and
reverse causality are further concerns. While economic deprivation may induce politicians
to adjust local taxes and expenditures, the reverse may also be true. Especially since
socio-demographic characteristics as well as preferences for local public good provisions
can be decisive for households to settle in a certain region. For example, richer households
may prefer to live in regions with higher standards or quality of public services, such as
12To be precise, we use the logged value of per capita spending on mandatory and voluntary self-
government tasks.
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theaters, operas, schools etc., even though local taxes may be higher. This can lead to a
shift in the income distribution.
In order to mitigate concerns regarding biased estimates due to the endogeneity of our
covariates, we apply two-stage least squares estimation using instrumental variables for
our economic deprivation measures. Following Boustan et al. (2013), we use counterfac-
tual (predicted) economic deprivation measures as our instruments for actual economic
deprivation. The instruments are constructed as follows: We first compute the average
household income for each percentile of the national income distribution for all survey
years (1991-2016). Then, we compute the annual national income growth rate for each
percentile. Next, we focus on the initial survey year, determine the income percentile each
household belongs to based on the national income distribution, and multiply each house-
hold’s income with the percentile-specific national income growth rate. In this way, we
obtain hypothetical incomes for all subsequent years for each household we observe in the
initial survey year.13 Finally, we use these hypothetical incomes to compute counterfactual
regional economic deprivation measures as instruments. These economic deprivation mea-
sures indicate how regional economic conditions would have developed in the absence of
inward and outward migration and whether each household’s income would have changed
over time in accordance with the percentile-specific national average. Consequently, our
instruments only capture changes in the regional income distribution that are driven by
national trends and cannot, by design, be influenced by district-specific trends such as
mobility into and out of regions (Boustan et al.; 2013).
The instrumental variables we construct mimic so-called Bartik-style instruments.
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) discuss the conditions under which these instruments
are valid. The authors show that for the exogeneity assumption to hold, differences in
initial conditions - here: a city district’s income distribution in the base year - must be
unrelated to changes in (not: levels of) the outcome variable in the following years. To
test whether this assumption holds, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) propose regressing
changes in the outcome variable on the time-invariant variable that indicates the initial
conditions interacted with time fixed effects. In principle, this approach resembles an
event-study analysis in which the indicator capturing the conditions in the base year is
the (continuous) treatment variable. In our setup, this implies regressing changes in the
tax variables and public spending on the poverty rate, poverty gap, and median gap in
the base year interacted with year dummies. The results are presented in Figure 2.A1 of
the Appendix. For the business tax rate and the property tax B rate, the event study
coefficients are insignificant at every reasonable level of significance, thus indicating the
13To account for the fact that at especially at the beginning of the 1990s, East and West Germany were
still very different, we follow this procedure separately for East and West Germany.
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validity of the IV approach. For aggregate spending, we obtain significant event study
coefficients in the first three sample years. In later years, however, the coefficients become
notably smaller (in absolute terms) and statistically insignificant. We are thus confident
that the bias in the IV estimate, when using aggregate spending as the dependent variable,
is negligible (if existent at all).
An additional challenge specific to the use of district-level data in Germany is that
the number of districts in East Germany has changed considerably after German unifica-
tion due to various administrative-territorial reforms. For example, from 1990 to 1996, the
number of districts in East Germany (excluding East-Berlin) dropped from 215 to 111. For
this reason, we are forced to use the income distribution of 1997 to construct our instru-
ments for East German counties. This, however, implies that we cannot use observations
on East German districts prior to the federal election held in 1998 when employing an
instrumental variable approach.
Table 2.1: Economic Deprivation and LBT - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.129 0.003
[0.391] [0.355]
Poverty Gap 0.049 0.011
[0.896] [0.225]
Median Gap 0.032 0.003
[0.892] [0.647]
Population (Log) -62.607∗∗ -64.543∗∗ -64.510∗∗ -0.334 -0.331 -0.367
[0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.175] [0.165] [0.133]
Share Foreigners 0.109 0.119 0.119 0.009 0.009 0.009
[0.820] [0.804] [0.805] [0.176] [0.163] [0.165]
Dependency Ratio 0.321 0.307 0.306 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.007
[0.146] [0.162] [0.161] [0.092] [0.085] [0.104]
Mean Income -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.237] [0.062] [0.060] [0.212] [0.209] [0.209]
Radical Right 3.405∗∗∗ 3.400∗∗∗ 3.399∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.012 -0.013
[0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.307] [0.327] [0.302]
Radical Left -1.008∗∗ -1.025∗∗ -1.026∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.002
[0.037] [0.035] [0.034] [0.713] [0.699] [0.749]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) 0.013 -0.139 -0.121 0.176∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
[0.997] [0.972] [0.976] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 414.95 414.95 414.95 6.03 6.03 6.03
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.48 0.48 0.48
N 2214 2214 2214 2222 2222 2222
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Local Taxation
We first address the question how economic deprivation in German city districts affects
local taxation. We concentrate on the effect on LBT and the property tax B in our main
analysis, as these are the more important tax instruments in terms of revenue collection.14
Both the effect on the local scaling factor of the respective tax rate and the revenue is
reported. We distinguish between two sample periods: a full sample from 1993 to 2016
and a restricted sample from 1993 to 2006. The restricted sample corresponds to the period
for which the spending data is also available.
Table 2.2: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 3.734∗∗ 0.051∗∗
[0.037] [0.023]
Poverty Gap 5.453∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
[0.038] [0.005]
Median Gap 2.936∗ 0.055∗∗
[0.093] [0.040]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 414.95 414.95 414.95 6.03 6.03 6.03
N 2214 2214 2214 2222 2222 2222
Cragg-Donald 46.08 85.72 73.77 47.40 85.19 72.94
Kleibergen-Paap 13.01 35.68 31.23 13.33 35.20 30.73
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
Full Sample: 1993-2016
For the full sample period from 1993 to 2016, OLS results for the relationship between
economic deprivation and the LBT are presented in Table 2.1. For all three measures
of economic deprivation, there is a positive effect on both the local scaling factor of the
LBT rate (see Columns 1, 2, and 3) and the tax revenue (see Columns 4, 5, and 6).15
However, this effect is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, OLS is likely
to produce biased estimates (see Section 2.5.1).
14Results for the property tax A are reported in the Appendix.
15Note that tax revenue is in log per capita.
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Table 2.2 therefore shows 2SLS estimates for the relationship between economic depri-
vation and the LBT. For all three measures of economic deprivation, there is a positive
effect on the local scaling factor of the LBT rate. For instance, a one percentage point
increase in the poverty rate, leads to an increase in the local scaling factor of the LBT
rate of 3.7 percentage points, which translates into an increase of the average local scaling
factor of the LBT rate by approximately 1% (see Column 1). An increase in the poverty
gap has the largest economic effect: a one percentage point increase in the poverty gap
causes the local scaling factor of the LBT rate to increase by 5.4 percentage points (see
Column 2). The median gap has the lowest economic effect. In comparison to the OLS
estimates, the 2SLS coefficients are larger and statistically significant. This shows that
OLS estimates are indeed biased, for example due to an endogeneity problem, sorting, or
reverse causality. In this respect, our results are in-line with Boustan et al. (2013).
Table 2.3: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.287 0.001
[0.334] [0.429]
Poverty Gap 0.086 0.002
[0.891] [0.248]
Median Gap 0.351 0.001
[0.430] [0.475]
Population (Log) -5.469 -9.827 -7.156 -0.537∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗
[0.922] [0.861] [0.899] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Share Foreigners 0.396 0.419 0.415 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.699] [0.685] [0.687] [0.521] [0.535] [0.533]
Dependency Ratio 0.327 0.294 0.308 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.474] [0.516] [0.498] [0.416] [0.420] [0.393]
Mean Income -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.820] [0.499] [0.774] [0.650] [0.664] [0.653]
Radical Right 12.147∗∗∗ 12.136∗∗∗ 12.150∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Radical Left -1.750∗∗ -1.790∗∗ -1.769∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.017] [0.018] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) -26.786∗∗∗ -27.124∗∗∗ -26.868∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 428.12 428.12 428.12 4.92 4.92 4.92
R2 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.87 0.87 0.87
N 2215 2215 2215 2224 2224 2224
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
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We report both the Cragg-Donald and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics for all three
measures of economic deprivation. As both exceed the respective critical values of the weak
instrument test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005),16 we can reject the weak instrument
assumption.
Table 2.4: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.889 0.003
[0.740] [0.637]
Poverty Gap 1.447 -0.000
[0.726] [0.980]
Median Gap -1.355 -0.003
[0.638] [0.723]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 428.12 428.12 428.12 4.92 4.92 4.92
N 2215 2215 2215 2224 2224 2224
Cragg-Donald 47.61 86.45 74.76 47.23 85.12 72.76
Kleibergen-Paap 13.29 36.17 31.71 13.29 35.21 30.67
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
Economic deprivation not only leads to a higher local scaling factor of the LBT rate but
also to a significant increase in the LBT tax revenue. The magnitude and the statistical
significance on LBT revenue is similar for the poverty rate and the median gap: a one
percentage point increase in either measure leads to a 0.05% increase in LBT revenue per
capita. With an increase in revenue by 0.1%, the effect of a one percentage point increase
in the poverty gap is even larger and the effect is statistically significant also at the 1%
level.
Table 2.3 shows OLS estimates for the local scaling factor of the property tax B rate
and revenue. The 2SLS estimates are displayed in Table 2.4. The point estimates suggest
a positive relationship between economic deprivation and the property tax B. Again, the
magnitude of the OLS results is downward-biased in comparison to the 2SLS estimates.
However, even for the 2SLS estimates, we do not find a statistically significant effect of
any of our economic deprivation measures on the local scaling factor of the property tax
B rate or revenue.17
16The critical values for the Stock-Yogo weak ID F-test are 16.38 (10% maximal IV size), 8.96 (15%),
6.66 (15%), and 5.53 (20%)
17Results for the local scaling factor of the property tax A rate and revenue are shown in Tables 2.B3
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Table 2.5: Restricted Sample: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 7.510∗∗ 0.042
[0.040] [0.135]
Poverty Gap 15.148∗∗ 0.164∗
[0.024] [0.064]
Median Gap 7.774∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
[0.001] [0.043]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 410.05 410.05 410.05 5.86 5.86 5.86
N 1204 1204 1204 1210 1210 1210
Cragg-Donald 15.67 16.74 34.85 15.69 17.22 35.94
Kleibergen-Paap 5.26 5.62 15.76 5.30 5.86 16.60
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
Based on the Cragg-Donald and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistics, we can reject the
weak instrument assumption for this specification as well.
Restricted Sample: 1993-2006
In addition to the complete sample, we also show results for a restricted sample from 1993
to 2006. As data on spending is only available for this time period, restricting the sample
in this way enables us to draw conclusions on how city districts’ taxation and spending
react to economic deprivation for the same time period.
Table 2.5 shows 2SLS estimates for the LBT.18 The point estimates for all three mea-
sures of economic deprivation are again positive and statistically significant. In comparison
to the full sample the magnitude of the point estimates has even increased, suggesting that
the economic impact of economic deprivation on the local scaling factor of the LBT rate is
even greater during the years 1993 to 2006. In-line with that, the LBT revenue increases,
as well. However, this effect is only statistically significant for the poverty gap and the
median gap.
The 2SLS results for the property tax B are summarized in Table 2.6.19 Similarly
to the results for the full sample the point estimates for all three measures of economic
and 2.B4 in the Appendix.
18OLS estimates for the restricted sample for the LBT are shown in Table 2.B5 in the Appendix.
19OLS estimates for the restricted sample for the property tax B are shown in Table 2.B6 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.6: Restricted Sample: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 2.161 0.007
[0.439] [0.421]
Poverty Gap 4.522 0.014
[0.446] [0.441]
Median Gap 3.362 0.010
[0.191] [0.195]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 404.48 404.48 404.48 4.80 4.80 4.80
N 1205 1205 1205 1211 1211 1211
Cragg-Donald 15.96 16.92 35.42 15.86 17.23 35.98
Kleibergen-Paap 5.34 5.70 15.97 5.30 5.86 16.61
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
deprivation are positive both for the local scaling factor of the property tax B rate and
revenue. However, the effects are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
2.6.2 Spending on Local Public Services
Next we turn to the expenditure side of the local budget and the question how economic
deprivation affects how much city districts spend on certain tasks. Our measures for
economic deprivation are again the poverty rate, the poverty gap, and the median gap.
The time period under consideration is 1993-2006. Table 2.7 shows OLS results for the
effect of economic deprivation on Aggregate Spending on voluntary and mandatory self-
government tasks. For all three measures of economic deprivation, the point estimates
are negative. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is low and hence, they are not
economically relevant. Moreover, as outlined in Section 2.5.1, OLS estimates are likely to
be biased.
Comparing the OLS results with the 2SLS results from Table 2.8, suggests that the
OLS estimates are biased towards zero. The 2SLS estimates imply that there is a negative
impact of economic deprivation on aggregate spending. For instance, aggregate spending
in city districts is reduced by 0.123% when the poverty gap increases by one percentage
point. This impact is also statistically significant at the 5% level. Only the negative effect
of the poverty rate on aggregate spending is statistically insignificant.
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Population (Log) -0.305 -0.279 -0.267
[0.321] [0.363] [0.390]
Share Foreigners 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.620] [0.656] [0.676]
Dependency Ratio -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
[0.012] [0.013] [0.015]
Mean Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000
[0.928] [0.743] [0.910]
Radical Right 0.001 0.001 0.000
[0.929] [0.921] [0.965]
Radical Left 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) -0.220∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.221∗∗
[0.040] [0.042] [0.038]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.91 6.91 6.91
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 1203 1203 1203
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %.
Table 2.8 shows how aggregate spending on voluntary and mandatory self-government
tasks reacts to economic deprivation. However, it is also of interest how the individual
categories are affected. Figure 2.5 therefore plots the 2SLS coefficients for all spending
categories by measure of economic deprivation.20
Across all three measures of economic deprivation, the pattern for the effect on the cat-
egories of spending is fairly similar. For most categories, the effect of economic deprivation
is not statistically significant at the 10% level. However, spending on welfare, schooling,
and sport is reduced significantly when any of the three measures of economic deprivation
increases by one percentage point. In addition, a one percentage point increase in the
poverty gap (median gap)leads to a significant reduction in spending on culture (roads).
20Tables 2.B7, 2.B8, and 2.B9 in the Appendix also summarize the 2SLS coefficients for the spending
categories by measure of economic deprivation.
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Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.91 6.91 6.91
N 1202 1202 1202
Cragg-Donald 14.57 17.32 36.77
Kleibergen-Paap 4.84 5.85 17.07
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %.
2.7 Discussion
What are the implications of our results for the effect of economic deprivation on redis-
tribution? It seems that local politicians actually want to make the tax system more
redistributive in response to greater economic deprivation: by increasing the respective
local scaling factor they raise the LBT rate, a tax on businesses. While Fuest, Peichl and
Siegloch (2018) show that the actual incidence of the LBT is shared between corporations
and workers, it is unlikely that local politicians consider aspects such as actual tax inci-
dence in their fiscal policy decisions. Instead, it seems more likely that the perception of
the LBT as a tax on corporations is what drives policy makers. Thus, raising the LBT
rate is likely to be viewed by the general public as a redistributive fiscal policy.
In addition to the positive effect on the LBT, our results reveal that policy makers
do not make statistically significant changes to the property tax B rate in reaction to
increasing economic deprivation. The incidence as well as the perception of the property
tax are less straightforward than in case of the LBT. On the one hand, it is a tax on real
estate, and in Germany higher income groups are more likely to own property (Dustmann
et al.; 2018). On the other hand, as it is part of the apportionable service charges, landlords
can pass it on to their tenants. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that in the long run
tenants bear the burden of the property tax (Löffler and Siegloch; 2018). Thus, there is
some degree of ambiguity in the perception of the property tax B incidence. This might
be an explanation for the fact that policy makers hesitate to adjust the property tax B in
reaction to increasing economic deprivation. Thus, our results for the effect of economic
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Figure 2.5: Categories of Public Services
(a) Poverty Rate (%) (b) Poverty Gap (%)
(c) Median Gap (%)
Notes: This figure plots the 2SLS coefficients and the 90% confidence interval for all spending categories by measure of economic
deprivation.
deprivation on local taxes rather speak for the intention of local politicians to make the
tax system more redistributive. These results are in-line with Borge and Rattsø (2004)
and Chevalier et al. (2018).
In contrast, our results for spending on local public services suggest that increasing
economic deprivation leads to less redistribution. The provision of most public services
should benefit lower income groups most as they cannot afford private alternatives. Thus,
a cut in spending on public services is most likely perceived as regressive fiscal policy.
However, different categories of public services also target different income groups. For
instance, cultural public services, like theater or opera, tend to be perceived as benefiting
higher income groups. Other public services, such as welfare, tend to benefit the lower
income groups. Moreover, with respect to some public services, such as schooling, it
is unclear who benefits most. One the one hand, one could argue that lower income
groups benefit most from a high-quality public provision of educational infrastructure. On
the other hand, Hayo and Neumeier (2019) show that an investment in human capital is
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preferred by those with higher education and income.
As we find that spending on welfare decreases in reaction to economic deprivation, this
fiscal measure is more likely to harm lower income groups. The impact of the decrease in
spending on schooling and sport facilities is more controversial. But here, too, it is more
likely that higher income groups could replace the missing or low-quality public provision
with private alternatives. Comparing our findings with the most closely related paper by
Boustan et al. (2013), the results seem to contradict one another at first glance. Boustan
et al. (2013) find that general expenditure is positively related to inequality. However,
this overall effect in their paper is mainly driven by increases in the expenditure on police
and fire protection, while the coefficients for welfare or health spending are statistically
insignificant. Thus, the overall expenditure effect in Boustan et al. (2013) is driven by
increases in spending on public services that are generally not considered redistributive.
Similarly, the coefficients for police and fire protection in our data are positive, although
statistically insignificant.
Finally, it also needs to be noted that our data on local spending does not include all
possible forms of financing. For instance, we do not have data on public private partner-
ships (PPPs). Hence, we are not able to account for investments in public goods, e.g. the
construction of a hospital, that are financed by means of PPPs.
Given any shortcoming in the data, an important difference to the previous literature
on the sub-national level is that it focuses primarily on the US, which has a majority
rule system. In such a setting the assumptions of the median voter theorem seem appli-
cable. In contrast, Germany follows the principle of proportional voting. Thus, coalition
governments are possible and frequent. This could affect our results since Freier and Oden-
dahl (2012) show that in municipalities with a majority government, spending increases.
They argue that majority governments can reach agreement more easily, whereas divided
governments in a coalition cannot agree on public spending, and may therefore forgo it
altogether. As coalition governments are frequent in German city districts, this inability
to decide could be an explanation for the decrease in spending that we observe. Mean-
while, the decision on local taxation is more straightforward, as there are only two main
tax instruments to decide on. Thus, our ambiguous results regarding the relationship be-
tween economic deprivation and redistribution for local taxation and spending could at
least partly be due to the particular political system in Germany. We test this possibility
by creating two indicator variables, which are proxies for unified and divided governments:
Unified, which is equal to one if one party obtains more than 50% of the votes in the
latest city council election, and Divided, which equals one if no party obtained more than
50% of the votes in the latest city council election. We interact both indicator variables
with our economic deprivation measures. As the coefficients for both interaction terms
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are very similar across the different specifications, we do not find any evidence to support
the hypothesis that unified and divided governments make different fiscal policy decisions
in reaction to economic deprivation.21 This also holds for the subcategories of spending,
especially for those categories for which we find statistically significant results. Thus, we
do not find any evidence to support the hypothesis that divided governments drive our
results.
As we find that tax revenue increases while spending goes down, an interesting question
is whether policy makers decide to use the excess revenue to reduce debt instead. We
therefore plan to extend our analysis to the question of how the level of debt in city districts
is affected by economic deprivation. Furthermore, increasing economic deprivation could
mean that the earmarked grants which the city districts receive are no longer sufficient,
particularly for social welfare. Thus, local policy makers could be forced to contribute a
part of their own budget to finance some of these tasks, which, strictly speaking, do not
fall under their own sphere of influence. Due to data availability, we currently cannot test
this possibility but plan to do so in the future.
Finally, an open question is how economic deprivation actually translates into fiscal
policy measures. For this to happen, policy makers and their voters need to be aware of
it. One possible mechanism of transmission is increasing segregation as income hetero-
geneity in a community increases. Previous literature shows that income inequality seems
to be accompanied by spatial inequality, as different societal groups in the population are
concentrated in different areas (see, for instance, Musterd et al. (2017) or Reardon and
Bischoff (2011)). Helbig and Jähnen (2018) study segregation in 74 bigger cities in Ger-
many. This is particularly relevant for our study, as we focus on city districts in Germany,
which more or less include the cities they analyze. Indeed, Helbig and Jähnen (2018) find
that spatial segregation by social groups has increased in these cities in their sample period
from 2002 to 2014 as, for instance, a growing number of receivers of social benefits lives
in certain parts of the city. Thus, increasing income inequality and economic deprivation
seem to manifest spatially and become apparent in this way. Attentive policy makers could
therefore be aware of them and could make corresponding political decisions.
212SLS results for the LBT, property tax B, and spending can be found in Tables 2.B10, 2.B11, and
2.B12 in the Appendix.
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2.8 Robustness Tests
Since it is possible to argue that it takes some time for economic deprivation to translate
into actual fiscal policy, we additionally run a lagged specification of Equation 2.3. More
precisely, we lag all the economic deprivation measures and the corresponding instruments
by one year but not the control variables. 2SLS estimates for the LBT are reported in
Table 2.B14 in the Appendix.22 We consider the full sample from 1993 to 2016. The point
estimates for the local scaling factor of the LBT rate and the revenue are positive and
statistically significant. Compared to our main specification (see Table 2.2), the effect on
the local scaling factor of the LBT rate is even higher in the lagged specification. This
could indicate that it does indeed take some time for policy makers to react to economic
deprivation.
Table 2.B16 in the Appendix summarizes the lagged 2SLS effects for the property tax
B.23 Similar to our main specification, the effects are not statistically significant.
Finally, Table 2.B18 in the Appendix shows the effect of economic deprivation on
aggregate spending for public services for the lagged 2SLS specification.24 Similar to
our main specification in Table 2.8, the point estimates suggest a negative relationship.
Moreover, the magnitude and the statistical significance is very similar to those in our main
specification. Hence, our results are robust to lagging the economic deprivation measures.
Moreover, to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers in the data, we winsorize
our economic deprivation measures at the 1%- and 5%-level. The results for the local scal-
ing factor of the LBT rate and revenue are robust to winsorizing at both levels as Tables
2.B19 and 2.B20 in the Appendix show. The same is true for the local scaling factor of the
property tax B rate and revenue (see Tables 2.B21 and 2.B22 in the Appendix). Finally,
Tables 2.B23 and 2.B24 in the Appendix show the winsorized results for aggregate spend-
ing. Again, both the magnitude of the point estimates and their statistical significance are
very similar to our main results. This suggests that our results are not driven by outliers
in the data.
22OLS results are shown in Table 2.B13 in the Appendix.
23OLS results are shown in Table 2.B15 in the Appendix.
24OLS results are shown in Table 2.B17 in the Appendix.
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2.9 Conclusion
Fiscal policy determines many important economic, social, and political outcomes. Under-
standing the factors that affect fiscal policy is therefore highly relevant. Income inequality
is found to be such a factor (Meltzer and Richard; 1981). However, it remains contro-
versial whether there is a positive or negative relationship between income inequality and
redistributive fiscal policy measures. This paper aims to contribute to the literature by
shedding light on this relationship.
First, in contrast to previous literature, we do not use a general measure of income
inequality like the Gini coefficient, but focus on inequality driven by the lower bound
of the income distribution. Specifically, we study the effect of three different measures
of economic deprivation - the poverty gap, the poverty rate, and the median gap - on
fiscal policy. This kind of inequality is of particular importance in the given context, as
the impact of redistributive measures is even greater when people cannot afford private
alternatives due to increasing economic deprivation.
Second, we exploit the specific institutional setting in Germany, which grants munici-
palities and districts a high degree of fiscal autonomy. They can set a number of different
taxes and can decide on spending for several public services. We use this rich level in local
variation to identify the effect of economic deprivation on fiscal policy. For our analysis we
combine administrative panel data on the universe of German city districts with measures
for economic deprivation from the German Microcensus.
Third, using instrumental variables estimation allows us to draw conclusions about the
causal influence of economic deprivation on local fiscal policy in Germany. Our instrument
predicts changes in regional economic deprivation through national income trends, which
allows us to overcome confounding effects like mobility and spatial segregation.
We find that increasing economic deprivation causes local policy makers to increase
the local business tax rate, while we do not find significant effects on local property taxes.
Given that the local business tax is likely to be perceived as a progressive tax, whereas the
perception of the property tax is more ambivalent, this seems to be an attempt to make the
tax system more redistributive as economic deprivation increases. In contrast, aggregate
spending on local public services is negatively affected by economic deprivation. This effect
is driven in particular by cuts in spending on welfare and schooling. As lower income groups
probably benefit most from these public services, our results suggest a negative relationship
between economic deprivation and redistributive fiscal policies on the expenditure side.
A possible explanation for our ambiguous findings regarding the relationship between
economic deprivation and redistribution may lie in the German political system, which
makes coalition governments likely. Such divided governments might not be able to agree
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on spending on public services, especially as the different parties might serve different voter
groups. Decisions on taxation, meanwhile, are more straightforward as there are only two
main tax instruments on the local level. We therefore test whether unified or divided city
councils make different fiscal policy decision in reaction to increasing economic deprivation.
However, our results do not provide any evidence to support this hypothesis.
Further explanations could be that city districts use the excess tax revenue to reduce
debt or are forced to invest part of their budget to supplement earmarked grants as eco-
nomic deprivation drives up social welfare costs. We plan to consider both options in future
research.
In summary, our results suggest that economic deprivation is an important factor de-
termining fiscal policy on the local level. However, there remains some ambiguity as to the
nature of the effect, which warrants future research.
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2.A Appendix: Additional Figures
Figure 2.A1: Bartik Instrument Test: Poverty Gap
(a) Business Tax Rate (b) Property Tax B Rate
(c) Aggregate Spending
Notes: This figure plots coefficients and the 90% confidence intervals.
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2.B Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 2.B1: Summary Statistics
1993 - 2016 1993 2006 2016
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Poverty Rate 18.4 5.5 14.2 5.0 18.7 5.8 21.1 5.2
Poverty Gap 4.9 1.9 4.0 1.9 4.7 1.9 5.6 2.1
Median Gap 16.8 3.6 14.1 3.3 17.1 3.9 18.3 3.5
Business Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) 415.1 39.6 403.8 36.6 414.3 37.4 434.1 43.9
Property Tax B Rate (Local Scaling Factor) 428.3 71.5 365.7 44.9 424.8 50.5 501.6 101.7
Property Tax A Rate (Local Scaling Factor) 288.1 68.3 256.6 61.8 285.4 63.8 315.5 72.6
Business Tax Revenues 500.7 343.8 392.7 150.6 595.4 423.2 689.4 408.6
Property Tax B Revenues 142.5 40.5 98.5 20.5 143.0 32.9 181.7 42.9
Property Tax A Revenues 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
Aggr. Spending 1027.6 230.0 996.6 217.0 1051.3 237.0 . .
Welfare 238.7 75.0 165.9 39.3 283.0 72.6 . .
Culture 61.4 56.6 49.3 45.9 48.8 43.8 . .
Schooling 204.8 77.5 176.3 60.6 233.7 86.2 . .
Public Education 24.8 11.4 24.1 12.4 24.1 11.0 . .
Sport 91.2 39.3 97.8 33.7 87.0 38.3 . .
Health 24.7 23.0 33.6 31.2 23.4 19.3 . .
Fire Protection 48.2 18.3 39.0 15.1 53.7 20.0 . .
Local Police 56.0 14.3 49.0 12.5 61.7 14.0 . .
Roads 103.3 53.8 92.6 37.3 110.0 59.4 . .
Waste Disposal 174.5 151.3 269.0 144.6 125.9 135.6 . .
Population (Log) 11.8 0.8 11.8 0.9 11.7 0.8 11.8 0.9
Share Foreigners 11.4 5.6 12.4 5.1 11.2 5.5 14.1 5.5
Dependency Ratio 32.8 3.2 31.5 3.0 32.8 3.2 33.3 3.2
Mean Income 1473.6 212.5 1446.2 105.1 1440.4 166.8 1590.5 163.0
Radical Right 3.0 2.1 3.0 1.7 2.2 1.1 6.4 1.5
Radical Left 7.8 8.5 0.4 0.2 9.1 8.1 9.5 7.1
Income Tax Revenue (Log) 5.6 0.4 5.8 0.1 5.5 0.4 5.6 0.7
Observations 2231 86 103 94
ıNotes: Gini is measured in percent, income percentiles in 100 Euro. Dependency ratio and share of foreigners are measured in
percent of the population. Tax revenues and spending categories are in per capita terms.
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Table 2.B2: Construction of Expenditure Variables




32 (321+323), 33 (331+332+333), 34 Culture
350 + 352 + 355 Public Education
451-458 + 460-468 + 47 + 470 Welfare
51 + 54 Health
55 + 56 + 57 + 58 + 59 Sport
63 + 65 Roads
70 + 72 Waste Disposal
Notes: The table shows how we mapped expenditure items that fall under
the definition of voluntary and mandatory self-government tasks into our final
variables based on their classification code in in the annual account data. In
our definition of voluntary and mandatory self-government tasks we follow
(Postlep; 1987).
Table 2.B3: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax A - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate -0.010 0.004∗
[0.973] [0.081]
Poverty Gap 0.142 0.012∗∗
[0.842] [0.029]
Median Gap -0.151 0.007∗
[0.743] [0.069]
Population (Log) 71.498∗ 72.391∗ 70.319∗ -0.217 -0.231 -0.234
[0.090] [0.082] [0.095] [0.504] [0.470] [0.467]
Share Foreigners -0.214 -0.215 -0.213 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
[0.830] [0.828] [0.831] [0.112] [0.117] [0.119]
Dependency Ratio 0.337 0.345 0.330 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.551] [0.542] [0.557] [0.542] [0.535] [0.602]
Mean Income 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
[0.263] [0.251] [0.300] [0.874] [0.634] [0.889]
Radical Right 6.003∗∗∗ 6.012∗∗∗ 5.996∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.016∗∗
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.046] [0.041] [0.047]
Radical Left -0.268 -0.257 -0.277 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
[0.654] [0.663] [0.640] [0.457] [0.456] [0.435]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) 12.749∗∗ 12.779∗∗ 12.646∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
[0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 287.67 287.67 287.67 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.06 0.06 0.06
N 2215 2215 2215 2217 2217 2217
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
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Table 2.B4: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax A - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 2.738 0.045∗∗
[0.219] [0.037]
Poverty Gap 4.119 0.080∗
[0.335] [0.061]
Median Gap 0.119 0.045
[0.966] [0.111]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 287.67 287.67 287.67 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
N 2215 2215 2215 2217 2217 2217
Cragg-Donald 47.61 86.45 74.76 48.02 85.00 73.81
Kleibergen-Paap 13.29 36.17 31.71 13.63 35.27 31.25
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
Table 2.B5: Restricted Sample: Economic Deprivation and LBT - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.292∗∗ 0.001
[0.049] [0.786]
Poverty Gap 0.496 0.003
[0.120] [0.758]
Median Gap 0.269 0.001
[0.255] [0.908]
Population (Log) -79.683∗∗ -83.349∗∗ -84.720∗∗ -0.455 -0.452 -0.477
[0.032] [0.025] [0.027] [0.368] [0.375] [0.345]
Share Foreigners -0.102 -0.086 -0.080 0.008 0.008 0.008
[0.815] [0.846] [0.857] [0.275] [0.275] [0.276]
Dependency Ratio -0.599∗∗ -0.607∗∗ -0.614∗∗ 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.013] [0.012] [0.011] [0.610] [0.609] [0.616]
Mean Income -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.138] [0.033] [0.039] [0.141] [0.166] [0.158]
Radical Right 0.104 0.108 0.143 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.906] [0.903] [0.871] [0.892] [0.899] [0.884]
Radical Left -0.999∗∗ -1.027∗∗ -1.044∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.027] [0.023] [0.022] [0.877] [0.880] [0.856]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) 14.711 14.445 14.809 0.244 0.242 0.244
[0.201] [0.209] [0.198] [0.149] [0.152] [0.148]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 410.05 410.05 410.05 5.86 5.86 5.86
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.34 0.34 0.34
N 1204 1204 1204 1210 1210 1210
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. Revenue variables are logged per capita.
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Table 2.B6: Restricted Sample: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.472 0.002∗∗
[0.112] [0.042]
Poverty Gap 1.203∗ 0.006∗∗∗
[0.084] [0.001]
Median Gap 0.701 0.003∗∗
[0.157] [0.032]
Population (Log) 14.842 13.704 11.177 -0.532∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗
[0.769] [0.787] [0.824] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Share Foreigners -0.530 -0.504 -0.487 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.681] [0.694] [0.704] [0.760] [0.784] [0.804]
Dependency Ratio -0.314 -0.317 -0.334 -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
[0.447] [0.441] [0.417] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005]
Mean Income -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
[0.054] [0.067] [0.054] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001]
Radical Right 5.197∗∗∗ 5.163∗∗∗ 5.248∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.022] [0.027] [0.021]
Radical Left -1.174∗ -1.181∗ -1.216∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
[0.092] [0.092] [0.084] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
Income Tax Revenue (Log) 43.289∗∗∗ 42.652∗∗∗ 43.567∗∗∗ 0.024 0.021 0.025
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.551] [0.606] [0.532]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 404.48 404.48 404.48 4.80 4.80 4.80
R2 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.82 0.83 0.82
N 1205 1205 1205 1211 1211 1211
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the






















Table 2.B7: Poverty Rate and Spending on Categories of Public Services - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Welfare Schooling Public Education Culture Sport Health Local Police Fire Protection Roads Waste Disposal
Poverty Rate -0.056∗∗ -0.083∗∗ 0.026 -0.121 -0.102∗ -0.064 0.010 0.037 -0.210 0.061
[0.042] [0.034] [0.572] [0.286] [0.065] [0.399] [0.452] [0.242] [0.151] [0.593]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 5.42 5.26 3.11 3.73 4.44 2.75 4.00 3.78 4.52 4.13
N 1202 1202 1178 1194 1202 1165 1202 1202 1201 1169
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the
median gap are in %.
Table 2.B8: Poverty Gap and Spending on Categories of Public Services - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Welfare Schooling Public Education Culture Sport Health Local Police Fire Protection Roads Waste Disposal
Poverty Gap -0.174∗∗ -0.302∗∗ 0.064 -0.678∗ -0.188∗ -0.164 0.021 0.026 -0.360 0.261
[0.028] [0.030] [0.612] [0.066] [0.053] [0.376] [0.472] [0.659] [0.116] [0.376]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 5.42 5.26 3.11 3.73 4.44 2.75 4.00 3.78 4.52 4.13
N 1202 1202 1178 1194 1202 1165 1202 1202 1201 1169
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the






















Table 2.B9: Median Gap and Spending on Categories of Public Services - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Welfare Schooling Public Education Culture Sport Health Local Police Fire Protection Roads Waste Disposal
Median Gap -0.076∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.234 -0.097∗∗ -0.054 0.007 0.009 -0.183∗ 0.130
[0.001] [0.001] [0.593] [0.110] [0.036] [0.430] [0.639] [0.749] [0.075] [0.259]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 5.42 5.26 3.11 3.73 4.44 2.75 4.00 3.78 4.52 4.13
N 1202 1202 1178 1194 1202 1165 1202 1202 1201 1169
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the
median gap are in %.
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Table 2.B10: Divided Government: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate * Unified 3.067∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.008]
Poverty Rate * Divided 2.373∗ 0.042∗∗∗
[0.066] [0.001]
Poverty Gap * Unified 8.410∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗
[0.007] [0.021]
Poverty Gap * Divided 5.612∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.002]
Median Gap * Unified 2.429 0.044∗
[0.247] [0.052]
Median Gap * Divided 1.890 0.059∗∗∗
[0.402] [0.008]
Controls Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 415.00 415.00 415.00 6.03 6.03 6.03
N 2217 2217 2217 2225 2225 2225
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %.
Table 2.B11: Divided Government: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate * Unified 2.373 0.012∗∗∗
[0.166] [0.006]
Poverty Rate * Divided 1.515 0.010∗∗
[0.343] [0.020]
Poverty Gap * Unified 5.767 0.027∗∗
[0.197] [0.014]
Poverty Gap * Divided 1.606 0.016
[0.655] [0.110]
Median Gap * Unified 2.932 0.016∗∗
[0.261] [0.013]
Median Gap * Divided 1.229 0.013∗∗
[0.642] [0.043]
Controls Interacted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 428.14 428.14 428.14 4.92 4.92 4.92
N 2218 2218 2218 2227 2227 2227
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %.
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Table 2.B12: Divided Government: Economic Deprivation and Aggregate Spending on
Public Services - 2SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Poverty Rate * Unified -0.030
[0.121]
Poverty Rate * Divided -0.026∗
[0.065]
Poverty Gap * Unified -0.194∗∗
[0.016]
Poverty Gap * Divided -0.146∗∗
[0.025]
Median Gap * Unified -0.077∗∗∗
[0.004]
Median Gap * Divided -0.070∗∗∗
[0.001]
Controls Interacted Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.91 6.91 6.91
N 1202 1202 1202
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %.
Table 2.B13: Lagged: Economic Deprivation and LBT - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Poverty Rate 0.098 0.004
[0.536] [0.235]
L.Poverty Gap 0.336 0.009
[0.410] [0.296]
L.Median Gap 0.111 0.002
[0.656] [0.665]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 415.90 415.90 415.90 6.05 6.05 6.05
R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.47 0.47 0.47
N 2016 2016 2016 2023 2023 2023
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.
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Table 2.B14: Lagged: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Poverty Rate 3.480∗∗ 0.055∗∗
[0.020] [0.025]
L.Poverty Gap 7.551∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
[0.018] [0.007]
L.Median Gap 4.523∗∗ 0.075∗
[0.033] [0.053]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 415.90 415.90 415.90 6.05 6.05 6.05
N 2015 2015 2015 2022 2022 2022
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.
Table 2.B15: Lagged: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - OLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Poverty Rate 0.310 0.001
[0.355] [0.469]
L.Poverty Gap 0.069 0.000
[0.927] [0.778]
L.Median Gap 0.518 0.000
[0.304] [0.762]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 432.32 432.32 432.32 4.95 4.95 4.95
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.84 0.84 0.84
N 2016 2016 2016 2025 2025 2025
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.
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Table 2.B16: Lagged: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.Poverty Rate 3.020 0.001
[0.226] [0.855]
L.Poverty Gap 5.639 -0.009
[0.262] [0.468]
L.Median Gap 1.584 -0.009
[0.675] [0.353]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 432.32 432.32 432.32 4.95 4.95 4.95
N 2015 2015 2015 2024 2024 2024
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.








Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.92 6.92 6.92
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10
N 1010 1010 1010
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.
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Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.92 6.92 6.92
N 1009 1009 1009
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in %. The economic deprivation measures and the
corresponding instrument are lagged by one year.
Table 2.B19: Winsorized 1%-level: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 3.840∗∗ 0.053∗∗
[0.037] [0.025]
Poverty Gap 5.763∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
[0.040] [0.006]
Median Gap 3.151 0.059∗∗
[0.103] [0.047]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 414.95 414.95 414.95 6.03 6.03 6.03
N 2214 2214 2214 2222 2222 2222
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and are winsorized at the 1%-level.
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Table 2.B20: Winsorized 5%-level: Economic Deprivation and LBT - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 4.739∗∗ 0.065∗∗
[0.042] [0.032]
Poverty Gap 6.811∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.009]
Median Gap 4.083 0.077∗
[0.113] [0.064]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 414.95 414.95 414.95 6.03 6.03 6.03
N 2214 2214 2214 2222 2222 2222
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and are winsorized at the 5%-level.
Table 2.B21: Winsorized 1%-level: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 0.914 0.003
[0.740] [0.638]
Poverty Gap 1.529 -0.000
[0.726] [0.980]
Median Gap -1.453 -0.003
[0.637] [0.722]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 428.12 428.12 428.12 4.92 4.92 4.92
N 2215 2215 2215 2224 2224 2224
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and winsorized at the 1%-level.
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Table 2.B22: Winsorized 5%-level: Economic Deprivation and Property Tax B - 2SLS
Tax Rate (Local Scaling Factor) Tax Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Rate 1.124 0.004
[0.740] [0.638]
Poverty Gap 1.803 -0.000
[0.725] [0.981]
Median Gap -1.876 -0.003
[0.636] [0.721]
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 428.12 428.12 428.12 4.92 4.92 4.92
N 2215 2215 2215 2224 2224 2224
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the effect on the local scaling factor of the tax rate. Columns 4, 5, and 6 show the
effect on tax revenue. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and winsorized at the 5%-level.
Table 2.B23: Winsorized 1%-level: Economic Deprivation and Aggregate Spending on








Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.91 6.91 6.91
N 1202 1202 1202
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and winsorized at the 1%-level.
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Table 2.B24: Winsorized 5%-level: Economic Deprivation and Aggregate Spending on








Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Political Polarization Yes Yes Yes
Income Tax Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. Variable 6.91 6.91 6.91
N 1202 1202 1202
Notes: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the city district level. */**/*** indicate significance at the
10%/5%/1% level. The poverty rate, the poverty gap and the median gap are in % and winsorized at the 5%-level.
Chapter 3
How will Brexit affect Tax Competition
and Tax Harmonization?
The Role of Discriminatory Taxation
3.1 Introduction
The decision of the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the European Union (EU) has given
rise to a lively debate about the implications of this move for corporate tax competition
in Europe. In this debate, two predictions are frequently mentioned. The first is that the
UK might become a large tax haven on the EU’s doorstep, trying to lure investment and
jobs away from other countries by offering low tax rates. The second prediction is that,
once the UK has left remaining EU member states will finally take steps toward more tax
harmonization.
The trouble with the first prediction is that there is currently nothing that stops the
UK from cutting taxes to attract investment, certainly not EU membership. There is no
minimum corporate tax rate in the EU. In fact, the UK has repeatedly reduced its tax
rate in recent years and currently has a much lower rate than comparable countries like
Germany, France or Italy (see Figure 3.1).1
This chapter is based on joint work with Clemens Fuest (Fuest and Sultan; 2019)
1Of course, if Brexit raises trade costs, this may force the UK to cut corporate taxes in order to stay
attractive as location for foreign direct investment. At least this would be the prediction of tax competition
models with increasing returns to scale, see Haufler and Wooton (1999).
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Figure 3.1: Corporate Tax Rates 1979-2017 (%)
Notes: This figure shows the development in corporate tax rates across Europe for the time period
1979-2017. The data is retrieved from various sources such as EY Tax Reports and the OECD.
The trouble with the second prediction is that UK membership does not prevent the
other EU member states to engage in tax harmonization if they want to do so. For
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instance, they could use the instrument of enhanced cooperation, which allows a subset of
EU member states to act jointly in different policy areas, including taxation. In addition,
it is certainly correct that a change in EU membership may also change incentives for
harmonization, but whether harmonization becomes more or less likely is far from trivial,
as the analysis in this paper shows.
In this paper we focus on another aspect of the tax policy implications of Brexit: The
fact that after leaving the EU, the UK will no longer be subject to EU state aid regulations
established in Articles 107 to 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
and the EU code of conduct for business taxation.2 While these regulations do not prevent
national governments from cutting headline tax rates, they do prevent them from offering
different tax rates to different companies or sectors. This form of tax discrimination plays
an important role in international tax policy. The relevance of the issue is exemplified
by the recent opening of in-depth investigations by the EU Commission into the UK tax
scheme for multinationals.3 Since 2013 the UK allows for an exemption to its Controlled
Foreign Company (CFC) rules, the Group Financing Exemption. It states that financing
income received by the offshore subsidiary of a UK-based multinational from a foreign
group company is exempted from reallocation to the UK. Hence, the UK parent company
is able to pay little or no tax on the financing income generated via that scheme. The EU
Commission has raised doubts as to whether the Group Financing Exemption complies
with EU state aid rules, as an exemption to an anti-avoidance provision, such as CFC
rules, can amount to a selective advantage for certain companies (EU Commission; 2017).
If the UK leaves the EU and starts to target its corporate tax policy to specific firms or
sectors even more aggressively, this may have consequences for corporate tax competition
throughout Europe.4
2This obviously also depends on the kind of Brexit deal the UK strikes with the EU. In case of a
membership to the European Economic Area, the UK would have to replicate all EU state aid rules, while
in case of a trade agreement, the impact on state aid regulations is less clear. For instance, in the CETA
deal between the EU and Canada, there are no state aid rule provisions (Mor; 2017).
3Similarly, the EU Commission has concluded in 2016 that Ireland’s tax benefits to Apple were illegal
under EU state aid rules and recently has reached the same conclusion about tax benefits granted to
Amazon in Luxembourg.
4The UK is not only subject to EU state aid regulations, but also to the WTO agreement on subsidies
and countervailing mechanisms. However, the WTO system is considered much less stringent than the EU
system (Mor; 2017). The most important difference between the two systems is that the WTO rules do
not provide for any ex ante control, but only ex post control. This allows a member state to challenge
another member state’s subsidy before the WTO dispute settlement body, where it has to prove that the
subsidy causes harm to itself. Instead, the EU system allows for both ex ante and ex post control. Thus,
a member state planning to grant aid must notify the EU Commission as implementation of the measure
depends on its clearance decision. Moreover, the EU Commission reviews aids and can request modification
to previously approved aid schemes. This means that EU rules do not require an official complaint from
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To investigate the implications of a policy shift towards tax discrimination we set up
a simple three-country model with competition for internationally mobile capital. There
are three sectors in the economy, each of which connects two of the three countries. This
implies that each country hosts two sectors. Since these sectors are different, for example
regarding size, countries have incentives to treat them differently for tax purposes. We start
by analyzing a situation where the three countries form a ‘union’ that bans discrimination
within countries. We compare this situation, in terms of tax competition outcomes and tax
harmonization incentives within the union, to a situation where one of the three countries
leaves the union and introduces discriminatory taxation. We also discuss how the stylized
setup of our model links back to the situation in the EU.
Our analysis leads to three key results. First, the introduction of tax discrimination in
one country, while the two other countries stick to uniform taxation but set their tax rates
independently, leads to increasing tax heterogeneity regarding rates as well as revenue
within the union. Second, if the two countries remaining in the union harmonize their
tax rates, the introduction of tax discrimination in the third country redistributes tax
revenue between the countries remaining in the union. The country with lower taxes before
harmonization loses while the high tax country benefits. Third and most importantly, the
incentives for tax harmonization among the countries remaining in the union decline as
the third country introduces discriminatory taxation. This also holds if countries can use
transfers to share gains from harmonization.
These results are important for several reasons. First, the fact that a country leaves the
union does not generally intensify tax competition, it puts the low tax countries remaining
in the union under stronger competitive pressure and eases pressures on high tax countries.
What does that imply for tax policy? For instance, currently multinational firms use low
tax jurisdictions like Ireland and the Netherlands to shift profits out of the United Kingdom.
The relatively large domestic tax base as well as lower competitive pressures from other high
tax countries like Germany or France, combined with EU rules against tax discrimination,
prevent the UK from competing more aggressively with the Netherlands and Ireland. Our
model predicts that, after leaving the EU, the UK will offer more attractive tax regimes
targeted to those firms and sectors which currently shift profits to the Netherlands and
Ireland. Second, the result that exit by one country makes harmonization among the
other countries less attractive does not rely on the argument that tax coordination or
harmonization becomes less effective if the number of participating countries falls and
a member state to be triggered. Other differences between the two systems are that the default position
in WTO rules is that subsidies not targeted at exports and/or imports substitution are generally allowed,
while they are generally considered illegal under EU rules. Moreover, WTO rules do not apply domestically
but only apply to international trade. For a more complete discussion of the two systems, see Ehlermann
and Goyette (2006).
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leakage effects grow (Konrad and Schjelderup; 1999): in our analysis, we compare situations
where there is an outsider who does not participate. More generally, the intuition that the
deviation of one country from a common tax policy norm – uniform tax rates – increases the
willingness to harmonize taxes within the group of the remaining countries complying with
the norm does not hold in our model. The opposite is true. This questions the widespread
view that Brexit will make tax coordination or harmonization among the remaining EU
countries more likely.
This paper is related to the literature on the economic consequences of Brexit.5 This
literature focuses on the implications of the rising trade costs for international trade and
welfare in the United Kingdom and the EU (Aichele and Felbermayr; 2015; Dhingra et al.;
2017; Felbermayr et al.; 2017), on the effect of Brexit anticipated by financial markets
(Davies and Studnicka; 2018; Schiereck et al.; 2016), on the effect on foreign direct invest-
ment (Dhingra et al.; 2016), and on consequences for the EU Budget (Felbermayr et al.;
2017), where the United Kingdom is a net contributor.
More specifically this paper is related to the literature on tax competition, coordina-
tion and preferential regimes, which started to develop in the late 80s as the internation-
alization of economic activity strained national tax structures (Zodrow and Mieszkowski;
1986).6 Keen (2001) analyzes a situation of two symmetric countries and concludes that
the introduction of preferential tax regimes can hamper tax competition. He assumes that
both countries are able to discriminate. In contrast to Keen (2001), Janeba and Peters
(1999) conclude that a uniform tax regime is preferable to tax discrimination as it allows
governments to exploit the mobile tax base. In a model with home bias of investors, Haupt
and Peters (2005) show that a partial restriction of preferential tax regimes increases tax
revenues. Janeba and Smart (2003) show that the benefits of tax discrimination depend on
the elasticity of the aggregate tax bases, reconciling the seemingly contradictory findings
of Keen (2001) and Janeba and Peters (1999). In a model with imperfect competition and
trade costs, Gaigné and Wooton (2011) compare the Nash equilibrium tax regimes. I trade
costs are high enough, a uniform tax regime is preferred. Otherwise countries will choose
to discriminate between mobile and immobile firms.
We also contribute to the literature on asymmetric tax competition. In a simple two-
country model, Kanbur and Keen (1993) analyze how tax competition and coordination
are affected by differences in country size. They conclude that the small country loses in
terms of tax revenue from harmonization. But they also find that both countries benefit
from the introduction of a minimum tax rate. Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) extend
Keen (2001)’s model to the case of asymmetric countries. They arrive at similar results
5Sampson (2017) provides a very useful survey of this literature.
6See Keen and Konrad (2013) for a complete discussion of the literature.
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as in the symmetric case. Similarly, Bucovetsky (1991) and Stöwhase (2005) analyze tax
competition when countries differ in size.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on partial tax coordination, where only a
subset of countries participates in tax coordination or harmonization agreements (Konrad
and Schjelderup; 1999; Conconi et al.; 2008; Haufler and Lülfesmann; 2015).
Finally, this paper can be linked to the literature on tax havens (Desai et al.; 2004;
Hong and Smart; 2010; Slemrod and Wilson; 2009; Johannesen; 2010; Becker and Fuest;
2012), where one of the central issues is whether tax havens mitigate tax competition
among non-haven countries.
This paper extends the literature by analyzing the effects of tax discrimination on tax
competition and harmonization in a three-country model. We consider a situation where
some countries are allowed to discriminate while others are not and where only a subset of
countries harmonizes taxes.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the model. In
Section 3.3 we analyze various tax competition equilibria with and without discrimination.
Section 3.4 focuses on tax harmonization and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
There are three countries A, B and C. Each country hosts two sectors. Each of these sectors
links the country to one of the two other countries. The companies in all sectors operate
under perfect competition in input and output markets. The number of firms per sector
and the output price are normalized to unity. Each firm is endowed with a sector specific
factor of production which is mobile across borders but not across sectors (Keen; 2001).
We refer to this factor as capital. Sector A has its headquarter in country A and employs
firm specific but internationally mobile capital either in country A or in its subsidiary
in country B, sector B has its headquarter in country B and a subsidiary in country C.
Accordingly, sector C resides in country C and has a subsidiary in A. The profit of the
representative firm in sector A is given by
PA = FAA (KA) + FBA (SA −KA)− TAKA − TBA(SA −KA), (3.1)
where FAA (KA) + FBA (SA − KA) is the firm’s revenue generated in countries A and
B, SA is the firm’s endowment of sector specific capital and KA is investment in country
A. Thus, the only choice the firm makes is to allocate its capital stock across the two
production locations in countries A and B. TA is the corporate tax country A levies per
unit of capital employed in sector A and TBA is the corporate tax on sector A investment
levied by country B. This setup implies that countries use territorial corporate taxation.
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Figure 3.2: The Model
Notes: This figure shows how countries A, B and C are connected by the different sectors SA, SB and SC
and the respective tax rates in the initial situation of non-discrimination in the model.
This is in line with existing tax regimes in the EU.7 Profit maximizing investment is given
by the first order condition
FA
′
A − TA = FB
′
A − TBA. (3.2)
Figure 3.2 visualizes how countries A, B and C are connected by the different sectors.
The tax revenue of country A is given by
RA = TAKA + TAC(SC −KC).
Accordingly, the tax revenue of countries B and C is given by
RB = TBKB + TBA(SA −KA)
and
RC = TCKC + TCB(SB −KB).
We consider two types of tax regimes for each country: uniform taxation, where both
sectors operating in the countries are taxed at the same rate, i.e. for country A this would
imply TA = TAC , and discriminatory taxation, where the two tax rates may differ.
7With the exception of Greece, Ireland and Poland, all EU members currently follow the territorial
approach to corporate taxation. The UK switched from worldwide to territorial taxation in 2009 (Matheson
et al.; 2013).
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Following Keen (2001), we assume that countries maximize their tax revenue and take
the behavior of the companies and the tax rates of the other countries as given. The focus
of our analysis is how the ability of countries to tax the two sectors differently affects the
tax competition equilibria and the incentives for tax harmonization between two of the
three countries.
To make the following analysis tractable, we follow Bucovetsky (1991) as well as Bu-
covetsky and Haufler (2007) in assuming that the production technology is quadratic:
F ji (K
j







2, i, j = A,B,C. (3.3)
Note that the factor determining asymmetries between the three countries is the en-
dowment of sector specific capital Si, i = A,B,C.
The first-order condition for firm A’s optimal investment can be written as
KA =
SA
2 + TBA − TA (3.4)
and the tax revenue of country A is
RA = TA(
SA
2 + TBA − TA) + TAC(
SC
2 + TC − TAC). (3.5)
For B and C we get, accordingly
RB = TB(
SB
2 + TCB − TB) + TBA(
SA




2 + TAC − TC) + TCB(
SB
2 + TB − TCB).
3.3 Tax Competition
As mentioned above, we assume that governments use the available tax instruments to
maximize their tax revenue. We consider two types of equilibria. First, we assume that
all countries tax the two sectors uniformly, that is they operate under uniform taxation.
Second, we consider the situation where A and B do not discriminate but C does.8
8The equilibrium tax rates and revenues in the case where all countries discriminate can be found in
the Appendix.
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3.3.1 Uniform Taxation in All Countries
Denote the uniform tax rate of country j by Tj , j=A,B,C. Under uniform taxation in all
countries the tax rate which maximizes tax revenue of country A, given the tax rates of B
and C, is
4TA − TB − TC =
SA + SC
2 .
Accordingly, the ‘reaction functions’ of countries B and C are given by




4TC − TB − TA =
SB + SC
2 .
These three equations can be solved for the equilibrium tax rates which emerge under
a regime of uniform taxation in all countries. This leads to
T uA =
1
10(2SA + 2SC + SB), (3.6)
T uB =
1
10(2SA + 2SB + SC), (3.7)
T uC =
1
10(2SB + 2SC + SA). (3.8)
Substituting into the revenue functions yields
Ruj = 2(T uj )2, j = A,B,C. (3.9)
Unsurprisingly, the tax rates emerging in the tax competition equilibrium depend on
the capital endowment of the different sectors. For instance, country A hosts activities of
sectors A and C but not of B. This is why the capital endowments of sectors A and C play
a greater role for its tax rate than the capital endowment of sector B. The latter is relevant
for country A only indirectly because it determines the tax rates of the other countries,
which do compete with country A for activities of sectors A and C.
3.3.2 Country C Discriminates While A and B Employ Uniform Taxa-
tion
We now consider the asymmetric situation where countries A and B levy uniform tax rates
but country C discriminates between the two sectors. In this case, the tax competition
equilibrium changes. Country C’s ‘tax reaction functions’ are now given by TC = SC4 +
TA
2
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and TCB = SB4 +
TB
2 . Reaction functions for countries A and B are the same as in the
previous subsection.




30(7SC + 6SA + 2SB), (3.10)
where the superscript udc stands for the equilibrium in which A and B have uniform
tax rates and country C discriminates. For country B we get
T udcB =
1
30(7SB + 6SA + 2SC). (3.11)
With these results, one can now derive the equilibrium values of TC as well as TCB:
T udcC =
1
30(SB + 3SA + 11SC), (3.12)
T udcCB =
1
30(11SB + 3SA + SC). (3.13)
For tax revenue we get
Rudcj = 2(T udcj )2, j = A,B (3.14)
and
RudcC = (T udcC )2 + (T udcCB )2. (3.15)
For the following analysis note that C will discriminate only if SB 6= SC .
3.3.3 How Does Discrimination in C Affect Equilibrium Tax Rates and
Revenues?
A key issue is how the introduction of discrimination in country C affects tax rates and
revenues in the other countries. In this section we compare the tax rates and revenues
in countries A and B for the situation of uniform taxation in all countries to the scenario
where only country C discriminates. For country A the relevant tax rates are given by
equations (3.6) and (3.10). Subtraction leads to
T uA − T udcA =
1
30(SB − SC). (3.16)
For country B the same procedure leads to:
T uB − T udcB =
1
30(SC − SB). (3.17)
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Note also that, under uniform taxation, the difference between the tax rates of A and
B is given by9:
T uA − T uB =
1
10(SC − SB). (3.18)
These results may be summarized as
Result 1: Tax Rates
If SB 6= SC , the tax rates of countries A and B differ under the regime of uniform taxation
within all countries. If country C switches to discriminatory taxation while A and B stick
to uniform taxation, the tax rates of A and B always move into opposite directions. Thus,
the tax rate difference between A and B increases.
How can this be explained? Consider for example the case where SC > SB, so that
country A levies a higher tax rate than B: T uA > T uB, as the capital endowment that connects
the respective country with C, is larger for country A than for country B. In this case,
country C would like to levy a higher tax on sector C than on B but non-discrimination
forces country C to choose a uniform rate. The equilibrium uniform tax rate in country
C will be between the rates that would be optimal for sectors B and C. When country
C switches to tax discrimination, it will compete less fiercely for sector C investment and
more fiercely for sector B investment. This in turn will induce country A to increase
its tax rate as well while country B responds by cutting its rate. The growing tax rate
divergence between A and B mirrors the tax rate divergence within country C. Therefore
discrimination in country C will drive the tax rates in countries A and B further apart.
As the previous results have shown, C will use its ability to discriminate if and only if
SB 6= SC . For the following analysis we therefore make
Assumption 1: Sector Sizes
Sector C is strictly larger than sector B, that is, SC > SB.
It is important to note that, given the setup of our model, Assumption 1 has two
implications. The first is that country A will want to levy higher taxes than country B.
The second is that, if country C discriminates, it will want to tax sector C at a higher
rate than B because rents in sector C are larger. This drives many of the results in the
following sections. Theoretically it would be possible to use a different setup, where the
tax rate difference between countries A and B is not determined by the size of the rents
in the sector which links these two countries to country C. For instance, there could be a
9Note also that under discriminatory taxation in C, the tax rate difference between A and B is given
by T udcA − T udcB = 16 (SC − SB), which is larger than the tax rate difference under uniform taxation
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very profitable and immobile fourth sector operating in country B only, which drives up
taxes there. We will come back to this issue in the discussion of the results.
Consider next the impact on tax revenue. It follows directly from equations (3.9) and
(3.14) that the regime switch of country C will increase tax revenue for the high tax country










B − S2C) + (12SA + 8SB)(SB − SC)]. (3.20)
However, aggregate tax revenue of A and B will increase due to the regime switch as
adding up equations (3.19) and (3.20) yields
(RudcA −RuA) + (RudcB −RuB) =
4
225(SB − SC)
2 > 0. (3.21)
How about country C? It is straightforward to show that the following holds
RudcC −RuC = (T udcC )2 + (T udcCB )2 − 2(T uC)2 =
1
18(SB − SC)
2 > 0. (3.22)
We may thus state the following:
Result 2: Tax Revenue
Given Assumption 1, a switch from uniform to discriminatory taxation by country C, while
A and B continue to levy uniform rates, increases the tax revenue of country C. Country
A’s tax revenue increases while B’s tax revenue decreases. Aggregate tax revenue of A and
B increases.
The impact on tax revenue in the different countries is a consequence of the tax rate
changes explained in the context of Result 1. It is interesting to note that the low tax
country, B, is negatively affected by the regime change in C, not the high tax country,
A. The parameters that determine this result are the relative capital endowments of the
different sectors. First of all the size of the respective sectors that connect countries A
and B with country C matters as discussed above. Moreover, the capital endowment of
sector A, which connects countries A and B, matters by scaling up the revenue effects of
the regime switch. Thus, if country B is forced to lower its tax rate on sector B due to
the competition from country C, uniform taxation will also force it to lower its tax rate
on sector A, thereby aggravating country B’s tax revenue loss due to the regime switch.
On the other hand, country A’s tax revenue will increase even further due to its higher
uniform tax rate on the two sectors it hosts. The result that tax revenue of C as well as
the aggregate tax revenue of A and B increases can be seen as an extension of Keen (2001)
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and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007). While these papers show that the introduction of tax
discrimination in all countries mitigates tax competition with symmetric and asymmetric
countries, our analysis shows that the introduction of tax discrimination in one country
only also mitigates tax competition in terms of revenue raised in a setting with three
asymmetric countries.
3.3.4 Discussion
How can these results contribute to our understanding of the tax policy implications of
Brexit? Our results are derived from a highly stylized model, with restrictive assumptions.
Three assumptions are particularly important: the first is that capital is mobile within but
not across sectors. The second is that the supply of capital to the economy is fixed. The
third is that each of the three sectors is present in only two countries.10 Regarding the
first assumption, it is important to note that introducing perfect capital mobility across
sectors removes the direct bilateral links between countries hosting firms from the same
sector. The only link between countries is the international capital market. In such a
framework tax discrimination in C will still occur but it will no longer make the tax
policies of countries A and B more heterogeneous. The link of country C to A and B,
the interest rate in the international capital market, is the same for B and C. As a result,
the tax rates in countries A and B will not diverge in reaction to tax discrimination in C.
Moreover, aggregate investment and capital demand in C stay constant after the regime
switch. Therefore the assumption of imperfect capital mobility across sectors is crucial.11
So how can the assumption of imperfect capital mobility across companies or sectors
be justified? There is no doubt that multinational companies have firm-specific capital like
managerial capacity which is mobile across countries at low costs but less easily transferred
to other firms. Our model should be interpreted as referring to this type of capital, rather
than capital in general. Moreover, links between entities of multinational firms but not
across firms are created through tax planning and the shifting of book profits. Adding
profit shifting to our model would make the analysis cumbersome but the economic forces
at work would be similar. To prevent profit shifting to the low tax country B, country C
would cut its tax in sectors where it is linked to that country and it would raise its tax in
sectors linking it to the high tax country A.
The relevance of both firm specific capital moving across borders and international
profit shifting depends strongly on how countries are linked through bilateral foreign direct
investments. Note that bilateral links between the UK and other EU countries in the form
10It has been shown in the literature that these assumptions may affect the impact of tax discrimination
in models of tax competition, see in particular Janeba and Smart (2003) and Janeba and Peters (1999).
11A formal analysis of this case is available from the authors upon request.
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of foreign direct investment differ considerably across EU countries (see Tables 3.B1 and
3.B2 in the Appendix). These asymmetries drive the results in our model.12
What are the implications for tax policy? For instance, it is plausible that multinational
firms with a presence in both the UK and Ireland currently shift significant profits to
Ireland. After leaving the EU, the UK will be able to offer these companies targeted tax
regimes with a lower tax burden, intensifying tax competition between the UK and the low
tax country Ireland. In contrast, for sectors or companies with a presence primarily in the
UK and Germany, the UK may levy higher rates than today in reaction to the relatively
high tax rates in Germany.
How about the assumption that the supply of capital to the economy is fixed? Relaxing
this assumption seems most plausible in a framework where capital is mobile across sectors
as well.13 Empirically savings are not very elastic but the EU is integrated into world
capital markets. As discussed previously introducing capital mobility across sectors and
a common capital market changes the results of introducing tax discrimination. If we
additionally assume that capital is perfectly mobile globally, the case for coordinating or
harmonizing taxes vanishes, at least if it is driven by the desire to raise more revenue and
if the EU or a subset of EU countries has no market power in the capital market. All of the
results on tax harmonization, discussed in the next section, depend on the assumption that
the remaining EU countries have at least some market power in capital markets. Again, if
our model is interpreted as a model of competition for firm or sector specific resources, it
is plausible to assume that these tax bases are at least not fully elastic in supply.
The third key assumption in our model is that each country hosts only two of the
three sectors. This particular assumption is not critical but if each country hosted every
sector, the countries would be symmetric in that respect. For our analysis we need sectoral
relations to be asymmetric between countries. This is in line with asymmetries in bilateral
12Blonigen and Piger (2014) show that important determinants of foreign direct investment include
gravity variables, cultural distance factors and relative labor endowments, all of which motivate asymmetries
in bilateral foreign direct investment relations.
13In the literature the effect of relaxing the assumption of fixed capital in Keen’s (2001) model has been
addressed by Janeba and Smart (2003). In their analysis they differentiate between a tax base effect and a
strategic effect of a restriction on tax preferences. The base effect captures the implications of restrictions
on tax preferences on the revenues from each tax base. Using the elasticities of tax bases they show that
these restrictions tend to increase equilibrium tax revenue through the tax base effect. The strategic effect
captures how the intensity of tax competition for the different tax bases between countries is affected by
the restrictions. Depending on the net impact of the two effects, which tend to work in opposite directions,
total revenues can either fall or rise with the restrictions. As the tax base elasticity is zero in our analysis,
the tax base effect is absent, and any restriction on tax preferences will reduce revenues and hence increase
tax competition through the strategic effect in our model. This corresponds to Proposition 2 in Janeba
and Smart (2003).
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economic relations among EU member states as illustrated by Tables 3.B1 and 3.B2 in
the Appendix, which show that bilateral FDI stocks between the UK and selected partner
countries in the EU vary substantially.
Finally, our analysis raises the more general question of why the union with its rule
of uniform taxation was formed in the first place and why one country decides to leave.
Clearly, in the model country C benefits from leaving as its tax revenue increases (see
Result 2). This is because by leaving country C gains additional tax policy options and
loses nothing. Of course, after leaving the EU many things will change for the UK, and
explaining why the UK was an EU member state for so long and why the country leaves
now is beyond the scope of this paper. It seem though that factors other than tax policy
were key drivers of the referendum vote, in particular opposition to immigration (Goodwin
and Milazzo; 2017; Sampson; 2017). Moreover, socioeconomic characteristics of the voting
population such as low educational attainment, economic deprivation, unemployment and
conservatism are associated with voting Leave in the referendum (Becker et al.; 2017;
Alabrese et al.; 2018).14 These findings corroborate the aggregate trend found by Goodwin
and Heath (2016) that the feeling of socioeconomic marginalization and of being left behind
were key drivers. In so far, analyzing tax policy implications of Brexit in a model where
the exit decision is exogenous seems acceptable.
3.4 Tax Harmonization
What are the implications of introducing tax discrimination in country C for corporate tax
harmonization? We consider tax harmonization of the following type: Countries A and
B set a common tax rate to maximize the sum of their tax revenues.15 The focus of our
interest is whether the incentives for countries A and B to engage in tax harmonization
change as a result of introducing tax discrimination in country C.
3.4.1 Tax Harmonization with Uniform Taxation in Country C
Assume that C levies a uniform tax rate and countries A and B choose the harmonized
tax rate which maximizes their aggregate tax revenue. By focusing on the case where
the harmonized tax rate is the one that maximizes aggregate tax revenue of A and B, we
implicitly assume that side payments between the two countries are possible in order to
14Exit polls by ICM/Guardian (2016) find that ’to take back powers from Brussels’ and immigration
were the main reason why people voted to leave the EU but also that these responses greatly vary by age,
social class, voting intention, region and ethnic group.
15One could think of alternative forms of tax harmonization or tax coordination. For instance, countries
A and B could bargain over the harmonized tax rate or they could coordinate their tax rates without
harmonizing them.
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reach an agreement on harmonization. In this Section we take this agreement as given,
but will return to this issue in Sections 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. Moreover, both sides take the tax








12(2SA + 3(SB + SC)), (3.24)
where T hucH is the harmonized tax rate levied by countries A and B, given that C has
a uniform tax rate (T hucC ).
Tax revenues are now given by
RhucA = (T hucH )2 +
T hucH
12 3(SC − SB), (3.25)
RhucB = (T hucH )2 +
T hucH
12 3(SC − SB), (3.26)
and
RhucC = 2(T hucC )2. (3.27)
3.4.2 Tax Harmonization with Discriminatory Taxation in Country C
Consider next the equilibrium where country C discriminates. Here the emerging tax rate
for A and B is:
T hdcH =
1
12(4SA + 3(SB + SC)). (3.28)
The tax rates of country C are
T hdcC =
1




24(4SA + 6SB + 3(SB + SC)). (3.30)
Note that the switch of C to tax discrimination leaves the harmonized tax rate of A
and B unchanged, i.e. T hdcH = T hucH ≡ TH . The reason is that C cuts its tax on sector B
and increases its tax on sector C. The optimal response for A and B, given that they are
not able to discriminate, is to do nothing.
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For tax revenues, we get
RhdcA =
TH
24 (8SA + 12SC + 3(SC − SB)), (3.31)
RhdcB =
TH
24 (8SA + 12SB + 3(SB − SC)) (3.32)
and
RhdcC = (T hdcC )2 + (T hdcCB )2. (3.33)
3.4.3 How Does the Regime Switch in C Affect Tax Revenues in the
Presence of Tax Harmonization?
Analyzing the effect of the regime switch on tax revenue under harmonization for A and
B separately, we get
RhdcA −RhucA =
TH




8 (SB − SC). (3.35)
Given Assumption 1, i.e. SC > SB, a switch to discrimination increases the tax rate
and revenue of A and reduces those of B. The reason is that country C has incentives to
increase its tax on the larger sector C and compete more aggressively for investment of
the smaller sector B. This will increase investment and, hence, tax revenue in country A.
The impact on country B is the opposite. Equations (3.34) and (3.35) also show that the
aggregate tax revenue of countries A and B does not change. Discrimination in C only
redistributes revenue from B to A.
What happens to the tax revenue in country C due to its switch to tax discrimination?





This means that country C benefits in terms of tax revenue by discriminating. We
again compare these results to the findings in Keen (2001). We extend on them not only
by showing that introducing tax discrimination in one country only also mitigates tax
competition (see Result 2) but that this also holds under tax harmonization in a subset
of countries. While tax competition is lowered in the sense that aggregate tax revenue is
increased, the distribution of these gains between the three countries in our model is highly
asymmetric. While C and A gain revenue, B loses.16
16Note also that RhdcC > RudcC . Thus, C gains more from discrimination if A and B set a harmonized tax
rate instead of independently setting uniform tax rates. Proof is available from the authors upon request.
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We summarize these findings in
Result 3: One-sided Tax Discrimination
If country C switches from uniform taxation to discriminatory taxation, and given that
countries A and B levy a harmonized tax rate, countries A and C gain tax revenue while
country B loses. Aggregate tax revenue of A, B and C increases.
3.4.4 How Does the Regime Switch in C Affect Incentives for Countries
A and B to Harmonize Taxes?
If country C gives up the rule of uniform taxation and introduces discrimination, how
does this affect the incentives for A and B to engage in corporate tax harmonization? To
investigate this, we compare the gains from tax harmonization between A and B under
uniform taxation in all countries to the gains from tax harmonization between A and
B in the case where C discriminates. It continues to hold that C does not enter the
tax harmonization agreement in either case. We start by considering countries A and B
individually.
Formally, by defining
∆Rucj = Rhucj −Ruj , j = A,B, (3.37)
and
∆Rdcj = Rhdcj −Rudcj , j = A,B, (3.38)












B − S2C) + (1.08SA + 1.28SC)(SB − SC)]. (3.40)
As one would expect, the harmonization gains are equal with and without discrimina-
tion (i.e. the right hand side of equations (3.39) and (3.40) is equal to zero) if SB = SC ,
as tax discrimination by C is irrelevant in that case.17
17Note also that the tax revenue effect of harmonization for A and B is positive both if C levies a uniform
tax rate (i.e.∆Rucj > 0) and if C discriminates (i.e. ∆Rdcj > 0) as long as they are not too asymmetric
regarding sector sizes. The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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But in the presence of asymmetries, things are different. If SC > SB, as stated in
Assumption 1, the switch to discrimination in C increases the benefit of country A (∆RdcA −
∆RucA > 0) but decreases B’s gains from harmonization (∆RdcB −∆RucB < 0). The reason
is that discrimination increases the heterogeneity in tax policy between countries A and B
(see Result 1), where, given Assumption 1, the initial tax rate in A is higher than in B .
This means that, in the absence of harmonization between A and B, B’s tax rate declines
even further and A’s tax rate increases even further as a result of discrimination in C.
In this situation harmonization means that B increases its tax rate considerably while A
actually lowers it. This has the effect that B loses capital to the other two countries. For
country A the opposite holds, which is why A gains more from harmonization in the regime
where C discriminates.
This can be summarized as
Result 4: Benefits from Tax Harmonization for Individual Countries
Introducing tax discrimination in C reduces the benefits from tax harmonization in country
B and increases the benefits from harmonization in country A.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, choosing the harmonized tax rate which
maximizes joint tax revenue only makes sense if transfers across countries are possible.
Result 4 implies that country A would have to pay higher transfers to B than in a situation
wihtout discrimination in C.
3.4.5 Are Transfers Between A and B Sufficient to Maintain Incentives
for Tax Harmonization?
Clearly the impact of the regime change in C on tax harmonization incentives in A and B
depends on its effect on aggregate tax revenue gains of A and B. To maintain incentives it
would suffice that the regime change at least does not reduce those gains.
Under uniform taxation in all countries the aggregate tax revenue gains from tax har-
monization for countries A and B are given by
∆RucA+B = (RhucA +RhucB )− (RuA +RuB). (3.41)
In case country C discriminates, the gains from tax harmonization for A and B are
given by
∆RdcA+B = (RhdcA +RhdcB )− (RudcA +RudcB ). (3.42)
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2 > 0. (3.43)
We may thus state the following:
Result 5: Aggregate Benefits from Tax Harmonization for Countries
A and B
If country C switches from uniform taxation to discriminatory taxation and countries A
and B levy a uniform tax rate, the aggregate revenue gains for countries A and B from
harmonizing their tax rates decline.
What is the economic explanation for Result 5? The reason that discrimination un-
dermines the incentives for A and B to harmonize their taxes is that, in the absence of
harmonization, the introduction of tax discrimination in C mitigates tax competition in the
sense that the tax revenue gain in country A exceeds the loss in country B, so that aggre-
gate tax revenue in A and B increases. In the equilibrium with harmonized taxes, revenue
for countries A and B is the same with and without discrimination in C. Therefore, the
revenue gain that can be achieved through harmonization is smaller if C discriminates.18
The result that the incentives for countries A and B to harmonize their corporate tax
rates will be smaller if country C discriminates compared to a situation where country C
levies a uniform tax is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it does not rely on the fact that
tax coordination or harmonization becomes less attractive if the number of participating
countries falls, because leakage effects grow. We compare situations where there is always
an outsider, country C, who does not participate. Second, the intuition that the deviation of
one country from a common tax policy norm – uniform tax rates – increases the willingness
to harmonize taxes in the group of remaining countries complying with the norm, does not
hold in our model. Instead, the opposite is true.
3.4.6 Discussion
Our result that tax rate harmonization between countries A and B becomes less attrac-
tive once C discriminates rests on the assumption that tax revenue is the decisive factor
in driving tax harmonization. The fear that tax competition may erode corporate tax
revenue is a widely discussed motive for governments to support tax coordination or har-
monization initiatives (Bond et al.; 2000). Also, it seems unlikely that countries will agree
18More formally, from the derivation of equations (3.34) and (3.35), we know that the regime switch of
C, given that A and B have harmonized their tax rate, does not change the aggregate tax revenue of A and
B. Thus, it follows from equations (3.41), (3.42) and (3.43) that (RudcA + RudcB ) > (RuA + RuB) must hold.
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to tax harmonization if they lose revenue as a result. However, we do not claim that tax
revenue is the only factor driving tax harmonization or the resistance against it. There is
an extensive literature exploring the welfare effects of tax coordination and harmonization
(Edwards and Keen; 1996; Zodrow; 2003), but the literature investigating why harmoniza-
tion happens or does not happen is limited. Exceptions are Cardarelli et al. (2002) and
Itaya et al. (2008) who study the endogenous formation of groups of countries harmonizing
their taxes in repeated interactions models. They show that two factors are important: the
degree of regional asymmetries and preferences for public goods. Osterloh and Heinemann
(2013) show empirically that ideology and as well as individual and national interests of
Members of the European Parliament are important factors in determining their stance
towards a European agreement on minimum tax rates. They also emphasize the critical
role of sovereignty and the shift of competencies regarding any agreement on corporate tax
harmonization. Thus, the emphasis on tax revenues in our model abstracts from a number
of relevant factors.
Finally, our analysis also abstracts from the question of why countries form tax unions
and join or leave harmonization agreements. Country C’s decision to exit the union is
exogenously determined in our model. We think this is a reasonable assumption given that
Brexit was not primarily motivated by tax policy but rather by opposition to immigration
(Goodwin and Milazzo; 2017; Sampson; 2017) and the feeling of socioeconomic marginal-
ization by part of the voting population (Becker et al.; 2017; Alabrese et al.; 2018; Goodwin
and Heath; 2016).
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a stylized model of tax competition to study the implications of a
regime change where one of three countries gives up a common tax policy norm, the norm
of levying uniform tax rates on all sectors in the economy. It turns out that this regime
change increases tax policy heterogeneity among the remaining countries which continue to
comply with the norm. We also show that the regime change discourages tax harmonization
among the remaining countries. If applied to the case of the EU, these results question the
widely held view that the remaining EU countries will be more likely to take steps towards
enhanced corporate tax harmonization. Interestingly, our model predicts that the low tax
countries will be those who lose as the country leaving the union introduces discriminatory
taxation. This holds both for the case of harmonization and non-harmonization in the
union.
Of course, the results of our theoretical analysis should be seen in the context of the
highly stylized nature of the model from which they have been derived. Most importantly,
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our model implies that tax rate differences within the union are determined by size differ-
ences in the sectors which link countries A and B to country C, which leaves the union.
These size differences are critical for the result that tax discrimination in C increases tax
rate heterogeneity within the union. A related and important assumption is that of sector
specific capital. With perfect capital mobility across sectors the direct bilateral links be-
tween countries hosting firms from the same sector play no role anymore and the key link
between countries is the international capital market with a uniform interest rate. While
tax discrimination in C would still occur in such a setting, it would no longer make the tax
policies of countries A and B more heterogeneous because the link of country C to A and
B, the interest rate in the international capital market, is the same. This implies that the
optimal tax policies of the two countries would no longer diverge in reaction to discrimina-
tion in C. Moreover, the finding that incentives for tax harmonization are reduced is driven
by the effect of tax discrimination on the intensity of tax competition. Essentially, this is
the effect first described in Keen (2001). As mentioned in the Introduction and in Section
3.3.4, the literature on tax discrimination has pointed out that models can be constructed
where tax discrimination intensifies tax competition (Janeba and Smart; 2003; Janeba and
Peters; 1999). Therefore our model should not be interpreted as showing generally that tax
harmonization becomes less likely as a result of one country introducing discrimination.
Rather, the contribution of our analysis is to show that there are economic forces pushing
into this direction.
There are more limitations of our model which should be considered. Countries focus
on revenue maximization but the analysis abstracts from issues like profit shifting and
other types of tax avoidance. Adding profit shifting to the analysis would create another
channel where different bilateral links between countries would play a role. We would
therefore expect our analysis to hold in such a setting.
Brexit will not just free the United Kingdom from the restrictions of EU state aid,
it will also most likely increase trade costs between the United Kingdom and the rest
of the EU. This will have an impact on location decisions and, hence, on corporate tax
competition. This aspect is entirely absent from the model considered here, which focuses
on tax discrimination.
While we have discussed the implications of relaxing some of the assumptions made in
our analysis, it is clear that more work needs to be done to improve our understanding of
how Brexit will change corporate tax competition in Europe and beyond.
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3.A Appendix: Discriminatory Taxation in All Countries












Accordingly, the tax rates for B and C are given by
TB = SB4 +
TBC




















































Under discrimination each country can target its tax rates to the two specific sectors,
which explains why the capital endowments of other sectors play no role. Put differently,
the number of policy instruments for each country equals the number of targets. Interest-
ingly, the result of discrimination by all, is a form of tax harmonization by sectors.
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3.B Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 3.B1: UK Inward FDI Stock by Partner Country
(in Million US $)
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Denmark 12,692 8,677 4,916 5,743 9,312 6,378 10,518 11,135 7,823
France 75,570 119,103 105,261 94,793 123,733 116,369 118,638 109,081 81,818
Germany 104,605 109,789 80,897 77,471 102,801 83,491 78,145 82,783 81,710
Ireland 14,875 17,632 14,909 17,048 22,006 17,732 21,431 23,520 14,128
Italy 9,123 7,862 1,179 3,260 13,909 13,406 6,925 9,520 6,223
Netherlands 200,080 179,589 175,784 196,153 227,295 246,487 274,585 231,568 260,914
Poland 111 26 41 152 n.a. 171 161 584 186
Spain 16,295 43,377 52,198 62,612 66,172 88,127 71,279 39,566 37,244
Notes: The table shows UK inward FDI stock by partner country for the time period 2008-2016 in Million US $. The data
has been retrieved from the OECD.
Table 3.B2: UK Outward FDI Stock by Partner Country
(in Million US $)
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Denmark 15,757 11,330 12,430 11,071 12,759 12,533 10,939 9,388 8,641
France 61,389 64,697 85,850 82,754 85,864 62,218 59,663 87,971 88,253
Germany 44,536 43,563 35,185 31,706 30,262 34,346 37,061 36,426 25,709
Ireland 44,505 56,461 64,069 69,418 65,364 52,069 52,679 52,712 67,093
Italy 15,648 18,933 18,740 18,124 24,246 16,971 15,495 15,793 14,983
Netherlands 233,499 236,519 227,425 224,406 199,114 202,564 185,281 175,969 149,963
Poland 4,248 6,030 5,709 5,876 6,374 7,879 7,778 8,789 7,621
Spain 54,092 52,724 56,099 57,807 58,287 21,670 25,356 62,361 68,820
Notes: The table shows UK outward FDI stock by partner country for the time period 2008-2016 in Million US $. The data
has been retrieved from the OECD.
Chapter 4
What Drives Chinese Overseas M&A In-
vestment?
Evidence From Micro Data
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, Chinese investors have significantly increased their foreign investment
activities especially in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In many
European countries and the United States, Chinese M&As arouse suspicion.1 Critics claim
that Chinese acquisitions lead to undesirable technology transfers, that Chinese acquirers
enjoy unfair advantages because of government subsidies, or that their acquisitions are
motivated strategically with the objective to gain market dominance or to increase China’s
political influence in the target countries.2 There are also concerns that Chinese takeovers
may have adverse consequences for the employees of the target firms. According to a recent
survey by the ifo Institute, for example, economists from 74% of the countries surveyed
are more critical of foreign investment from China than of that from other countries (ifo
Institute; 2019). At the same time, there are legitimate reasons for the surge in Chinese
investment abroad. China has invested the revenue from its trade surplus primarily in US
This chapter is based on joint work with Clemens Fuest, Felix Hugger, and Jing Xing (Fuest, Hugger,
Sultan and Xing; 2019)
1Of course investment is not the only channel via which China spreads its outreach, but it can also
have a strong impact via trade as for instance Autor et al. (2016) and Hsieh and Ossa (2016) have shown.
2In a recent report the European Commission has analyzed challenges and prospects in the relationship
with China (EU Commission; 2019).
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government bonds for a long time. Thus, diversifying its foreign investment through cross-
border M&As seems perfectly rational. For many Chinese firms, foreign acquisitions are
also a way to ensure access to customers or key suppliers, in particular of raw materials.3
This debate on Chinese foreign M&A activities, however, is mostly based on speculations
and anecdotes. Despite a growing number of studies on Chinese overseas investment, there
is surprisingly little systematic evidence on whether Chinese cross-border M&As differ from
investment coming from other countries. As Buckley et al. (2018) conclude, “the degree
to which China is truly different from the advanced economies, or from other emerging
economies, is worthy of debate” (Buckley et al.; 2018, p. 18).
The objective of this paper is to fill this gap by examining whether Chinese cross-border
acquisitions differ from foreign acquisitions of investors from other countries. Specifically,
we address three questions: First, how do Chinese acquirer select their targets? Second,
do Chinese acquirer pay more in a takeover? Third, what are the effects of a Chinese
acquisition on the target firm?
Unlike previous quantitative studies that mostly use aggregate data, we use an extensive
deal-level dataset, which allows us to analyze not only how target country-level factors but
also how target-level characteristics affect cross-border transactions. Instead of focusing
solely on Chinese cross-border M&As, we use a logit model to directly compare the drivers
of Chinese foreign acquisitions with those of non-Chinese investments. Such an approach
has not been carried out before on a comparable scale.
On the question of target selection, we find that Chinese overseas M&As are distinct
from non-Chinese cross-border investments in several dimensions. For example, Chinese
acquirers seem less concerned about market size, and conduct more deals in tax havens
and offshore financial centers. Chinese companies also tend to acquire targets with lower
profitability, more assets, higher levels of debt, and more patents. In contrast, we do not
find that target countries’ institutional qualities, such as political stability and the rule of
law, play a different role in determining Chinese cross-border acquisitions than they do for
non-Chinese investors.
At the same time, we uncover rich differences between private and state-owned Chi-
nese acquirers (SOEs), which appear to be attracted to distinctive sets of target-level and
target-country-level characteristics. For example, Chinese SOEs and private investors are
differently affected by recent Chinese government policies like the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) or Made in China 2025. While we find these government initiatives to have a signif-
icant impact on the location and industry choices of Chinese SOEs’ overseas acquisitions,
they do not appear to influence those of Chinese private investors.
3For Japanese firms Raff et al. (2018) provide evidence of the link between financial frictions and foreign
direct investment.
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Whether the prevailing critical attitude towards Chinese cross-border M&As is justi-
fiable also requires a comparison between Chinese SOEs and state-owned investors from
elsewhere, which has not been conducted before. Based on a sample of government-led
acquisitions, we find no significant difference between Chinese and non-Chinese SOEs in
seeking natural resources or industry diversification. Chinese SOEs, however, do tend to
purchase larger targets with poorer financial performance.
Another critique of Chinese acquirers is that they systematically outbid other investors,
benefiting from government support. This in turn may distort the global M&A market,
with potentially negative economic effects on the target countries. However, such criticism
is largely based on anecdotal evidence. To shed light on this debate we use our detailed
deal-level dataset to examine whether Chinese investors pay higher acquisition prices. In
contrast to the view that Chinese companies pay premiums to win bids, we do not find that
Chinese investors pay more for similar target firms compared to non-Chinese acquirers.
Finally, a key question is whether Chinese acquisitions have a different impact on the de-
velopment of target firms or their employees. We find that post-merger performance differs
in two dimensions. First, growth in capital productivity is lower in the short-run, mostly
because Chinese acquirers seem to invest more after the takeover. Second, the growth
of employee compensation is higher. Since most Chinese foreign acquisitions happened
relatively recently, the number of cases where we can observe post-merger performance is
limited, though.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a
brief review of the related literature. In Section 4.3, we describe our data and sample
construction. We provide descriptive statistics in Section 4.4 and present our empirical
analysis in Sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. Our first research question focuses on
the determinants of Chinese acquisitions. Determinants for foreign investment have been
the topic of extensive academic research, resulting in a long list of factors suggested to
influence cross-border M&As. This list includes access to resources and technology, entry
to the foreign market, diversification, geographic proximity, bilateral trade, and relative
valuation in currencies and stock markets (Erel et al.; 2012); domestic financial market
development (Di Giovanni; 2005); accounting disclosure and accounting standards (Erel
et al.; 2012; Rossi and Volpin; 2004); shareholder protection and corporate governance
(Kim and Lu; 2013); cultural differences (Ahern et al.; 2012); and social attitudes (Dinc
and Erel; 2013); target and home countries’ institutional qualities such as political stability
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and the rule of law (Brockman et al.; 2013; Erel et al.; 2012; Jandik and Kali; 2009);
regulatory arbitrage (Alimov; 2015; Karolyi and Taboada; 2015); and taxes (Huizinga and
Voget; 2007). Some argue that no new theoretical framework is needed to explain Chinese
foreign investment (Alon et al.; 2009; Rugman; 2010). That is, the same list of economic
and institutional factors should similarly affect both Chinese and non-Chinese cross-border
M&As. Others believe that Chinese multinational companies are distinctive (Boisot and
Meyer; 2008; Buckley et al.; 2009; Child and Rodrigues; 2005). Despite these contrasting
views, there is a lack of systematic quantitative analysis that compares the patterns of
Chinese cross-border M&As with those of other investors.
Following the seminal work by Buckley et al. (2009), there has been an increasing
number of studies on the determinants of Chinese outward greenfield investment (e.g.,
Kolstad and Wiig 2012; Lu et al. 2011). However, there are much fewer quantitative
studies on Chinese cross-border M&A activities, even though they have become the main
form of outward foreign direct investment by Chinese firms and may be influenced by a
different set of factors (Buckley et al.; 2016). Using aggregate-level data for the years
1985-2011, Buckley et al. (2016) examine country-level factors that affect the location
and scale of Chinese overseas M&As. According to Buckley et al. (2016), institutional
rather than economic factors make cross-border acquisitions by companies from emerging
market distinct. Consistent with this view, they find that Chinese acquirers are attracted
to countries with higher risks, proxied by a poorer record of law and order. Nonetheless,
Buckley et al. (2016) do not compare Chinese acquirers with investors from other countries.
Therefore, their study does not answer the question whether economic and institutional
features affect Chinese investors differently.
One distinct feature of Chinese investors is that many of them have close government
ties. Studies on Chinese foreign greenfield investment have compared SOEs with private
firms (Amighini et al.; 2013; Duanmu; 2012; Ramasamy et al.; 2012; Luo et al.; 2017), and
uncovered significant differences. For example, SOEs are less concerned about political risk
in the target country, less market oriented, and more resource-seeking in their investment
decisions. Nevertheless, the contrast between state-owned and private acquirers may not
be China-specific. Comparing cross-border M&As by both private and government-led
acquirers around the globe, Karolyi and Liao (2017) find that pursuing targets in coun-
tries with rich natural resources and a high potential to diversify industrial structures are
common features of government-backed acquirers in general. Therefore, to answer the
question whether Chinese cross-border M&As are different, it is important to compare
Chinese state-owned acquirers with other government-led acquirers. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to conduct such a comparison on a larger scale.
Furthermore, this paper is related to the literature on determinants of the take-over
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premium, and the post-take-over performance of target firms. In particular, our study
is closely related to studies on the impact of acquisitions on targets’ productivity (e.g.,
Arnold and Javorcik 2009; Bertrand and Zitouna 2008; Fons-Rosen et al. 2013; Schiffbauer
et al. 2017. There also exists a small number of studies that examine the effects of foreign
acquisitions in China on firms’ productivity (Wang and Wang; 2015; Zhang et al.; 2019).
Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, we are the first to investigate the impact of recent
Chinese foreign takeovers on the performance of the target firms.
4.3 Data and Sample Construction
We combine data from a number of sources to construct our samples. To obtain deal-level
information, we use Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Zephyr database, which contains information
on worldwide M&A transactions. We only consider cross-border deals and exclude deals
with multiple acquirers.4 If a firm acquires several targets in one deal, we regard each
acquirer-target pair as a single transaction. Our full sample contains 157,985 completed
cross-border M&A deals of which 3,283 are conducted by Chinese investors. The sample
period covers the years from 2002 to 2017, and, therefore, only includes years after China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization. We differentiate between three types of acquir-
ers: Chinese private acquirers, Chinese state-owned acquirers, and non-Chinese acquirers.
A Chinese acquirer is regarded as an SOE if its global ultimate owner is state-owned or
state-controlled. Following this definition, 1,279 deals of our full sample are conducted by
Chinese SOEs.
As financial information about the targets and acquirers is limited in Zephyr, we use
the BvD Orbis database to obtain financial and ownership information on both targets
and acquirers. Each target or acquirer is assigned a unique identifier by BvD, which allows
us to link Zephyr with Orbis. Table 4.A2 in the Appendix provides the definitions of
target-level variables in our analyses.
For analyses and estimations, we restrict the sample further. First, we focus on deals
where at least 50% of the target’s shares are purchased and exclude deals where the target
country is unknown. We drop deals where the target reports non-positive total assets,
turnover, or employees, and where the target’s intangible fixed assets are greater than
its total assets. To ensure comparability, we only keep targets acquired once during our
sample period. This leaves us with a total of 72,056 deals, of which 1,168 are conducted
4Cross-border deals are those where the target and the acquirer are located in different countries. To
identify the origin of the acquirer, we use the location of the acquirer’s global ultimate owner. Frequently,
the location of the acquirer is the same as that of its global ultimate owner, but in some cases relying on
the location of the acquirer would be misleading due to intricate ownership structures.
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by Chinese private investors and 732 by Chinese SOEs (see Table 4.1).







Acquirer type All With deal value
CN private 1,168 577 159.0 20.0
CN SOE 732 391 394.3 54.6
Non-CN 70,156 21,038 263.8 32.1
Total 72,056 22,006 263.4 23.0
We augment the deal-level data with target country-level variables from various sources.
From the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), we obtain general macroe-
conomic variables like GDP, exchange rate, population, and the share of resource rents
in GDP. We use CEPII data for a population weighted distance measure from the target
country to China. The UN Comtrade database provides us with the trade volume between
the target country and China. To identify tax havens, we rely on an OECD definition5.
To measure institutional quality, we use the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators
(WGI) on the rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, and regulatory strength.
Table 4.A1 in the Appendix provides more details about the definitions and sources for
these country-level variables.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
This section first provides some general descriptive statistics on Chinese and non-Chinese
cross-border acquisitions. We then describe target country-level characteristics in more
detail before looking at target firm-level characteristics.
Figure 4.1 shows the number and value of cross-border acquisitions by type of acquirer
for 2002-2017.6 For non-Chinese acquisitions (Panel A), we observe a peak in both number
of deals and transaction volume around 2006-2007 and a significant drop during the 2008-
2009 financial crisis. There is a gradual recovery of global cross-border M&As since around
2012. These patterns are consistent with observations made elsewhere (EU Commission;
2018). Panel B shows that the evolution of Chinese cross-border acquisitions is rather
different from the global trend. In particular, there was a spike in the number of Chinese
cross-border transactions in 2008, in contrast to the dip in global M&A activities. Over
5See Table 4.A3 in the Appendix for the list of countries.
6Deals are assigned to years depending on their date of completion.
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the full sample period, both the number and the volume of Chinese overseas acquisitions
increase substantially.
Figure 4.1: Number and Value of Deals by Deal Category
Notes: This figure shows the development of the number and value of deals over the sample period 2002-2017. We differentiate
between different deal categories depending on the nature of the acquirer: non-Chinese acquirers (Panel A) and Chinese acquirers
(Panel B). We furthermore decompose Chinese acquirers into private firms (Panel C) and SOEs (Panel D). The number of deals is
reported in the right hand scale and the value of deals (in constant billion Euros with base year 2015) is reported in the left hand
side.
In Panels C and D, we distinguish between Chinese private and state-owned acquirers.
This reveals that while there are fewer acquisitions by Chinese state-owned acquirers, they
tend to conduct larger deals. The spike in the number of deals in 2008 shown in Panel
B is largely driven by the activities of Chinese private acquirers. For both private and
state-owned acquirers, the total value of acquisitions rises sharply over time. Since 2011,
however, the rise is more prominent for acquisitions by SOEs. Table 4.1 summarizes the
number of deals, and the mean and median deal values by acquirer types. Deal value
data is available for about half of the Chinese transactions and for about one third of
non-Chinese acquisitions. Table 4.1 confirms that Chinese SOEs are involved in larger
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deals than other acquirers, which is reflected by substantially higher mean and median
deal values. In contrast, Chinese private acquirers tend to conduct deals of similar sizes to
non-Chinese acquirers.
Figure 4.2: Types of Deals by Percentage of Shares Acquired
Notes: This figure shows the share of different types of deals for the three types of acquirers. Full means that 100% of the target firm
were acquired. Majority means that at least 50% but less than 100% were acquired. Minority means that less than 50% were
acquired. Stake increased means that the acquirer already owned a share of the target firm and increased this share.
There are also notable differences across the three types of investors in terms of the
target share they acquire. Figure 4.2 shows that Chinese SOEs predominantly engage in
full or majority acquisitions. In contrast, a larger percentage of acquisitions by Chinese
private or non-Chinese investors takes the form of gradual increases in stakes. This could
reflect that Chinese SOEs follow a less cautious investment strategy or are less financially
constrained than other investors.
Next, we look at the geographical distribution of M&A deals by acquirer group. Figure
4.3 shows that a major share of global cross-border M&As takes place in Europe, which
amounts to 66.6% of transactions by non-Chinese acquirers, 47.5% by Chinese SOEs, and
38.2% by Chinese private acquirers. Around 15-20% of global cross-border acquisition tar-
gets are located in North America. Significant differences emerge in other regions between
Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers. There are more transactions by Chinese acquirers in
the East Asia and Pacific region, as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Table 4.2 offers a more detailed look at the distribution of deals by target countries
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of Cross-Border M&As by Target Regions
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of cross-border M&As in different regions. The category “Other” includes countries in
Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, and South Asia.
and acquirer types. Target countries are ranked based on the number of Chinese private
acquisitions. For each target country, we provide the number of deals, the total deal value,
and the corresponding sample percentages. A large share of Chinese private acquisitions
occurs in tax havens and offshore financial centers. In terms of the number of deals, the
British Virgin Islands lead the list for Chinese private acquirers. Chinese SOEs also have
substantial M&A activities in the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Bermuda.
In contrast, tax havens and offshore financial centers are less popular with non-Chinese
acquirers. In addition, Table 4.2 again shows the geographic preference of Chinese acquirers
for Asia and Pacific countries. Based on the total value of deals, a much higher share of
Chinese acquisitions happens in Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore, relative to non-
Chinese acquisitions. There is no indication that Chinese acquirers invest more in BRIC
countries (excluding China), as their investment pattern in Brazil, Russia, and India is not























Table 4.2: Number of Deals and Deal Value by Target Countries and Acquirer Types
Number of Deals Total deal value (in million EUR)
Non-Chinese CN private CN SOE Non-Chinese CN private CN SOE
Target Country Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Value Percent Value Percent Value Percent
Virgin Isl. 553 0.79 223 19.09 54 7.38 22,340 0.38 12,898 13.76 8,474 5.41
US 9,885 14.09 138 11.82 90 12.30 2,061,414 34.89 25,790 27.50 4,938 3.15
Gr. Britain 10,105 14.40 104 8.90 61 8.33 967,109 16.37 4,758 5.07 18,992 12.13
Germany 4,897 6.98 84 7.19 87 11.89 212,247 3.59 1,519 1.62 2,923 1.87
Cayman Isl. 271 0.39 76 6.51 24 3.28 47,186 0.8 4,535 4.84 9,968 6.36
Singapore 682 0.97 47 4.02 24 3.28 36,608 0.62 4,023 4.29 6,441 4.11
Australia 2,118 3.02 46 3.94 46 6.28 163,839 2.77 4,909 5.24 15,561 9.94
France 3,032 4.32 34 2.91 19 2.60 185,400 3.14 118 0.13 2,314 1.48
Italy 1,720 2.45 23 1.97 22 3.01 83,315 1.41 2,229 2.38 359 0.23
Japan 280 0.40 23 1.97 8 1.09 26,175 0.44 1,865 1.99 565 0.36
Netherlands 3,234 4.61 23 1.97 27 3.69 315,270 5.34 3,185 3.40 1,675 1.07
Spain 3,144 4.48 22 1.88 41 5.60 111,175 1.88 2,937 3.13 2,175 1.39
Malaysia 475 0.68 21 1.80 19 2.60 7,483 0.13 2,533 2.70 489 0.31
Bermuda 142 0.20 20 1.71 12 1.64 57,152 0.97 8,156 8.7 3,721 2.38
Canada 2,602 3.71 16 1.37 23 3.14 256,285 4.34 361 0.38 17,999 11.49
Belgium 1,482 2.11 14 1.20 5 0.68 78,600 1.33 229 0.24 1,890 1.21
India 239 0.34 13 1.11 6 0.82 35,634 0.60 39 0.04 48 0.03
Switzerland 1,296 1.85 12 1.03 8 1.09 113,653 1.92 4,355 4.64 37,432 23.90
Russia 1,727 2.46 11 0.94 4 0.55 106,778 1.81 78 0.08 3,155 2.01
Brazil 1,005 1.43 8 0.68 15 2.05 63,985 1.08 914 0.98 2,033 1.30
RoW 21,267 30.32 210 17.99 137 18.7 955,940 16.19 8,336 8.90 15,474 9.87
World 70,156 100 1,168 100 732 100 5,907,588 100 93,767 100 156,626 100
Notes: This table shows the number of deals and total deal value by target country and acquirer type. Total deal value is reported in constant million EUR with base year 2015.
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Last, we consider target-level determinants of M&A activities. Table 4.3 compares
the different groups of acquirers regarding the means of assets, leverage, return on as-
sets (ROA), share of intangibles, assets growth, and patents of targets.7 We also conduct
a t-test to formally examine whether the sample means of target-level factors are equal
between different types of acquirers. The descriptive statistics reveal some interesting het-
erogeneities. Relative to non-Chinese investors, Chinese investors purchase larger targets
in terms of total assets. Moreover, Chinese private firms tend to purchase targets with
significantly lower ROA but with more patents than non-Chinese investors.8
Table 4.3: Target-Level Characteristics by Acquirer Types












Total assets 101,189 702,026 0.0000 858,103 0.000 581,966 0.000
Leverage 0.191 0.256 0.7779 0.252 0.862 0.260 0.824
ROA 0.003 -0.045 0.0317 0.002 0.982 -0.080 0.005
Intangibles % 0.050 0.056 0.3705 0.055 0.570 0.056 0.483
Asset growth 14.258 4.942 0.8462 1.003 0.853 8.142 0.925
Patents 4.927 22.357 0.0003 8.927 0.568 30.819 0.000
Notes: This table reports the sample means of target size, leverage, return on assets (ROA), the share of intangibles in total assets, asset
growth, and number of patents. Sample means are reported for each variable for targets acquired by non-Chinese, all Chinese, Chinese
state-owned, and Chinese private investors, separately. The t-tests test the null hypothesis of equal sample means between targets acquired
by non-Chinese and Chinese investors, between targets acquired by non-Chinese and Chinese state-owned investors, and between targets
acquired by non-Chinese and Chinese private investors. P-values from the associated t-tests are reported. For definitions of target-level
variables listed here, see Table 4.A1 in the Appendix.
4.5 How Do Chinese Acquirers Select Their Targets?
The first question we address in this study is whether Chinese overseas acquisitions have
different rationales and patterns than non-Chinese investments. To shed light on this issue,
we employ the deal-level data and estimate the following logit regression model:
Pr(CNi,j,t = 1) = F (β0 + µXT Fi,t + γZT Cj,t +Deal Y ear FE + εi,j,t) (4.1)
where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether target i in country j in year
t is purchased by a Chinese acquirer. In some estimations, we also differentiate between
7Variable definitions are provided in Table 4.A2 in the Appendix.
8In unreported exercises, we compare Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers in terms of their sizes and
profitability at the time of the acquisition. We do not find any significant differences between the two types
of acquirers and hence, the observed differences in target features are unlikely to be driven by acquirers’
size and profitability.
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private Chinese firms and SOEs.9 XT Fi,j,t is a set of target firm-level characteristics, and
ZT Cj,t is a set of target country-level characteristics. The coefficients of interest are µ and
γ, which indicate how various target firm-level and target country-level characteristics
influence the probability of a target being acquired by a Chinese firm. If a coefficient is
not statistically significant, the corresponding characteristic is either not important for all
investors or equally important for Chinese and non-Chinese investors. We include deal year
fixed effects in all specifications to control for general time trends. In some specifications,
we also control for industry and target country fixed effects. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the target firm level.
4.5.1 Effects of Target Country Characteristics
We first examine how target country characteristics affect the probability of a target be-
ing acquired by a Chinese company as opposed to a non-Chinese investor. We consider a
set of country-level economic indicators frequently employed in the literature.10 We use
three variables to proxy for market size: Ln(GDPPC) is the log of real gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita in the target country; GDPgrowth is the target country’s an-
nual real GDP growth rate; Ln(Population) is the log of population of the target country.
Cross-border M&As may also be influenced by geographic proximity and trade volume.
Distance measures the population-weighted distance between China and the target coun-
try; Ln(Trade) measures the log of the bilateral trade volume between China and the target
country. We construct a dummy variable Tax Haven that equals 1 if a target country is
regarded as a tax haven. To investigate whether Chinese cross-border M&As are more
attracted to countries abundant in natural resources, we use the variable Resource rents
measuring total resource rents relative to the target country’s GDP. We further consider
two variables associated with economic risks in the target country: Inflation is the an-
nual inflation rate in the target country; and ∆Exchange rate is the rate of appreciation
of the target country’s currency against the Chinese Renminbi (RMB), where a negative
value stands for an depreciation of the RMB. Institutional qualities in target countries are
often considered to influence cross-border M&As. Using the World Bank’s World Gover-
nance Indicators, we control for four institutional quality indicators: Political Stability,
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. A larger value in these
variables indicates better institutional qualities in the target country.
Table 4.4 reports the estimated marginal effects based on the logit model, focusing
9In the regression for Chinese private companies, acquisitions by Chinese SOEs are excluded from the
sample and vice versa.
10Table 4.A1 in the Appendix provides on overview of definitions and summary statistics for these
variables.
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Table 4.4: Target Country Characteristics and Probability of Chinese Acquisitions
Probability of being
acquired by
All CN CN Private CN SOE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln(GDPPC) -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP growth -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Population) -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Distance -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Trade) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tax haven 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Resource rents -0.010 -0.014 -0.020 -0.018 -0.010 -0.039*** 0.021**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010)
Inflation -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ Exchange rate -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.012** -0.014***





Rule of law -0.002
(0.002)
Control of Corruption -0.000
(0.001)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 63,085 63,085 63,085 63,085 63,085 62,536 62,373
Notes: This table considers how target country-level economic and institutional characteristics affect the likelihood of a Chinese cross-border
acquisition. Marginal effects from logit estimations based on Equation 1 are reported. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the target
firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
on target country characteristics. Column (1) of Table 4.4 shows that relative to non-
Chinese acquirers, Chinese acquirers tend to conduct acquisitions in countries with lower
GDP per capita, lower GDP growth, and a smaller population. This suggests that Chi-
nese cross-border M&As do not seem to be motivated by market size. As expected, being
geographically closer to China and having a larger trade volume with China both increase
the probability of Chinese cross-border acquisitions. Chinese investors also show a strong
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preference for targets in tax havens, consistent with the previous descriptive analysis. A
potential explanation for this result is the existence of capital controls in China. Success-
fully bidding for firms requires the ability to make large international payments at short
notice. This may require Chinese companies to set up holding companies abroad. Tax
havens and offshore financial centers may offer the easiest way to do so. We do not find
that the estimated marginal effect on Resourcerents is statistically significant. Relative to
other investors, Chinese acquirers tend to avoid inflation risks, as the estimated marginal
effect on Inflation is negative and significant. However, they do not seem to be partic-
ularly concerned about currency risks. We control for Political Stability in Column (2),
RegulatoryQuality in Column (3), RuleofLaw in Column (4), and ControlofCorruption
in Column (5) of Table 4.4. However, we find no evidence that these institutional quali-
ties of target countries affect decisions on Chinese overseas acquisitions differently, as the
estimated marginal effects on all four indicators are insignificant.
In Columns (6) and (7), we differentiate between Chinese private and state-owned
acquirers. The investment strategy of the two types of Chinese acquirers appears similar
in many dimensions. However, some target country characteristics have different effects on
the two. First, the strong preference for tax havens is unique to Chinese private acquirers,
while the difference between Chinese SOEs and non-Chinese acquirers is not significant in
this dimension. Second, while Chinese private acquirers are less likely to purchase targets
in resource-rich countries, the opposite is true for Chinese SOEs. Thus, seeking natural
resources is a motivation for Chinese state-owned acquirers only. Third, Chinese private
investors tend to invest in countries where the currency depreciates against the RMB,
but the reverse holds for Chinese SOEs. This suggests that Chinese SOEs may be less
concerned about costs due to exchange rate risks. In unreported exercises, we include the
four indicators of institutional qualities and compare the two types of Chinese acquirers
with international acquirers. We continue to find that institutional qualities of target
countries do not affect Chinese acquirers in a distinct way, regardless of their ownership
type.
4.5.2 Effects of Target Industry
Using deal-level information, we are able to investigate whether Chinese acquirers are
drawn to specific industries. Table 4.5 includes a set of target industry dummies based on
the NACE industry classification11, in addition to a basic set of macroeconomic control
11We use NACE industries 77 to 99 as the reference group. This reference group includes administrative
and support service activities, public administration and defense, compulsory social security, education,
human health and social work activities, arts, entertainment and recreation, and other service activities.
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variables.12 Column 1 in Table 4.5 reveals that Chinese acquisitions are more likely to
occur in certain industries. For example, Chinese investors are keen on targets in certain
manufacturing industries, such as manufacturing of electronics, machinery, and vehicles.
Consistent with resource seeking motives, Chinese acquirers are also more likely to con-
duct deals in the mining sector. In contrast, firms in the information and communication
industry are less likely to be targeted by Chinese acquirers.
Table 4.5: Target Industries and Probability of Chinese Acquisitions
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
acquired by All CN CN Private CN SOE
Agriculture 0.010 -0.009* 0.019**
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008)
Construction 0.001 -0.003 0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Energy, water, gas. 0.004 -0.003 0.006**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Finance & Insurance 0.004 -0.001 0.005***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Information & Communication -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Manufacturing of chemicals/oil, pharma -0.002 -0.007** 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Manufacturing of electricity & machinery 0.023*** 0.007** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Manufacturing of metal products 0.011** -0.006* 0.017***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Manufacturing of vehicles 0.048*** 0.017** 0.033***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Mining 0.016*** -0.007** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Professional/scientific/techno-logical activities -0.004 -0.008*** 0.003**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 62,353 61,723 61,373
Notes: This table considers how target industries affect the likelihood of a Chinese cross-border acquisition.
Classification of industries is based on NACE industry classification. NACE industries 77 to 99 are used as the
reference group. Marginal effects from logit estimations based on Equation 1 are reported. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the target firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.5 differentiate between private and state-owned Chinese
companies. Chinese SOEs, for example are more likely to acquire agricultural firms, but
12This includes GDP P C, GDP growth, P opulation, Distance, and T rade.
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the opposite is true for Chinese private firms. A similar pattern holds for targets in
the utility, construction, and the mining sector. These results are consistent with the
previous finding that Chinese SOEs are particularly attracted to natural resources abroad.
Additionally, a comparison between Columns (2) and (3) reveals that even within the
manufacturing sector, the two types of Chinese acquirers display different preferences for
specific industries.
Generally speaking, we find that there are some notable differences between Chinese
and non-Chinese investors in terms of their industry preferences. However, the distinction
is even greater between Chinese SOEs and non-Chinese investors.
4.5.3 Effects of Target Firm Characteristics
Next, we consider target firm-level characteristics that may affect the probability of Chinese
cross-border acquisitions. These include: Industry Diversity (a dummy that equals 1 if
the target and the acquirer are active in different industries), the log of total assets of the
target firm, as well as return on assets (ROA), Leverage, Asset Growth, Intangibles %,
and Patents. All variables except Patents are measured one year before the acquisition
and are winsorized at the 1% level.
We formally analyze whether Chinese acquisitions are different from other investments
by including these target-level characteristics in the logit model, as specified by Equation
(1). Table 4.6 reports the corresponding results. Columns (1) to (3) suggest that Chinese
acquirers prefer targets in industries different from their own, with more assets, lower prof-
itability, higher levels of debt, and more patents. Based on our preferred specification in
Column 3 where we control for both target country and target industry fixed effects, the
probability of this target being acquired by a Chinese investor increases by 0.7 percent-
age points if the target is from a different industry than the acquirer. A 10-percentage
point reduction in ROA would increase the probability of a Chinese acquisition by around
0.2 percentage points. A 10-percentage point increase in target leverage leads to a 0.13
percentage point increase in the probability of a Chinese acquisition. Consistent with the
view that Chinese cross-border M&As are particularly driven by technology transfer and
know-how, we find a positive marginal effect associated with the number of patents the
target holds. If the number of patents held by the target firm increases by one standard
deviation, this increases the probability of acquisition by Chinese investors by around 0.2
percentage points.13 Considering that only 2.6% of cross-border acquisitions are made by
Chinese investors in our sample, these estimated marginal effects from ROA, leverage, and
13The distribution of patents held by target firms is highly skewed. One standard deviation equals to
around 200 patents.
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patents are rather large.14 There is also a positive and significant marginal effect of target
size measured by total assets, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller. Based on the
estimation result in Column 3, a 100-log points increase in target size raises the probability
of a Chinese acquisition by 0.6 percentage points. Neither Asset Growth nor the share of
intangibles matter differently for Chinese acquirers relative to non-Chinese acquirers.15
Table 4.6: Target-Level Characteristics and Probability of Chinese Acquisitions
Probability of
being acquired by
All CN CN Private CN SOE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Industry Diversity 0.008** 0.006 0.007* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006** 0.006* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.006* -0.008* -0.009* -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Leverage 0.007 0.014** 0.013** 0.006 0.009** 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Asset Growth -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Intangibles % -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014)
Patents 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 8,786 7,509 7,509 8,459 6,918 6,787 8,410 6,947 6,849
Notes: This table considers how targets’ financial characteristics affect the likelihood of Chinese cross-border acquisition. We report the marginal effects
from logit estimations based on Equation (1). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the target firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We focus on Chinese private acquirers in Columns (4) to (6) and Chinese state-owned
acquirers in Columns (7) to (9). We uncover several differences between SOEs and pri-
vate firms. The preference for industry diversification is mainly driven by Chinese SOEs.
This corroborates the results from Columns (1) to (3). Chinese SOEs favor larger targets.
While the estimated marginal effect on ln(TotalAssets) is also positive for Chinese private
acquirers, the effect becomes insignificant when we control for target-industry fixed effects.
These results could imply that Chinese SOEs have financial support from the state-owned
banking system which allows them to engage in large-scale cross-border M&As. The ten-
14We also use the Stata command firthlogit to correct for potential bias due to the low probability of
Chinese acquisitions in our sample (results available upon request), and the results are very similar to logit
estimation results.
15Results are similar when we use a matched sample where Chinese and non-Chinese acquisitions are
more comparable in terms of target size and profitability.
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dency to buy highly leveraged targets and those which hold patents is mainly driven by
Chinese private acquirers. These results indicate that Chinese private acquirers are more
likely to purchase targets in financial distress, and that access to technology and knowledge
may be a particularly important consideration for them. Relative to non-Chinese investors,
both Chinese private and state-owned acquirers tend to purchase targets with lower ROA.
Chinese acquirers may be less motivated by short-run profits, less cautious of investing in
poorly-performing targets, or more optimistic about improving the performance of such
targets after the acquisition.
4.5.4 Effects of Recent Chinese Policy Initiatives
Table 4.7: The Belt and Road Initiative and
Probability of Chinese Acquisitions
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
acquired by All CN CN Private CN SOE
PostBRI -0.115 -0.182 0.103
(0.254) (0.327) (0.392)
BRI -0.223* -0.0118 -0.539**
(0.132) (0.163) (0.220)
BRI×PostBRI 0.0320 -0.181 0.386*
(0.142) (0.182) (0.230)
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 69,269 68,574 68,186
Notes: This table analyzes the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI,
on Chinese cross-border acquisitions. We report the point estimates from
logit estimations. PostBRI is a dummy that equals to 1 if the deal took
place in or after 2013. BRI is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the target
country is one of the 65 BRI countries (see Table 4.B1 in the Appendix for
the list of countries). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the target
firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The Chinese government announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and Made in
China 2025 in 2015, which both reinforce the Go Out policy from 2000. Do these policy
initiatives have a material impact on Chinese overseas acquisitions?
The initial aim of the Belt and Road Initiative is to improve trade, infrastructure, and
investment links between China and 65 countries in Central, South, and South East Asia,
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.16 We use a differences-in-differences (DiD)
approach to test whether the BRI has changed the regional focus of Chinese overseas
acquisitions. To do so, we construct a dummy PostBRI, which equals 1 if the cross-
16The list of BRI countries is provided in Table 4.B1 in the Appendix.
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border deal happened in or after 2013 and 0 otherwise. We also construct a dummy BRI,
which equals 1 if the target is located in one of the 65 BRI countries narrowly defining the
outreach of the BRI initiative according to the China International Trade Institute. The
interaction term between BRI and PostBRI measures the effect of BRI on the location
decisions of Chinese acquirers.
Column (1) of Table 4.7 shows that before 2013, Chinese acquirers were less likely
to pursue targets in BRI countries, as the estimated coefficient on BRI is negative and
statistically significant. For Chinese private acquirers, the Belt and Road Initiative fails
to encourage acquisitions in BRI countries since 2013, as the estimated coefficient on
BRI × PostBRI is insignificant in Column (2). In contrast, the estimated coefficient on
BRI × PostBRI is positive and statistically significant for Chinese state-owned acquirers
in Column (3). These results suggest that the BRI only influences the location choice of
cross-border M&As by Chinese SOEs.
Table 4.8: Made in China 2025 and Probability
of Chinese Acquisitions
Probability of being (1) (2) (3)
acquired by All CN CN Private CN SOE
PostCN2025 0.0116 -0.100 0.343
(0.299) (0.374) (0.484)
CN2025 -0.0166 0.0960 -0.185
(0.0868) (0.107) (0.148)
CN2025×PostCN2025 0.0815 -0.218 0.402*
(0.143) (0.198) (0.214)
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 62,353 61,723 61,373
Notes: This table analyzes the impact of the Made in China 2025 policy on
Chinese cross-border acquisitions. We report the point estimates from logit
estimations. P ostCN2025 is a dummy that equals to 1 if the deal took place
in or after 2015. CN2025 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the target
belongs to the industries defined in the Made in China 2025 strategy. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the target firm level.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Made in China 2025 announced in 2015, defines ten industries in which the Chi-
nese government wants Chinese companies to become globally competitive.17 One way
to reach that goal is through takeovers of foreign firms in these industries. To investi-
17These include new generation information technology, high-end computerized machines and robots,
space and aviation, maritime equipment and high-tech ships, advanced railway transportation equipment,
new energy and energy-saving vehicles, energy equipment, agricultural machines, new materials, and bio-
pharma and high-tech medical devices (Conrad et al.; 2016).
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gate whether the policy influences the industry focus of Chinese overseas acquisitions, we
again use a DiD estimator. We construct a dummy variable CN2025 that equals 1 for
targets active in industries that are related to the Made in China 2025 strategy. A second
dummy, PostCN2025, equals 1 for acquisitions since 2015. We then interact CN2015 with
PostCN2025 for the DiD estimations.
Table 4.8 reports the corresponding estimation results. There is no evidence that
Chinese acquisitions occurred more frequently in industries targeted by Made in China
2025 before 2015, relative to non-Chinese acquisitions. However, targets in these industries
become significantly more likely to be purchased by Chinese SOEs after the policy was
introduced. Again, the policy does not change the investment pattern of Chinese private
acquirers.
4.5.5 Comparison between Chinese and Non-Chinese State-Owned Ac-
quirers
An open question is whether Chinese SOEs are different from state-owned acquirers in other
countries. We identify 619 non-Chinese state-owned acquirers in our sample. However,
only for 522 of the basic country-level characteristics are available. We then run a logit
estimation where the dependent variable equals 1 if a target is acquired by a Chinese SOE,
and 0 if it is purchased by a non-Chinese SOE. We report the marginal effects based on
this estimation in Table 4.9. We use alternative specifications to control for year and
target-country fixed effects in the different columns.
Columns (1) and (2) consider target country characteristics that were previously found
to matter for Chinese state-owned acquirers. In Columns (3) and (4), we add three target
level characteristics: the indicator Industry diversity, the log of targets’ pre-acquisition
total assets, and ROA. These are the target firm characteristics we found to matter most
for Chinese SOEs compared to non-Chinese investors (see Section 5.3). This reduces the
sample size in the last two columns of Table 4.9, since we do not observe target-level
characteristics for many acquisitions by state-owned investors.
While the estimated marginal effects on some factors vary across teh different columns
due to changes in specifications and sample sizes, two robust results emerge: Chinese SOEs
are more likely to acquire larger targets and those with lower pre-deal profitability. These
patterns are consistent with previous findings when we use a broader set of non-Chinese
acquirers as the control group. The estimated marginal effects are generally larger in Table
4.9, relative to those in previous tables, since the sample size becomes much smaller and
the share of Chinese acquisitions increases. Relative to non-Chinese SOEs, Chinese state-
owned acquirers no longer appear to be particularly focused on seeking natural resources,
and there is only weak evidence in Column (3) that they are especially keen on industry
What Drives Chinese Overseas M&A Investment? Evidence From Micro Data 141
Table 4.9: Comparison between Chinese and Non-Chinese
State-Owned Acquirers
Probability of being
acquired by CN SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(GDPPC) -0.050 1.724** -0.063 1.365
(0.033) (0.714) (0.053) (1.300)
GDP growth -0.010 -0.030** -0.008 -0.021
(0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.026)
Distance -0.008 -2.592 -0.017 0.902
(0.007) (2.043) (0.015) (4.129)
Ln(Population) -0.052* -0.023 -0.040 -1.346
(0.027) (1.940) (0.053) (4.638)
Ln(Trade) 0.107*** -0.050 0.068 0.017
(0.027) (0.218) (0.051) (0.501)
Resource rents 0.027 0.941 -1.303 -11.382
(0.480) (2.669) (1.027) (12.552)
∆ Exchange rate -0.554** -0.670** -0.412 -0.382
(0.261) (0.294) (0.460) (0.564)
Industry Diversity 0.116** 0.054
(0.055) (0.060)




Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target country FEs Yes Yes
No. of observations 928 828 271 233
Notes: This table compares Chinese and non-Chinese state-owned acquirers. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a target is purchased by a Chinese SOE and 0 if
it is purchased by an SOE from other countries. We report the marginal effects from logit
estimations. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the target firm level. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
diversification. Our findings thus echo Karolyi and Liao (2017) that state-owned acquirers
in general are more oriented towards targets in resource-rich countries and aim to diversity
their industry portfolio. In these dimensions, Chinese SOEs are not different from other
SOE acquirers.
4.6 Do Chinese Acquirers Pay More?
In this section, we investigate whether Chinese acquirers pay different prices compared to
non-Chinese investors for targets with similar observable characteristics. The motivation
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for this analysis is the anecdotal evidence that Chinese acquirers, backed by cheap financing
from domestic banks or direct government subsidies, overpay relative to other investors to
win bids. As around 95% of target firms in our sample are unlisted, we do not observe
the share prices of target firms, which is the most common variable used in the literature
for pricing analyses. Instead, we calculate the variable Pricei,j,t which is the amount an
acquirer pays for 1% of the equity of target firm i in country j in year t.18 We then estimate
Equation (2) as follows:
lnPricei,j,t = β0 + β1CNi,j,t + β2lnEquityi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4Leveragei,t
+ β5Full ACi,j,t + β6Any Patenti,t + γZT Cj,t +Deal Y ear FE
+ Industry FE + Target country FE + εi,j,t.
(4.2)
In Equation (2), CN is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer of target firm i in country
j in year t is a Chinese firm. To differentiate between Chinese private and state-owned
acquirers, we include in some specifications a dummy CNprivi,j,t that equals 1 if the
acquirer is a Chinese private firm, and a second dummy CNSOEi,j,t that equals 1 if the
acquirer is a Chinese SOE. We include several target firm-level characteristics: ROA and
ln(Equity) are the average value of return on assets and the average book value of equity
over the three years prior to the deal;19 Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and short-
term loans as a ratio to total assets also averaged over the three years prior to the deal;
Full AC is a dummy variable indicating whether 100% of the target’s equity is acquired;
AnyPatent is a dummy indicating whether the target firm holds any patents. ZT Cj,t is a set
of target country-level controls. Furthermore, we control for industry and target-country
fixed effects and allow for different time fixed effects across specifications.
Table 4.10 shows the estimation results based on Equation (2). Larger ln(Equity) or
ROA increases the payment for the target among all types of acquirers. Similarly, investors
pay more to purchase targets with patents. Surprisingly, all types of acquirers tend to pay
more for highly-leveraged firms. This may reflect potential tax advantages associated with
debt or unobserved factors improving both borrowing capacity and value. These results
are robust throughout the different specifications shown in Table 4.10. Whether the deal
is a full acquisition has no significant impact on the prices paid for 1% of a target’s equity.
Controlling for these observable characteristics, we do not find any tendency of over-
payment by Chinese acquirers relative to non-Chinese investors as the estimated coefficient
on CN is not statistically significant across specifications. When we distinguish between
18This is to account for the fact that not all acquirers in our sample bought 100% of the target firm.
19We control for book equity value instead of total assets because acquirers purchase the equity of the
target firm, which is different from asset acquisition. Our results are robust to controlling for total assets
instead of equity.
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Table 4.10: Prices Paid for Targets by Chinese Acquirers
Dep. variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (P ricei,j,t)
CN 0.127 0.065 0.001 0.053
(0.095) (0.098) (0.110) (0.165)
CNpriv 0.084 0.002 -0.067 0.025
(0.137) (0.142) (0.157) (0.243)
CNSOE 0.164 0.119 0.060 0.077
(0.117) (0.125) (0.139) (0.213)
Ln(Equity) 0.742*** 0.742*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.736*** 0.735*** 0.758*** 0.758***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
ROA 0.289*** 0.289*** 0.252** 0.252** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.346*** 0.346***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.105) (0.105) (0.133) (0.133)
Leverage 1.182*** 1.182*** 1.190*** 1.189*** 1.126*** 1.125*** 1.212*** 1.211***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.099) (0.099) (0.135) (0.135)
Full AC 0.016 0.016 0.022 0.021 -0.059 -0.059 -0.131 -0.131
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.088) (0.088)
Any Patent 0.340*** 0.340*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.422*** 0.422***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.070) (0.070)
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes







No. of observations 5,166 5,166 5,159 5,159 5,131 5,131 3,350 3,350
Notes: This table analyzes whether the prices paid by Chinese acquirers are different those paid by non-Chinese investors. The dependent variable
P ricei,j,t is the natural logarithm of price paid for a 1% share of the target firm (in thousand EUR). CN is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer
is a Chinese firm. CNpriv is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese private firm, and CNSOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the
acquirer is a Chinese state-owned or state-controlled firm. ROA, Ln(Equity) and Leverage are the average value of return on assets, the natural
logarithm of the book value of equity and total debt in total assets over the three years prior to the deal. F ull AC is a dummy variable indicating
whether 100% of the target were acquired. Any P atent is a dummy indicating whether the target firm holds any patent. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the target firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Chinese SOEs and private investors, neither appears to pay more for similar targets as
compared to non-Chinese investors (Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 4.10). These
results question the view that Chinese investors systematically outbid others in the global
M&A market. One should also note that we do not find any systematic difference between
Chinese SOEs and non-Chinese acquirers, even though in particular the former might re-
ceive government subsidies and support in other forms. As a robustness test, we estimate
Equation (2) using acquisition prices instead of logarithms of prices as dependent variable.
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In these estimations we even find slightly lower prices paid by Chinese investors, confirming
the result that they do not overpay.20
4.7 What Are the Effects of Chinese Acquisitions on Target
Firms?
As last step of the analysis, this section investigates how a takeover by a Chinese company
affects the target firm and its employees. Again, the focus is on the question of whether
these effects differ from the changes triggered by a non-Chinese acquisition.
4.7.1 Empirical Approach
When estimating the effects of a Chinese acquisition, a simple OLS-estimation is likely
to yield biased results as the selection of targets by Chinese investors is endogenous. For
instance, the selection of targets is likely to depend on their pre-acquisition financial perfor-
mance. To address this issue, we use a differences-in-differences approach. The treatment
group consists of targets acquired by a Chinese company, and the control group comprises
targets acquired by non-Chinese investors. Following the approach of Wang and Wang
(2015), the dependent variable in all regressions is the accumulated change in the target
firm’s financial variables since the deal. Accordingly, only targets for which financial infor-
mation from pre- and post-deal periods is available are used for this analysis. This leaves
us with 14,243 targets that were acquired by non-Chinese companies and 351 targets with
Chinese acquirers. Most targets in this sample are from Europe. This is not surprising, as
a large share of acquisitions in the sample took place in Europe.
We focus on the effects of Chinese acquisitions on target firms’ labor and capital pro-
ductivity. We use turnover per employee and value-added per employee to proxy labor
productivity. Capital productivity is proxied by the ratio of turnover or value-added to
total assets. We also investigate changes in targets’ leverage, ROA, average cost of labor,
and the share of intangible assets in total assets. Summary statistics of these variables are
provided in Table 4.A4 of the Appendix.
The results presented in Section 5 suggest that targets of Chinese acquirers are different
in a number of dimensions as compared to other acquisition targets. Targets of Chinese
acquirers tend to be larger, have lower profitability and tend to have higher levels of debt
before acquisition. In the baseline OLS regressions, we therefore control for total assets,
return on assets, and leverage. We also control for the deal year. To account for the specific
industry distribution of Chinese acquisitions across industries, industry group dummies are
20The corresponding estimation results are reported in Table 4.C1 in the Appendix.
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added. We control for the target country characteristics that affect the probability of a
target being acquired by a Chinese firm as opposed to a non-Chinese investor (see Table
4.3).21 The estimation equation takes the following form:
∆Dep.V ari,j,t = β0 + β1CNi + µXT Fi,t + γZT Cj,t
+Deal Y ear FE + Industry FE + εi,j,t
(4.3)
where ∆Dep.V ari,j,t measures the relative performance of target firm i in country j in pe-
riod t. We run separate regressions for the acquisition year and each of the two subsequent
years.22 CN is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese firm. XT Fi,t
comprises the target firm controls and ZT Cj,t is a set of target country-level controls.
Since the differences-in-differences estimator crucially relies on the suitability of the
control group, we employ two re-weighting strategies to improve the comparability of the
treatment and control groups: entropy balancing (Hainmueller; 2012)23 and propensity
score matching. Entropy balancing re-weights observations in the control group such that
the distribution of a set of pre-specified covariates matches that of the treatment group.
The weights are chosen in a way that the balancing constraints are met, but remain as
close as possible to uniform weights. The weights are calibrated based on the variables used
as controls in the baseline OLS estimation, including target country-level and target firm-
level controls, industry and deal year dummies. Parts A and B of Table 4.A5 illustrate the
effects of the re-weighting based on entropy balancing.24 Part A of Table 4.A5 summarizes
the mean and variance for a number of variables in treatment and control group without
reweighting. As discussed above, on average, the leverage of target firms in the treatment
group is higher, while their return on assets is lower than for the control group. Firms in
the treatment group also tend to be larger in terms of total assets. The target country
characteristics are also distributed differently across treatment and control group. As
shown in Part B of Table 4.A5, the treatment and control groups become much more
comparable with respect to these parameters after re-weighting using entropy balancing.
To test the robustness of the estimation results, we use propensity score matching as a
21These include target countries’ GDP per capita, GDP growth, population, inflation, corporate income
tax rate, distance to and trade volume with China.
22As the coverage of the different dependent variables varies, individual samples are constructed for each
of them. To ensure that results are comparable across time, we only keep observations that we observe in
each of the three periods. For most dependent variables, the treatment group contains between 100 and
150 target firms.
23For the implementation of this approach, we rely on the Stata package described in Hainmueller and
Xu (2013).
24The re-weighting shown in Table 4.A5 reports the data used for the estimations on capital productivity
1 as an example. Results for the samples for all other dependent variables look very similar.
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second re-weighting strategy (see Abadie and Imbens 2016 on this approach). The propen-
sity score reflects the conditional probability of assignment into the treatment group. Here,
the propensity score is calculated using a logit regression based on the same independent
variables as described above. In a second step, all observations in the treatment group are
matched with three observations from the control group based on their propensity score.25
Part C of Table 4.A5 summarizes the effects of this re-weighting technique.
4.7.2 Results on Acquisition Effects
Table 4.11 summarizes the estimation results on the effects of a Chinese acquisition as
compared to an acquisition by an investor from another country. Each cell of Table 4.11
reports the treatment effect for an individual estimation. Columns (1) to (3) present
the results from the basic differences-in-differences estimation without re-weighting for the
acquisition year (Column (1)) and the two years following the acquisition (Columns (2) and
(3)). According to these estimations, the effects of an acquisition by a Chinese company
are similar to those of a non-Chinese acquisition in terms of labor productivity, leverage,
ROA, and the share of intangible assets. In contrast, both measures of capital productivity
are negatively affected by a Chinese acquisition in the acquisition year. This effect fades
out over the subsequent years. The treatment effect for the average compensation of
employees shows the opposite pattern. While there is no significant effect in the treatment
year and the first year after the acquisition, the respective coefficient is positive and highly
significant in the second year. On average, wages in firms bought by Chinese investors
grow by roughly 7,000 Euro over three years after acquisition compared to firms acquired
by other investors.
25We use nearest neighbor matching with three matches per observation in the control group. Using a























Table 4.11: Estimation Results on Acquisition Effects
Baseline OLS Entropy Balancing Propensity Score Matching



















Labor Productivity 1 -13.27 -16.93 65.46 -25.37 -24.81 44.54 1.431 -46.48 45.35
(25.42) (29.04) (60.73) (27.82) (32.08) (64.68) (26.96) (34.23) (63.27)
Labor Productivity 2 -0.004 4.326 6.579 -0.151 1.407 6.356 11.63 5.598 12.14
(16.23) (12.78) (13.28) (17.76) (13.22) (13.50) (18.27) (15.07) (15.23)
Capital Productivity 1 -0.177*** -0.046 -0.086 -0.177*** -0.012 -0.077 -0.160** 0.001 -0.065
(0.059) (0.080) (0.095) (0.061) (0.080) (0.097) (0.074) (0.092) (0.105)
Capital Productivity 2 -0.064*** -0.051* -0.055 -0.064*** -0.046* -0.060 -0.030 0.018 0.002
(0.025) (0.030) (0.041) (0.025) (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) (0.032) (0.040)
Leverage 0.004 0.045 0.025 -0.003 0.021 0.000 -0.011 0.031 0.004
(0.021) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027) (0.038) (0.040) (0.028) (0.038) (0.040)
Return on assets -0.031 -0.010 -0.007 -0.039 -0.021 -0.015 0.018 0.007 0.017
(0.036) (0.021) (0.025) (0.039) (0.035) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041)
Avg. Compensation of Employees 0.308 2.416 8.849** -0.599 2.181 7.513** -0.979 1.102 7.373*
(1.751) (2.304) (3.624) (2.033) (2.548) (3.766) (2.349) (2.644) (3.971)
Intangibles % 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.008
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Notes: This table summarizes the effects of Chinese cross-border acquisitions on target firms. We report the marginal effects of difference-in-difference estimations using simple OLS (Columns 1-3), entropy
balancing (Columns 4-6) and propensity score matching (Columns 7-9). Dependent variables are the differences in the respective variable between the pre-acquisition year and the year noted. The baseline OLS
estimations contain target firm-level controls (return on assets, ln(total assets), return on assets) and target country-level controls (GDPPC, GDP growth, Inflation, Population, Distance, Trade) and as well as
industry and deal year dummies. Entropy balancing and propensity score matching are based on the same variables. Standard errors are robust. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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The control groups for the estimations of Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.11 are re-
weighted using entropy balancing. The results from the corresponding estimations confirm
the findings of the baseline regressions in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4.11. Again, the
treatment effect is negative and statistically significant for both measures of capital pro-
ductivity immediately after the acquisition, while the coefficient on average compensation
of employees becomes positive and significant in the second year after the acquisition. The
negative effect on capital productivity seems to be due to an increase in assets shortly after
the acquisition. While turnover also increases after the acquisition, this sets in a little later
(see Table 4.C2 in the Appendix). In Columns (7) to (9) of Table 4.11, the control group
is constructed using propensity score matching. Results are similar but of slightly lower
statistical significance. This is mainly due to a smaller sample.
To check whether an acquisition by Chinese private firms and SOEs have different effects
on the targets, all estimations are also conducted including two different dummy variables
indicating whether a company is a Chinese private company or a Chinese SOE, similar to
the approach used in Section 4.6. About half of the treatment group was acquired by an
SOE. Table 4.C3 in the Appendix shows the results of the corresponding estimations for the
two measures of capital productivity, average compensation of employee and the share of
intangible assets.26 The negative short-run effect on capital productivity is similar between
Chinese private acquirers and SOEs. In contrast, the increase in average compensation of
employees is mainly driven by Chinese SOEs. Lastly, the effect on the share of intangible
assets differs between the two acquirer types. While the corresponding coefficient is positive
for Chinese private acquirers and statistically significant in the acquisition year and two
years after the acquisition, it is negative and insignificant for Chinese SOEs.
How can these findings be explained? There is anecdotal evidence that Chinese in-
vestors place a larger impact on the ‘footprint’ of their investment and less on profitability,
at least in the short term. This would be compatible with the observation that Chinese
investors inject more assets into target firms, even at the cost of declining capital produc-
tivity immediately after the acquisition. The fact that employee compensation is higher
than in targets firms bought by Chinese investors may have various explanations. More
investment in the target may raise the bargaining power of employees. It is also possible
that employees are more hostile towards takeovers by Chinese investors, especially Chinese
SOEs, than towards other investors. Given this, Chinese investors may decide to offer
higher salaries to get employees to cooperate or prevent them from leaving.
26For all other dependent variables from Table 4.11, all coefficients of CNpriv and CNSOE are not
statistically significant. The control group in the estimations shown in Table 4.C2 is re-weighted based on
entropy balancing.
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4.8 Conclusion
The growing importance of Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions in recent years
has given rise to a debate about the motivations and the likely impact of these investments.
In this debate, the idea is widespread that Chinese investors differ from other international
investors. This idea is related to the far reaching influence of the Chinese government on
economic activities of Chinese companies both domestically and abroad. A direct indicator
for this influence is the large number of SOEs, which also play an important role as acquirers
of foreign companies.
The aim of this paper is to investigate determinants, pricing, and effects of Chinese
cross-border acquisitions. First, regarding the question of target selection, our analysis
suggests that Chinese investment does indeed differ from investment coming from other
countries in several aspects. Our findings support the view that Chinese acquirers tend to
be less concerned about market size and economic risks of target countries. Instead, they
are more interested in factors like natural resources. Acquisitions by Chinese SOEs are
also significantly influenced by government policies like the Belt and Road Initiative and
Made in China 2025., With respect to target firm-level characteristics, we find that Chinese
companies acquire less profitable and more indebted targets. This suggests that Chinese
acquirers might have easier access to finance than other investors, which allows them to
pursue less cautious investment strategies. Alternatively, it may be the case that Chinese
acquirers are more optimistic about the improving targets’ post-acquisition performance,
have a longer time horizon or pursue objectives other than profitability, such as a large
‘footprint’ of investment. The latter seems plausible in particular for Chinese SOEs, where
the managers are often politicians who intend to pursue a career in politics.
Second, on the question of acquisition prices, we do not find that Chinese acquirers
pay higher prices than other investors for targets with comparable characteristics. This
contradicts the view that government support enables Chinese companies to outbid other
investors in the global M&A market.
Third, we have also analyzed the impact of a Chinese acquisition on the target firms.
In many dimensions, the effects of a Chinese acquisition are similar to those of non-Chinese
takeovers. However, we do find that the capital productivity of Chinese acquisition targets
declines in the short run, while average employee compensation gradually rises compared
to other targets. Thus, our results do not support the concern that a Chinese takeover
leads to lower wages for employees compared to other acquisitions.
Drawing policy conclusions from these findings is difficult though, for a number of
reasons. First, some of our findings are based on a small number of observations, mostly
because the increase in Chinese acquisitions abroad is a relatively recent phenomenon.
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The impact of takeovers by Chinese investors on target firms and target countries may
also only become more visible in the longer run, which would require a longer sample
period. Second, we are unable to investigate important issues such as technology transfer
due to data limitations. These questions should be addressed in future research.
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4.A Appendix: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 4.A1: Country-Level Control Variables
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. Dev
Ln(GDPPC) Ln of GDP per capita (USD) WDI 69,540 10.36 0.815
GDP growth GDP growth rate (%) WDI 69,540 2.24 2.65
Distance Population weighted dis-
tance to China (1000 km)
CEPII 71,783 8.87 2.42
Ln(Population) Ln of No. of inhabitants WDI 69,656 3.52 1.73
Ln(Trade) Ln of the sum of exports and
import in goods with China
(USD)
UN Comtrade 69,543 3.53 1.54
Inflation Annual inflation of con-
sumer prices (%)
WDI 68,306 2.49 3.03
Tax haven Dummy=1 if the target
country is defined as a
tax haven according to the
OECD (see Table A3 for the
list of countries)
OECD 72,056 0.028 0.164
Resource rents Share of resource rents in
GDP
WDI 63,653 0.021 0.020
∆Exchange rate Annual growth rate of target
country currency relative to
Chinese Yuan
WDI and own calculations 66,687 0.021 0.259
Political stability Measure for political stabil-
ity on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5
WGI 68,918 0.538 0.609
Regulatory quality Measure for regulatory qual-
ity on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5
WGI 68,894 1.284 0.633
Rule of law Measure for rule of law on a
scale from -2.5 to 2.5
WGI 68,917 1.287 0.750
Control of corruption Measure for control of cor-
ruption on a scale from -2.5
to 2.5
WGI 68,896 1.288 0.880
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Table 4.A2: Firm-Level Control Variables
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. Dev
Industry Diversity Dummy=1 if the target and
the acquirer are in different
industries
Orbis 58,385 0.543 0.498
Ln(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total
assets of the target firm
Orbis 21,999 8.51 2.12
ROA (Profit or loss before taxes)
/ Total assets
Orbis 21,907 0.027 0.339
Book equity Natural logarithm of Total
assets - (loans + long-term
debt)
Orbis and own calculation 23,589 71,019 806,934
Patents Number of patents the tar-
get firm holds as reported in
2017
Orbis 71,525 5.39 204.3
Any patent Dummy variable indicating
whether the target firm
holds any patent
Orbis 71,525 0.133 0.339
Leverage (Short-term loans + long
term debt) / Total assets
Orbis 18,591 0.313 6.91
Asset Growth Annual growth rate of total
assets
Orbis 23,783 14.04 1,114
Intangibles % Intangible fixed assets / To-
tal assets
Orbis 20,550 0.050 0.140
Notes: All variables are winsorized at the 1%-level.
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Table 4.A3: List of Tax Haven Countries
Andorra Gibraltar Netherlands Antilles
Anguilla Grenada Niue
Antigua and Barbuda Guernsey Panama
Aruba Isle of Man Samoa
The Bahama Jersey San Marino
Bahrain Liberia Seychelles
Bermuda Liechtenstein St. Lucia
Belize Malta St. Kitts & Nevis
British Virgin Islands Marshall Islands St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Cayman Islands Mauritius Turks & Caicos Islands




Table 4.A4: Variable Description and Summary Statistics for Effects Estimations
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. Dev
∆Labor Productivity 1 ∆ (Turnover / No. of Em-
ployees)
Orbis 7,273 21.24 276.7
∆Labor Productivity 2 ∆ (Added Value / No. of
Employees)
Orbis 4,918 12.97 145.1
∆Capital Productivity 1 ∆ (Turnover / Total assets) Orbis 10,226 0.012 0.941
∆Capital Productivity 2 ∆ (Added Value / Total as-
sets)
Orbis 6,308 -0.012 0.342
∆Leverage ∆ ( (Short-term loans +
long term debt) / Total as-
sets )
Orbis 10,389 -0.020 0.213
∆ROA ∆ ( (Profit / loss before
taxes) / Total assets)
Orbis 11,078 -0.018 0.387
∆Average Cost of Employees ∆ (Total compensation of
employees / No. of employ-
ees)
Orbis 6,595 2.57 19.14
∆Intangibles % ∆ (Intangible fixes assets /
total assets)
Orbis 10,977 -0.004 0.058
Notes: All information on the number of observations, mean and standard deviation of variables refer to the difference between the
pre-acquisition year and the acquisition year. All variables are winsorized at the 1%-level.
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Table 4.A5: Reweighting
Treatment Control
Variable Mean Variance Mean Variance
Part A: Without weighting
Leverage 0.295 0.195 0.203 0.093
ROA -0.050 0.142 0.037 0.094
Ln(Total Assets) 9.813 4.403 8.794 3.926
GDPPC 32,593 2.95E+08 33,677 4.94E+08
GDP growth 1.956 5.56 1.695 11.16
Inflation 2.189 5.197 3.062 18.81
Population 47.66 2,135 51.56 10,773
Distance 7,634 5.40E+06 3,482 1.31E+07
Trade 99.32 5,410 83.79 1,868
CIT rate 26.49 43.53 26.02 45.05
Part B: After re-weighting based on entropy balancing
Leverage 0.295 0.195 0.294 0.194
ROA -0.050 0.142 -0.050 0.142
Ln(Total Assets) 9.813 4.403 9.788 4.392
GDPPC 32,593 2.95E+08 32,509 2.94E+08
GDP growth 1.956 5.556 1.951 5.542
Inflation 2.189 5.197 2.184 5.189
Population 47.66 2,135 47.54 2,130
Distance 7,634 5.40E+06 7,615 5.39E+06
Trade 99.32 5,410 99.07 5,396
CIT rate 26.49 43.53 26.42 43.43
Part C: After re-weighting based on propensity score matching
Leverage 0.295 0.195 0.252 0.117
ROA -0.050 0.142 -0.048 0.173
Ln(Total Assets) 9.813 4.403 9.553 4.263
GDPPC 32,593 2.95E+08 29,645 3.29E+08
GDP growth 1.956 5.556 2.064 6.584
Inflation 2.189 5.197 2.254 5.080
Population 47.66 2,135 52.70 10,262
Distance 7,634 5.40E+06 8,065 1.67E+7
Trade 99.32 5,410 94.99 4,293
CIT rate 26.49 43.53 26.51 49.62
Notes: All variables as in the year before the acquisition. In addition to the variables reported
here, reweighting is also based on deal year and industry. The samples shown here are used for
the estimations on capital productivity 1, but look very similar for the other estimations on the
effects of Chinese acquisitions. The unweighted sample shown here contains 113 treated units
and 6,083 control units. Apart from the variables listed here, re-weighting is also based on deal
year and industry. For Part C, nearest neighbor matching with three matches per observation
in the control group is used.
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4.B Appendix: The Belt and Road Initiative
Table 4.B1: Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative
Region Countries
East Asia China, Mongolia
South East Asia Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Middle East and North Africa Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Europe Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, North Macedonia, Georgia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine
Source: Steer Davies Gleave (2018).
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4.C Appendix: Additional Estimations
Table 4.C1: Prices Paid for Targets by Chinese Acquirers - Using the Level of Prices as the Dependent
Variable
Dep. variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P ricei,j,t
CN -2424.5* -2203.6 -2960.9** 0.053
(1417.9) (1523.2) (1474.8) (0.165)
CNpriv -4653.2** -4218.2** -5013.6** -5116.8*
(1997.4) (1973.6) (2362.1) (2982.7)
CNSOE -535.9 -511.0 -1228.7 -2104.9
(1535.7) (1821.9) (1291.0) (1698.1)
Ln(Equity) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ROA 3463.6*** 3463.3*** 2793.1*** 2788.6*** 3757.7*** 3760.8*** 4846.7*** 4867.7***
(926.7) (926.5) (751.1) (750.9) (1066.5) (1066.2) (1507.1) (1509.4)
Leverage 3908.2*** 3879.6*** 3619.3*** 3587.9*** 3740.5*** 3714.8*** 3275.3** 3260.3**
(1123.5) (1121.6) (1113.4) (1112.8) (1077.1) (1073.5) (1655.4) (1654.7)
Full AC 306.1 291.0 670.9 646.6 -106.0 -119.0 54.4 32.6
(396.6) (396.4) (411.3) (411.2) (422.1) (421.3) (783.4) (784.8)
Any Patent 728.1 719.5 1034.2 1026.3 1199.5** 1188.7** 1730.3* 1729.7*
(621.8) (620.4) (682.2) (680.9) (571.6) (570.9) (975.3) (974.2)
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes







No. of observations 5,315 5,315 5,307 5,307 5,288 5,288 3,485 3,485
Notes: This table analyzes whether the pricing of targets by Chinese acquirers is different from non-Chinese investors. The dependent variable P ricei,j,t
is what the acquirer paid for a 1% share of the target firm (in thousand EUR). CN is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese firm. CNpriv
is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese private firm, and CNSOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese state-owned or
state-controlled firm. ROA, Ln(Equity) and Leverage are the average value of return on assets, the natural logarithm of the book value of equity and total
debt in total assets over the three years prior to the deal. F ullAC is a dummy variable indicating whether 100% of the target were acquired. AnyP atent is
a dummy indicating whether the target firm holds any patent. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the target firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 4.C2: Acquisition Effects of Chinese Acquirers
Dep. variable Total Assets Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acquisition One year Two years Acquisition One year Two years
Year after after Year after after
CN 0.303* 0.121 0.108 0.277 0.376* 0.150
(0.161) (0.080) (0.069) (0.243) (0.211) (0.136)
Notes: This table contains estimation results on acquisition affects for Chinese companies using a difference-in differences
approach. Dependent variable is the difference in the growth rate between treatment and control group in the respective
variable. CN is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese firm. The control group is re-weighted using entropy
balancing based on target firm characteristics (return on assets, ln(total assets), return on assets and industry group) and























Table 4.C3: Acquisition Effects of Chinese Private Firms and SOEs
Dep.
variable
Capital Productivity 1 Capital Productivity 2 Av. CoE Intangibles %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Acquisition One year Two years Acquisition One year Two years Acquisition One year Two years Acquisition One year Two years
Year after after Year after after Year after after Year after after
CNpriv -0.215** -0.054 -0.244 -0.065* -0.021 -0.086 -2.371 0.66 1.383 0.013* 0.0137 0.018*
(0.098) (0.154) (0.185) (0.038) (0.039) (0.060) (2.713) (3.492) (5.186) (0.007) (0.00835) (0.010)
CNSOE -0.146** 0.023 0.060 -0.063** -0.062* -0.042 1.122 3.657 13.46*** -0.008 -0.010 -0.0132








Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table contains estimation results on acquisition affects for Chinese private firms and SOEs. CNSOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the acquirer is a Chinese state-owned or state-controlled firm. The control
group is re-weighted using entropy balancing. Standard errors are robust. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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